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!
Abstract !!
The fundamental distinction made in Shiite legal epistemology is that between 
qaṭʿ (certainty) and ẓann (conjecture). Contemporary Uṣūlī epistemology 
maintains that in the juristic process of the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, a 
mujtahid is prohibited to use any evidence that gives rise to mere ẓann. Rather, 
he must only use evidence that gives qaṭʿ of Sharīʿa precepts. Furthermore, this 
discourse distinctly argues that a mujtahid can also derive knowledge of 
Sharīʿa precepts through the ẓann al-khāṣ (especial conjecture) that is 
emanated from evidence that is ẓannī (conjectural) by nature but is 
substantiated by the Divine Lawgiver Himself through other qaṭʿī (certainty-
bearing) evidence. This understanding effectively curtails the derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts to only the textual evidence of the Qurʾān and sunna, and in 
the present day this textualist dependency can be criticised for contributing 
towards the gulf that exists between traditional Shiite jurisprudence and 
matters that are pertinent to contemporary societies. 
 
In light of this, this study critically analyses the contemporary discourse of 
Uṣūlī epistemology and explores whether it has the potential to legitimise the 
epistemic validity and utility of a wider range of evidence in the juristic 
process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts. It essentially focuses on the strength and 
rigour of the epistemological underpinnings that are maintained in Uṣūlī legal 
theory, and by highlighting that these underpinnings and the underlying 
epistemic assumptions that are prevalent in contemporary Uṣūlī legal 
epistemology are rationally derived, this study explains how and why the 
Uṣūlīs have been led to rationally give preference to textual evidence over non-
textual evidence.  This study concludes that Uṣūlī legal theory has the potential 
to, and moreover is required to, undergo an epistemological paradigm shift that 
permits the acceptance of the epistemic validity of a wider range of evidence, 
other than just those that emanate qaṭʿ or ẓann al-khāṣ.! !
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Introduction 
 
 
In the Twelver (Ithnāʿasharī) Imāmī Shiite1 jurisprudential discourse, aḥkām 
al-Sharīʿa are described as aḥkām (literally: rules) that are commanded or 
prescribed by God or the Shāriʿ (the Divine Lawgiver, or more accurately the 
One who commands or prescribes the Sharīʿa2), which necessitate order and 
regulation. These rules lay down instructions that direct proper conduct in all 
spheres of a human beings life, insomuch that following and acting in 
accordance with them can guide and lead one to prosperity and perfection, in 
both an individual capacity and a social-communal capacity3. In light of this 
description, the most fitting explanation of aḥkām al-Sharīʿa (or Sharīʿa 
precepts4) is that they are “divinely revealed precepts.” 
 
Despite claiming that Sharīʿa precepts direct humanity as a whole towards 
perfection, the Shiite jurisprudential discourse maintains that the mukallaf, who 
is an individual that is endowed with the responsibility (taklīf) of enacting 
Sharīʿa precepts, is a person who accepts the religion of Islam and abides by its 
fundamental theological tenants. Mukallaf is thus a general term that refers to 
an individual who either belongs to the laity, or one who is recognised as a 
mujtahid. The difference between a  mukallaf and a mujtahid is that the latter is 
someone who performs ijtihād, inasmuch as he “strives” and “exhorts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Henceforth referred to as Shiite. 
2 Henceforth the Shāriʿ will be referred to as the Divine Lawgiver. 
3 See Al-Faḍlī, ʿAbd al-Hādī. Mabādī al-uṣūl, (Qum: Maṭbūʿāt Dīnī, 1967) pp. 7-8 
4 Henceforth referred to as Sharīʿa precepts. 
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maximum effort” in the pursuit to gain the required ability to derive or 
extrapolate Sharīʿa precepts from evidence (dalīl) that indicate them. In 
contrast, the former is someone who has not committed himself to such a task, 
but instead is required to merely follow or imitate (taqlīd) the fiqh 
(jurisprudence or the corpus of derived Sharīʿa precepts) of a mujtahid. 
 
The hermeneutic methodology, or the systematic framework of interpretation, 
that is employed by a mujtahid to derive fiqh, or Sharīʿa precepts, is provided 
in the discourse of uṣūl al-fiqh (legal theory). It is technically described in the 
contemporary Shiite jurisprudential discourse that the core function of uṣūl al-
fiqh is to provide an acute study of the general rules (qawāʿid) of inference or 
extrapolation (istinbāṭ) that are applied by a mujtahid in the juristic procedure 
of deriving Sharīʿa precepts from the evidence that give knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts5.  
 
One of the major concerns of Shiite legal theory is regarding the epistemic 
validity (ḥujjiyya) of “dalīl” or “evidence” that indicates upon and reveals 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. As a result, it is found that the mainstream 
Shiite jurisprudential discourse, which in the present day is more accurately 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See Muẓaffar, al-Shaykh Muḥammad Riḍā, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 2 edn. 2 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassabsa 
al-ʿilmī li-l Maṭbūʿāt, 1990) vol. 1, p. 5; Faḍlī, Mabādī al-uṣūl, p. 5; Instead of defining uṣūl 
al-fiqh as the study of general principles, Ṣadr defines the discourse of uṣūl al-fiqh as a 
discipline that studies the comment elements (ʿanāṣir al-mushtarika) that are utilised by a 
mujtahid in the process of derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. It must be noted that there is no 
difference between general principles and common elements. See Al-Ṣadr, Sayyid Muḥammad 
Bāqir, al-Durūs fi ʿilm al-uṣūl, 2 vols. (Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashar al-Islāmī, 2006) vol. 1, pp. 
42-43 
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recognised as the Uṣūlī discourse, primarily maintains a four-fold 
categorisation of evidence that it deems as being epistemologically valid 
(ḥujja). This evidence includes the textual sources of the Qurʾān and sunna 
(tradition of the Prophet and the impeccable (maʿṣūm) Imams6) and the non-
textual sources of ijmāʿ (consensus) and ʿaql (reason). However, the term dalīl 
is not only restricted to the independent sources of Sharīʿa precepts, but it also 
refers to the hermeneutical methods that are used to interpret and understand 
the aforementioned independent sources. Therefore, alongside discussing the 
epistemic validity of the four-fold categorisation of evidence, Uṣūlī legal 
theory also considers the epistemic validity of hermeneutical methods, whose 
application they accept as leading to indicate and reveal knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts. 
 
Nevertheless, in the present day, numerous Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers 
have criticised the traditional Muslim jurisprudential discourse for 
indiscriminately relying upon a textualist derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, insofar 
as it restricts their derivation to only those evidence that have directly been 
revealed by the Divine Lawgiver, such as the sources of the Qurʾān or sunna7. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 In the Shiite tradition, the impeccable Imams are the selected decedents of the Prophet who 
are theologically accepted to be the divinely appointed successors of the Prophet, and hence 
succeed him in every aspect, which includes being the source of knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts. It must be noted that in the Shiite jurisprudential discourse, both the Prophet and the 
Imams are commonly referred to using the term al-maʿṣūm (the impeccable). Henceforth, the 
term maʿṣūm will include both the Prophet and the Imams who have been appointed by the 
Divine Lawgiver as His representatives. 
7 For the textual dependency that is maintained in the Muslim tradition see Weiss, Bernard G. 
The Spirit of Islamic Law, (Athens Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1998) pp. 38-66; also see 
Hallaq, Wael B, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An introduction to Sunni uṣūl al-fiqh, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 207-255 
!!! 11!
It is clear that this textualist dependency has evidently led to, or at least is 
unable to solve, numerous challenges that are faced by Muslims in the present 
day. An immediate example of a major issue concerning Muslims living in the 
modern world is the apparent differences that exist between Muslim law8 and 
the derived Sharīʿa precepts, and the modern, or what at times is described as 
the “Western” discourse of Human Rights. Although the subject of Human 
Rights is itself not free from criticism9, there is no doubt that certain Sharīʿa 
precepts have been derived that directly conflict it, particularly those that 
concern the rights of women and the rights of non-Muslims10. As a result of 
such incompatibilities, Muslims living in contemporary societies – especially 
those societies that strictly adhere to the universal declaration of human rights - 
face the challenge of having to choose to either follow and act in accordance 
with the norms that are set by society, or to follow and act in accordance with 
the precepts/norms that are set by their religion.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Please note that the term Muslim law is commonly used synonymously with the term Islamic 
law. The term “Islamic” usually connotes something that is directly revealed by the Divine 
Lawgiver. It will become apparent from this research that although the Divine Lawgiver 
directly reveals law, since in the modern context law is derived and interpreted by Muslims – 
or more specifically Muslim mujtahids – the term “Muslim law” is more appropriate, as it 
takes into account the fallibility of Muslim mujtahids, and hence the fallibility of the derived 
Muslim law or Sharīʿa precepts. In essence, the term “Muslim law” recognises the fallibility of 
the derived law, whereas the term “Islamic law” does not. 
9 For criticisms against the modern discourse of Human Rights, see Ignatieff, Michael “The 
Attack on Human Rights,” Foreign Affairs, 80.6 (2011) pp. 102-116; regarding how the 
modern discourse of human rights has been criticised to be incompatible with the Muslim 
tradition, see An-Naʿim, Abdullahi Ahmed. Toward an Islamic Reformation; Civil Liberties, 
Human Rights and International Law, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p. 162; 
Bennett, C, Muslims and modernity: an introduction to the issues and debates (London: 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005), p. 65; regarding the critique on how the 
philosophical foundations of the modern discourse of human rights are western and 
Eurocentric in nature, see Almond, B “Rights” in Peter Singer (ed.) A Companion to Ethics, 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1993), pp. 259-269 
10 See An-Naʿim, Towards an Islamic Reformation, p. 11 
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An immediate example of a direct conflict between the textualist derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts and the discourse of Human Rights is with regards to the 
traditional Islamic/Muslim law of apostasy (irtidād). An apostate (murtadd) is 
defined as a Muslim – either by birth or by conversion – who renounces Islam, 
irrespective of whether or not he subsequently embraces another faith. The 
punishment given to the apostate is the death penalty11, and Muslim jurists 
have categorised this punishment as a ḥadd (fixed) punishment, inasmuch as 
they claim that God Himself has predetermined the punishment for the 
apostate, and it is the responsibility of the sovereign to execute it12. Apart from 
being given the death penalty, the apostate also does not have the right to 
inherit, even from those whose co-religionist he has become. Moreover, in the 
case of apostasy of one or both partners who are married, their marriage 
contract expires immediately without any need for judicial intervention13. 
Regarding the practical application of the Sharīʿa precepts concerning apostasy 
in modern civil law, Rudolph Peters and Gert J. J.  De Vries point out that: 
 
There is no evidence that apostates are still being put to death in Islamic 
countries. Though in Saudi Arabia the Sharīʿah is officially still in 
force, no contemporary case of executions or apostates have been 
reported, which may be due to the fact that apostasy does not occur… !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 It must be noted that Shiite law forbids that a female apostate should be executed by the 
death penalty, instead Shiite mujtahids have claimed that she should be imposed with solitary 
confinement during which she should be beaten during the hours of prayer (ṣalāt). See ibid 
12 See Īrwānī, Shaykh Bāqir, Durūs Tamhīdiyya fi-l Fiqh al-Istidlālī, 3 edn. 4 vols. (Qum: al-
Markaz al-ʿĀlimī  li-l Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya) vol. 4, pp. 203-234 
13 See Peters, Rudolph and Gert J. J. De Vries “Apostasy in Islam” in Die Welt des Islams 17.1 
(1976-1977) pp. 1-25 
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In this century, some isolated instances have been recorded in 
Afghanistan. In 1903 and 1925, Moslems who converted to 
Aḥmadiyyah were condemned to be stoned to death. Recently, a curious 
trial was held in Morocco. On December 14th 1962, the criminal court 
of Nador condemned some schoolteacher who had been converted to 
Bahāʾiyyah, to death on the accusation of rebellion, formation of 
criminal bands and disturbance of religious practices. 
 
There is no doubt that the ḥadd punishment for apostasy and its praxis in civil 
law opposes Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights14, which 
states: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
and observance.15 
The worldly ḥadd punishment for – or the Sharīʿa precepts regarding - 
apostasy has been derived from the apparent indication of the textual evidence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Other than Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the law of apostasy also 
opposes Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and 
the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based 
on Religion and Belief. See Garces, Nicholas “Islam till death do you part: rethinking apostasy 
laws under Islamic law and international legal obligations”, Southwestern Journal of Islamic 
Law 16 (2010) pp. 229-263!
15 See “The Universal Declaration of Human Right” at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18  
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of the sunna of the maʿṣūm. Thus, in essence it appears that at times the 
traditional textualist dependency maintained in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa 
precepts can be criticised for being in direct conflict with norms that, at least in 
theory, are universally accepted. 
 
In response to these criticisms, contemporary Muslim thinkers have 
categorically argued that the Muslim jurisprudential discourse is required, and 
has the potential, to evolve and bridge the apparent gulf that exists between it 
and the issues it faces in the contemporary world16. In essence, it is apparent 
from the extensive literature of contemporary Muslim thinkers that there is a 
strong emphasis on introducing the utility of a wider range of evidence that has 
not traditionally been accepted within the bounds of Muslim legal theory, 
particularly within the discourse of Shiite legal theory. They argue that other 
than the traditional four-fold categorisation of sources and hermeneutical 
methods, knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts can also be acquired from, or in 
conjunction with, other independent sources such as maṣlaḥa (public interest), 
istiḥsān (juristic preference), ijmāʿ (consensus), ʿurf (social custom) etc. It is 
further arguable that knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts can also be acquired from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 For the contemporary Muslim thought, see ibid; Arkoun, Mohammad. “Rethinking Islam 
Today” in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 588 (2003) 
pp.18-39; El-Fadl Khaled Abou. “The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam” edited 
version of an article presented in Runzo, J and Martin, N et al (ed.) Human Rights and 
Responsibilities (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002); Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal 
Theories; Johnston, David.  “A Turn in the Epistemology and Hermeneutics of Twentieth 
Century uṣūl al-fiqh” Islamic Law and Society 11.2. pp. 233-282; Rahman, Fazlur. Islam and 
Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982); Kerr, Malcolm H. Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad 
ʿAbduh and Rāshid Riḍā (Berkeley: University of California, 1966) 
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the findings of the contemporary discourses of natural science and social 
science, and thus these findings may also be used as independent sources in the 
juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. Other than extending the number of 
independent sources, contemporary Muslim thinkers have also called for the 
utility of numerous new hermeneutical methods. For example, rather than 
relying solely upon the traditional acceptance of the hermeneutical primacy of 
apparent meaning (aṣālat al-ẓuhūr), which is criticised for leading to a 
literalistic interpretation of the textual sources of Sharīʿa precepts, there exists 
a necessity to also undertake a contextual reading of the textual sources, in 
order to arrive at a more accurate derivation of Sharīʿa precepts that meet 
contemporary demands17.  
 
Therefore, the central tenet of contemporary Muslim thought is its significant 
reliance on non-textual or rational evidence. However, since it has mainly 
operated within the bounds of the mainstream Sunni tradition, its proposed 
theories have been severely criticised for not adhering to the traditional Sunni 
theological affiliation with the Ashʿarite thought. One of the fundamental 
doctrines promoted by Ashʿarite theology is that human intellect, or reason 
(ʿaql), is oblivious to the knowledge of moral truths, rather it expounds that 
such knowledge is only known by God, as He is the One who postulates the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 For instance, the “maqāsidī” theory proposed by Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388), see Al-
Raysuni, Ahmad. Imam al-Shatibi’s Theory of the Higher Objective and Intents of Islamic Law 
(Virginia: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005); or Fazlur Rahman’s (d. 
1408/1988) “double movement theory” see Rahman, Islam and Modernity, p. 20; or An-
Naʿim’s theory of reversing the traditional principle of abrogation (naskh), see An-Naʿim, 
Abdullahi Ahmed. “The Islamic Counter-Reformation” in New Perspective Quarterly 19.1, 
(2002) pp. 29-35 
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moral value of either “praiseworthiness” (ḥusn) or “blameworthiness” (qubḥ) 
to each individual action. Consequently, knowledge of the moral values of 
actions, or more specifically knowledge of the morality that is promoted by 
Sharīʿa precepts, can only be acquired through what He reveals. Ashʿarite 
theology concludes that knowledge of moral truths, or Sharīʿa precepts, can 
only be known through the textual evidence of the Qurʾān and sunna18, and as 
a result by significantly relying upon non-textual and rational evidence, the 
contemporary Muslim thought is indeed inconsistent with the fundamental 
theological tenets of the mainstream Sunni tradition. 
 
In contrast to the Sunni tradition, the Shiite tradition holds a theological 
affinity with the Muʿtazilite thought. Unlike the Ashʿarites, Muʿtazilite 
theology upholds the fundamental doctrine that human intellect or reason is 
able to ascertain moral truths without the aid of Divine revelation19, and it 
maintains the rational ineligibility of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness 
(al-ḥusn wa-l qubḥ ʿaqlī) of actions. Due to their theological appreciation of 
God’s justice (ʿadl), the Shiite and the Muʿtazilite are collectively referred to 
as the ʿAdliyya (literally: the people of justice). For example, they argue that 
the act of “giving alms” is recognised as praiseworthy not because its moral !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 For further discussion on the impact of the Ashʿarite theological thought on the mainstream 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, see Johnston, “Turn in the Epistemology and Hermeneutics of 
Twentieth Century Uṣūl al-Fiqh,” p. 257; Hourani, George F. “Ethics In Medieval Islam: A 
Conspectus” in Hourani, George F (ed.) Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science (New 
York: New York University Press, 1975) pp. 128-135; Hourani, George F. Reason and 
Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 57-66; El-
Affendi, Abdelwahab. “Islamic Theology” in Craig, Edward and Leaman, Oliver (ed.) Islamic 
Philosophy (UK: Routledge, 1998) vol. 5 pp. 25-31 
19 For a thorough examination of the difference between the Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite 
theological doctrines and theory, see Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics 
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property of praiseworthiness has been postulated by the Divine Lawgiver, but 
because reason independently judges and ascertains that the act of giving alms 
has the intrinsic moral property of praiseworthiness.  
 
In line with the ʿAdliyya theological thought20, it can evidently be seen that the 
Shiite jurisprudential discourse does not contain any theological constraints 
that make it unable to accept the epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) of a wider range 
of non-textual or rational evidence. In fact, it is due to the ʿAdliyya thought that 
the Shiites have categorically accepted ʿaql as independent evidence in the 
four-fold categorisation of evidence. Nonetheless, despite this, it is found that 
in practice the Shiite jurisprudential discourse, like the Sunni jurisprudential 
discourse, displays a preference towards the utilisation of textual evidence over 
non-textual evidence. In his overall analysis of the textualist dependency 
promoted in the Muslim jurisprudence, Weiss summarises: 
 
Had God so chosen, He could have let humans depend entirely on 
reason as the instrument of access to the law. But this in fact has not 
been the divine plan. Rather, God has chosen to reveal His law through 
the Prophet (and, for Shiʿis, through the Imams). This being the case, it 
is the first responsibility of every jurist seeking to formulate law to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 For the analysis of ʿAdliyya theological doctrine, see Sobhani, Jaʿfar. Doctrines of Shīʿī 
Islam: A Compendium of Imami Beliefs and Practices (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001) pp. 50-51; 
Ḥillī, ʿAllāma. Kashf al-murād fi sharḥ tajrīd al-iʾtiqād: Qism al-Ilahiyyāt, (Beirut: Dār al-
Amira, 2006), pp. 56-62; For the specific impact of the ʿAdliyya thought on the discourse of 
Shiite legal theory, see Gleave, Robert. Inevitable Doubt: Two Theories of Shīʿī Jurisprudence 
(Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 183-188 
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explore the foundational texts to the best of his ability. To the extent 
that human reason has a role, it is a strictly subordinate one. 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a Shiʿi jurist of recent times, has in fact 
gone so far as to say that reason is a potential source of law rather than 
an actual one. Sadr claimed that whilst reason has in principle the 
ability to discover the law on its own, this has never happened nor need 
ever happen, given the existence of the Qurʾan and the Sunna, for 
whatever reason might discover would in any case be bound in the 
foundational texts21. 
 
This statement establishes that in the Shiite tradition, the independent role of 
reason, or for that matter any rational evidence, has always been dominated by 
the apparent indication of textual evidence 22 . The reason why juristic 
preference is given to textual evidence over non-textual evidence is critically 
discussed in Shiite legal theory, and indeed one of the most prominent 
discussions within this discourse is on the subject matter of legal epistemology. 
The primary function of legal epistemology is to examine how a mujtahid may 
acquire and comprehend knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts that exist in the wāqiʿī 
(objective reality) or in the Mind of the Divine Lawgiver. Accordingly, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law, p. 39 
22 For a thorough evaluation of how the role of reason (ʿaql) as an independent source of 
Sharīʿa precepts has been reduced in Shiite legal theory despite the Shiite acceptance of the 
ʿAdliyya thought, see Bhojani, Ali-Reza. Moral Rationalism and Independent Rationality as a 
Source of Sharīʿa in Shīʿī Uṣūl al-Fiqh: In Search for an ʿAdliyya Reading of Sharīʿa 
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Durham, 2013) 
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ḥujjiyya (epistemic validity) of evidence that indicate Sharīʿa precepts is 
evaluated.  
 
The fundamental distinction made in Shiite legal epistemology is that between 
qaṭʿ (certainty) and ẓann (conjecture). Contemporary Uṣūlī epistemology 
maintains that in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts, a mujtahid is 
prohibited to use any evidence that gives rise to mere ẓann of Sharīʿa precepts. 
Rather, he must only use evidence that gives qaṭʿ. A distinct feature of this 
discourse is that it further argues that a mujtahid can also derive knowledge of 
Sharīʿa precepts through ẓann al-khāṣ (especial conjecture) that is emanated 
from those evidence that are ẓannī (conjectural) by nature but are substantiated 
by the Divine Lawgiver Himself through other qaṭʿī (certainty-bearing) 
evidence.  
 
In light of this, this research seeks to critically analyse the contemporary 
discourse of Uṣūlī epistemology and explore whether it has the potential to 
legitimise the epistemic validity and utility of a wider range of evidence in the 
juristic process of the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. Rather than evaluating 
how contemporary Uṣūlīs have argued for, or rejected, the epistemic validity of 
each evidence that is available, this research will essentially focus on the 
strength and rigour of the epistemological underpinnings that are currently 
maintained in Uṣūlī legal theory. By highlighting that the epistemological 
underpinnings and underlying epistemic assumptions that are prevalent in the 
contemporary Uṣūlī discourse of legal epistemology are rationally derived, this 
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research will explain how the Uṣūlīs have been led to rationally give 
preference to textual evidence over non-textual evidence. In effect, a critical 
evaluation of the key epistemological underpinnings will enable us to conclude 
whether the discourse of Uṣūlī legal theory requires, or has the potential to, 
undergo an epistemological paradigm shift, which will permit it to accept the 
epistemic validity of a wider range of evidence, other than just those that 
emanate qaṭʿ or ẓann al-khāṣ in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
Apart from the fact that the Shiite jurisprudential discourse contains no 
theological restraints in accepting a wider range of evidence due to its 
theological affiliation with the ʿAdliyya thought, this research has chosen to 
specifically focus on the contemporary Uṣūlī discourse because the 
contemporary Uṣūlī texts of legal theory are studied as core texts in present day 
traditional Shiite religious seminaries (ḥawza)23. Furthermore, by taking an 
“insider” perspective as someone who not only belongs to the Shiite tradition, 
but has also completed the seminary studies and extensively studied the 
contemporary texts of uṣūl al-fiqh, I maintain the belief that a critical 
evaluation of the discourse of contemporary Uṣūlī legal theory, or more 
particularly Uṣūlī epistemology, will not only potentially legitimise the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 For more information on the Shiite religious seminaries, together with the information on the 
core curricula that are taught, see Litvak, M. “Madrasa and Learning in Nineteenth-Century 
Najaf and Karbalāʾ” in Brunner, R et al (ed.) The Twelver Shia in the Modern Times: Religious 
Culture and Political History (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 58-79; Stewart, Devin J. “The Portrayal 
of the Academic Rivalry: Najaf and Qum in the Writings and Speeches of Khomeini, 1964-78” 
in Walbridge, Linda S (ed.) The Most Learned of the Shiʿa: The Institutions of the Marjaʿ 
Taqlid (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 216-230; Mallat, Chibli. “Archetypes 
of Shi’i law” in The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi’i 
international (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 29-58 
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epistemic validity of a wider range of evidence, but can also lead to a 
normative egalitarian derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. I propose that the most 
comprehensive way in which this can be achieved is by employing the 
philological and analytical method that is set forth within the discourse of uṣūl 
al-fiqh itself. The Uṣūlī method consists of textual analysis that builds on, and 
argues for, the set paradigms within the jurisprudential discourse, and it uses 
normative argumentation from both textual and non-textual sources that is 
consistent with the overall Uṣūlī theological or religious framework. 
 
A large number of texts dedicated to Islamic legal studies have debated the 
exact role and function that uṣūl al-fiqh has historically played in the derivation 
and interpretation of Sharīʿa precepts. Traditionally, uṣūl al-fiqh had been 
described as providing the general rules that must be adhered to in the juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, however it has since emerged as an independent 
discipline subsequent to the development of the discipline of fiqh. As such, 
some have rendered its function and relevance to be merely nominal24, arguing 
that its primary purpose was to just systematically justify and defend the pre-
occurring Sharīʿa precepts found in the early works of fiqh and within 
prominent social practices of Muslim societies25. Meanwhile, others have 
adhered to its traditional function and thus have argued that the role of uṣūl al-
fiqh is to inform how fiqh ought to be derived. For instance, the prominent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Schact, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 60. For 
further discussions on the role and function of the discourse of uṣūl al-fiqh, see Hallaq, Wael 
B. “uṣūl al-fiqh: Beyond tradition” Journal of Islamic Studies 3.2, (1992) pp. 172-202 
25 Jackson, Sherman A. “Fiction and Formalism: Towards a Functional Analysis of Uṣūl al-
Fiqh” in Weiss, Bernard G (ed.) Studies in Islamic Legal Theory (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p .178 
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contemporary Uṣūlī Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (d.1400/1980), in al-Durūs fi 
ʿilm al-uṣūl describes the function of uṣūl al-fiqh as the manṭiq (logic) of fiqh. 
By this, he meant that similarly to how the discourse of manṭiq or logic 
provides the general principles whose application ensure a correct way of 
thinking and rational deduction, the discourse of uṣūl al-fiqh provides general 
principles whose function is to ensure that a mujtahid’s deduction of fiqh is 
correct. Accordingly, Ṣadr argues that although the emergence of uṣūl al-fiqh 
was subsequent to fiqh, fiqh was never practiced in isolation of the theoretical 
injunctions that later became the subject matter of the discipline of uṣūl al-
fiqh26. Although it is recognised that there exists debate over the exact function 
of uṣūl al-fiqh, this study maintains the view expounded by Ṣadr and proposes 
that a potential revaluation of Uṣūlī epistemology can effectively influence a 
normative derivation of fiqh. 
 
Although the debate surrounding the relationship that exists between uṣūl al-
fiqh and fiqh is common in both the Shiite and mainstream Sunni 
jurisprudential traditions, specific engagement with uṣūl al-fiqh, in particular 
regarding Shiite legal epistemology, is a relatively underdeveloped area of 
study within Islamic legal studies. The most critical works on this discourse 
have predominantly been concerned with describing its historical development, 
with the main focus being on the pre-modern period of the Shiite 
jurisprudential discourse. These works have elucidated that in its formative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 See Ṣadr, Durūs vol. 1, pp.46-47 
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period, Shiite legal epistemology was developed in the milieu of the 
theological debates that existed between it and mainstream Sunni 
jurisprudence, and later as a result of the internal legal debates that existed 
between it and the Shiite Akhbārī School of jurisprudence27. These works have 
thus spanned the period from the formative period up until the inception of 
Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī (d.1280/1864), who is recognised as the pioneer of the 
contemporary Uṣūlī thought due to the pivotal role he played in sealing the 
Uṣūlī stronghold over the Akhbārīs in traditional Shiite seminary circles.  
 
Works within Shiite reformist circles – which are composed mainly in Persian 
as opposed to English – do in fact comment upon the implications of 
contemporary Uṣūlī legal epistemology on fiqh, particularly the works of ʿAbd 
al-Karīm Surūsh28. However, since these reformist works have mainly focused 
on proposing a new epistemology or hermeneutical methodology that leads to 
an egalitarian derivation of fiqh, it is found that they do not strictly abide by the 
principles that are contained within the established framework of uṣūl al-fiqh29. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 For a detailed description of the historical development of the Shiite jurisprudential 
discourse and its internal schisms and debates, see Calder, Norman. “Doubt and Prerogative: 
The Emergence of Imāmī Shīʿī Theory of Ijtihād” Studia Islamica 70 (1989), pp. 57-78; 
Modarressi, Hossein. “Rationalism and Traditionalism in Shīʿī Jurisprudence: A Preliminary 
Survey” Studia Islamica 59 (1984), pp. 141-158; Gleave, Inevitable Doubt; Gleave, Robert. 
Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhbārī Shīʿī School (Leiden: Brill, 
2007); Newman, Andrew J. The Formative Period of Twelver Shīʿism: Hadithh as a Discourse 
between Qum and Baghdad (Richmond: Curzon, 2000) 
28 See Dahlen, Ashk. Islamic Law, Epistemology and Modernity: Legal Philosophy in 
Contemporary Iran (New York: Routledge, 2003) for a comprehensive contribution of Surūsh 
in the field of epistemology and its impact on Islamic Law. 29!In his conclusion, Dahlen points out that: “As far as Surūsh’s metholodolgy on 
jurisprudence is concerned, he is far from locating himself in the tradition of the Islamic 
philosophy of law. In fact, he belives that philosophy as a pursuit of eternal truth must be 
abandoned in a termprolised world, where all boundaries are under siege from within as well as 
without” (see ibid, p. 351). This categorically establishes that by denying traditional Islamic 
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In comparison, this research will operate within the set parameters of the 
contemporary Uṣūlī discourse, as by undertaking an evaluation of their key 
epistemological underpinnings and rational assumptions, it will critically 
analyse how Uṣūlīs have argued for, and justified, their discourse of legal 
epistemology. Rather than proposing a new legal epistemology, this research 
will determine whether the existing contemporary Uṣūlī framework has the 
potential to undergo a further paradigm shift, which will enable it to appraise 
its current discourse of legal epistemology. 
 
By specifically considering contemporary Uṣūlī epistemology, this research 
will critically analyse the epistemological foundations that are explicated in the 
Uṣūlī legal theories proposed by Anṣārī and post-Anṣārī mujtahids30. An in-
depth focus on the legal theory of Muḥammad Riḍā Muẓaffar (d.1384/1964) 
will be undertaken, whose work entitled uṣūl al-fiqh is in fact a core textbook 
that is currently studied at the intermediary (suṭuḥ) level of Shiite religious 
seminary studies, and must be completed in order for a student to progress to 
the final stage of baḥth al-khārij (graduate research) and formally be 
recognised as a qualified mujtahid31. Therefore, this study will provide a 
critical analysis of post-Anṣārī epistemological underpinnings, through 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
philosophy of law, Surūsh is operating outside the set paremeters of uṣūl al-fiqh, for it will 
become apparent that the traditional “Islamic” discourse of philosophy – or epistemology – 
plays a vital role in the contemporary discourse of Shiite legal theory.!!
30 Henceforth, the term “post-Anṣārī” will be used as a general term that not only includes the 
opinions and the discourse of scholars who came after Anṣārī, but will also include the opinion 
and the discourse of Anṣārī himself. 
31 See Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic law, pp. 39-43'
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predominantly utilising the general framework provided in Muẓaffar’s 
textbook of legal theory.  
 
In order to present the findings of this study in a coherent manner, the research 
will be divided into five chapters. Chapter One will introduce the discourse of 
Shiite legal epistemology, by focusing on its historical origin and development. 
This will be followed by a prelude to the contemporary discourse of Uṣūlī 
epistemology. Through specifically focusing on Muẓaffar’s analysis of 
mabāḥith al-ḥujja (legal epistemology), this chapter will explain the 
foundations of contemporary Uṣūlī epistemology, by clarifying important 
concepts such as its subject matter, the technical meaning of epistemic validity 
(ḥujjiyya), and the technical meaning of evidence (dalīl) etc. 
 
Following this, Chapter Two will provide a detailed analysis of the primary 
axiom maintained in contemporary Uṣūlī epistemology of the non-validity of 
zann (conjecture per se) in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. This 
chapter will thus critically evaluate whether the primary axiom is theologically 
founded or whether it has been established through rational reasoning, and 
elucidate how contemporary Uṣūlīs have argued against the epistemic validity 
of evidence that emanate ẓannī knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts.   
 
Similarly, Chapter Three will provide a detailed analysis of the Uṣūlī 
acceptance of the epistemic validity of qaṭʿ (certainty). It will critically 
evaluate how the Uṣūlīs have described the nature of qaṭʿ and subsequently 
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argued that it is obligatory (wājib) to follow and act in accordance with its 
indication in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts. This chapter will 
thus clarify how contemporary Uṣūlīs have upheld the epistemic validity of 
those evidence that emanate qaṭʿī knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
After highlighting the primary distinction between evidence that emanates ẓann 
and evidence that emanates qaṭʿ, Chapter Four will establish how 
contemporary Uṣūlī epistemology has argued for, and accepted, the epistemic 
validity of especial conjecture (ẓann al-khāṣ) that is emanated from particular 
evidence. Using Muẓaffar’s evaluation as a basis, this chapter will critically 
focus on the arguments presented by Uṣūlīs in order to substantiate especial 
ẓann that is emanated from one of the most utilised textual evidence in the 
juristic process of derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, namely khabar al-wāḥid (the 
isolated report). 
 
Finally, Chapter Five will evaluate the key differences that exist between the 
epistemological underpinnings maintained in post-Anṣārī contemporary Uṣūlī 
thought to the epistemological understanding that was prevalent amongst the 
Uṣūlīs prior to Anṣārī. Accordingly, using post-Anṣārī literature, this chapter 
will critically engage with the theories that were proposed by pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs 
to substantiate the epistemic validity of conjecture qua conjecture (ẓann al-
muṭlaq), and clarify how these arguments have been rejected by post-Anṣārī 
Uṣūlīs. Indeed, this analysis will signify how deeply rooted the post-Anṣārī 
discourse of legal epistemology is within the overall Shiite Uṣūlī tradition. 
!!! 27!
 
In essence, a thorough and critical examination of contemporary Uṣūlī legal 
epistemology will be presented in the aforementioned chapters, which will 
undoubtedly provide an analytical insight into the strength and rigour of the 
epistemological foundations that are expounded within this theory. 
Furthermore, this study will significantly evaluate whether or not Uṣūlī 
epistemology has the capacity to legitimise the epistemic validity of a wider 
range of evidence that can be utilised in the juristic process of deriving 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction to the Discourse of 
Uṣūlī Legal Epistemology 
 
 
It is a widely held belief amongst Shiite Muslims that knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts (aḥkām) can only be acquired from those individuals who have been 
directly appointed by the Divine Lawgiver (shāriʿ) as His representatives. In 
comparison to the mainstream Sunni Schools, the Shiites have upheld that even 
after the demise of the Prophet, it was still possible to acquire absolute 
knowledge (ʿilm) of every aspect of the divine Sharīʿa precepts, and they 
believe that the group of individuals who have been appointed as 
representatives of the Divine Lawgiver included not only the Prophet, but also 
the impeccable (maʿṣūm) Imams, who are selected descendants from the 
family of the Prophet (Ahl al-Bayt)32. Accordingly, whilst the impeccable 
Imams were present, Shiite Muslims had absolute access to knowledge of 
Sharīʿa precepts, as they were able to directly seek their guidance on all legal 
enquiries concerning how the Divine Lawgiver expected them to act in 
situations that had not previously arisen during the era of the Prophet. 
Therefore, whilst the mainstream Sunni Schools actively sought legal solutions 
to deal with new situations, the Shiites were largely reliant on the impeccable 
Imams as their source of legal knowledge. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 For a detailed discussion on the theological beliefs maintained in the Shiite tradition 
regarding the maʿṣūm i.e. the Prophet and the Imams, see Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, pp. 150-240; 
Sobhani, Doctrines of Shīʿī Islam, pp. 61-96 
!!! 29!
Owing to this, during the era of the impeccable Imams, Shiite Muslims did not 
experience the same sense of urgency as the Sunnis did in collecting and 
interpreting evidence that relayed the Divine precepts of the Sharīʿa, and thus 
there was no real requirement for producing works on legal theory. 
Accordingly, unlike the Sunnis, the Shiites did not establish a hermeneutical 
methodology or systematic epistemological framework upon which they could 
arrive at, or infer, an accurate derivation or interpretation of Sharīʿa precepts; 
rather, their legal epistemology simply proposed reliance upon the impeccable 
Imams of their time. In other words, absolute epistemic access to knowledge of 
Sharīʿa precepts was historically never restricted for the Shiites whilst the 
impeccable Imams were present. 
 
However, a keen interest in legal theory developed following the greater 
occultation (ghayba) of the twelfth impeccable Imam in 329/941. During the 
initial phase of the occultation, Shiite Muslims anticipated his instant return, 
however, after some time it became apparent that the promised return of the 
twelfth Imam was not imminent33. Accordingly, the Shiites had no choice but 
to adopt and develop a system, which they could use to tackle the legal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 The occultation of the twelfth Shiite Imam is split into two phases; the first phase is of the 
minor occultation (ghaybat al-ṣughrā), which lasted from 874-941 AD. In this period, the 
Shiites believe that the twelfth Imam still maintained contact via deputies with the Shiite 
community. The second phase of the major occultation (ghaybat al-kubrā) started from 941AD 
and has lasted till the present day. In accordance with the Shiite theological doctrine, this phase 
will last until the twelfth Imam reappears. For a detailed understanding of the Shiite theory of 
occultation see Hussain, Jassim M. The Occultation of the Twelfth Imam: An Historical 
Background (Tehran: Bunyad Be’thet, 1982); Modarressi, Hossein. Crises and Consolidation 
in the Formative Period of Shi’ite Islam: Abū Jaʿfar ibn Qiba al-Rāzī and his Contributions 
Imāmite Shīʿite Thought (New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1993) pp. 89-91 Halm, Heinz. Shiism, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991) pp. 34-38; Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, pp. 238-240 
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questions and issues that began to arise in the absence of the impeccable 
Imams. It is important to note that in lieu of this, modern commentators on 
Shiite jurisprudence are of a mixed opinion regarding when exactly the science 
of legal theory was introduced within the boundaries of Shiite juristic 
discourse. For instance, Calder notes that: 
 
In a remarkably short of time the Imāmī Shīʿa, once they had defined 
the Imam as absent, came to accept the canonical text of the Qur’ān and 
produced a canonical body of Traditions [or reports] - thereby 
signalling their submission to the otherwise Sunni principle that the 
moment of God's intervention in human affairs had passed and that 
continuing knowledge must be based on texts, the residue and witness 
of that intervention34. 
 
Thus, it is suggested that prior to the occultation, epistemic value was only 
granted to those Sharīʿa precepts that were directly obtained from the 
impeccable Imams, and it was only during post-occultation that Shiite Muslims 
deemed it necessary to grant epistemic value to the legal knowledge that was 
available from the Qurʿān and the reports of the traditions (sunna) of the 
maʿṣūm.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Calder, “Doubt and Prerogative,” p. 58 
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However, in contrast it can be claimed that even during the era of the 
impeccable Imams, the Shiite community were occupied in preserving and 
reporting the traditions of the maʿṣūm. Indeed, this would imply that during the 
presence of the impeccable imams, Shiite Muslims also granted epistemic 
value to at least the reported traditions of the maʿṣūm. This stance is supported 
by the notion that during the presence of the Imams, two prominent tendencies 
co-existed amongst Shiite Muslims, namely the rationalist tendency and the 
traditionalist tendency35. The former consisted of individuals who were greatly 
influenced by the Aristotelian peripatetic mode of thought, and therefore 
displayed a keen interest in the discipline of theology (ʿilm al-kalām). 
Meanwhile, the latter consisted of those individuals who were more inclined 
towards the transmission of traditions, and accordingly refrained from any sort 
of theological debate.  
 
Consequently, it is arguable that if epistemic access to legal knowledge had 
been restricted to only those instances where direct contact with the impeccable 
Imams was available, then it would have been futile for the Shiites to collect 
and preserve traditions of the Imams, as they would not hold any epistemic 
value. Moreover, it can also be argued that if direct contact with the Imams – 
or for that matter the maʿṣūm – was the single criterion for acquiring 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, then this would assume that every Shiite 
Muslim had such direct access. However, this is clearly not true, as the Shiites 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 See Modarressi, “Rationalism and Traditionalism,” pp. 147-148 
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were demographically spread across the Muslim empire, and thus it would 
have been unfeasible for every Muslim to acquire legal knowledge directly 
from the Imams36. Accordingly, it is more than reasonable to suggest that the 
widespread Shiite communities sent representatives, whose function was to 
acquire legal knowledge from the Imams and then report it back to their 
respective communities. Therefore, it is highly probably that the traditions of 
the Imams were recognised as epistemologically valid amongst the Shiites 
even during the time of the Imams. 
 
Nonetheless, in the Shiite jurisprudential tradition, the rationalist Shiite School 
gained significant prominence over the traditionalist school, resulting in the 
formation of Shiite legal theory. It is found that the initial legal theory works of 
al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d.413/1022) and al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d.436/1044) were 
developed alongside a polemic encounter with the mainstream Sunnis37, and 
thus the legal epistemology that evolved rejected the epistemic validity of 
evidence that were commonly accepted within the mainstream Sunni tradition - 
namely qiyās (jurist analogy), ijtihād (personal opinion of a jurist) and al-
akhbār al-āḥād (the isolated reports)38. It was claimed that qiyās, ijtihād and 
akhbār al-āḥād were evidence that produced mere conjecture (ẓann), which in 
accordance with the rationalist Shiites was not sufficient in producing or 
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36 As it will be seen in Chapter Five, the Uṣūlīs too maintain that it was not possible for each 
Muslim to access the Imam, and as a result they utilised the verse of nabaʾ (49:6) from the 
Qurʾān to substantiate this point and consequently prove the epistemic validity of the isolated 
report (khabar al-wāḥid) of the maʿṣūm. 
37 See Calder, “Doubt and Prerogative,” pp. 57-60 
38 ibid, p. 59 
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revealing knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. Therefore, during its formative 
period, Shiite legal epistemology was very rigid in accepting the epistemic 
validity of evidence used in the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, inasmuch as the 
Shiites only accepted evidence which they believed were able to provide 
certainty (qaṭʿ) or absolute knowledge (ʿilm) of Sharīʿa precepts.  This 
evidence included the Qurʿān, traditions of the maʿṣūm, which were mediated 
through widely narrated reports (mutawātir), consensus of Shiite jurists (ijmāʿ), 
and independent rational knowledge (ʿaql). 
 
However, it is noted that the first epistemological paradigm shift within the 
Shiite jurisprudential discourse was incepted by Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d.460/1067). 
His ʿUddat al-uṣūl was the first detailed and comprehensive research 
undertaken within Shiite legal theory. Speaking of its outcome, Ṣadr 
elucidates: 
 
His [i.e. Ṭūsī’s] works serve as the line of demarcation between the era 
of preparation and that of maturity. He brought the preparatory era to a 
close and initiated the era of maturity, a period in which both 
jurisprudence and uṣūl became disciplines with their own specific 
criteria, methods and modes of scholarly precision39. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: According to Shiʿi law 
(London: ICAS, 2003), pp. 33-34 
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The major revelation from Ṭūsī’s research described that, in line with the 
established Shiite understanding, the tradition (sunna) of the maʿṣūm that was 
revealed from isolated reports (akhbār al-āḥād) did not give rise to absolute 
ʿilm (knowledge) of Sharīʿa precepts. However, he was the first recognised 
Shiite mujtahid to have argued using other rational and textual injunctions that 
specific permission has been granted by the Divine Lawgiver, which allows a 
mujtahid to follow and act in accordance with the conjectural (ẓannī) isolated 
report in his derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. Thus, by maintaining strict 
yardsticks, which only permit a mujtahid to follow and act in accordance with 
the isolated reports that were transmitted by a chain of trustworthy reporters 
who belonged to the “True Sect40,” Ṭūsī initiated the first epistemological 
paradigm shift within the discourse of Shiite legal theory. 
 
Nonetheless, despite the continuing polemic encounter with the Sunnis, the 
Shiites were significantly inspired, and continued to be inspired, by Sunni legal 
theory, especially the legal theory proposed by the Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥāmid al-
Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) 41 . Ghazālī, in his al-Mustaṣfā, wrote a lengthy 
introduction to Aristotelian formal logic, in order to present the 
epistemological and hermeneutical arguments that were discussed in traditional 
legal theory in a logical manner, primarily through using Aristotelian 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 See Calder, “Doubt and Prerogative,” p. 62 
41 See Stewart, Devin J. Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal 
System (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 1998), pp. 61-110  
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syllogistic reasoning42. Following this trend set by Ghazālī, Sunni works on 
legal theory began to legitimise a broader range of Aristotelian logical methods 
or evidence, such as analogy43 and a fortiori argument. However, despite this 
inclusion of “new” evidence, Ghazālī and his contemporaries significantly 
maintained the importance of following and acting in accordance with 
traditional epistemological typology that appraised the authenticity and clarity 
of evidence on the scale of certitude (qaṭʿ) and conjecture (ẓann)44. This thus 
signifies that although early mainstream Sunni jurisprudence accepted the 
epistemic validity of evidence that gave rise to ẓann, this was thoroughly 
evaluated prior to doing so. 
 
Ghazālī’s endeavour combined with the development of mainstream Sunni 
legal theory had an immense influence on Shiite legal theory, particularly upon 
the Shiite School of Ḥilla in the seventh/thirteenth century. One of the most 
celebrated champions of Shiite jurisprudence originating from Ḥilla was al-
ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, who played a pivotal role in the development of Shiite legal 
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42 It is vital to note that prior to al-Ghazālī’s novel contribution, Sunni legal theory held pure 
logical arguments as necessarily linguistic, for the conclusion of such arguments was seen to 
be derived from the language of textual evidence rather than through the medium of rational 
inferences. The arguments usually presented were either deductive in nature or argumenta e 
contrario, and both types attempted to establish conclusions, or legal precepts, which 
necessarily followed a set of textual premises, see Hallaq, Wael B. “Logic, Formal Arguments 
and Formalization of Arguments in Sunni Jurisprudence” Arabica 37.3. (1990), pp. 315-317 
43 Hallaq points out that there was contention amongst Sunni scholars regarding the correct 
meaning of qiyās. On one hand, the likes of Ghazālī argued that in the Muslim jurisprudential 
discourse, the term qiyās refers to analogical reasoning in a real sense, and categorical 
syllogism in a metaphorical sense. On the other hand, others at the time argued that qiyās, in 
legal theory, refers to both analogical reasoning and categorical syllogism in the real sense. For 
a detailed discussion on this, see Hallaq, Wael B. Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), p. 48 
44 See Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal theories, pp. 137-138 
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theory, (d. 726/1325)45. ʿAllāma is renowned to be one of the most prominent 
Shiite mujtahids, who explicitly shifted the epistemological paradigm of Shiite 
legal theory by openly accepting the epistemic validity of ẓann in the 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, and arguing for the necessity of accepting the 
ẓann that emanated from the isolated reports and ijtihād (opinion of jurist46).  
 
Apart from this, ʿAllāma is also recognised as the first Shiite mujtahid to 
explicitly imitate the four-fold categorisation of evidence that was prevalent in 
the Sunni jurisprudential discourse. As a result, ʿAllāma concluded that 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts could be obtained from the Qurʾān, sunna 
(irrespective of whether it is mediated by widely narrated reports or isolated 
reports), ijmāʿ and dalīl al-ʿaql (rational evidence) 47 . Therefore, this 
categorisation establishes that ʿAllāma not only accepted the epistemic validity 
of qaṭʿī (certainty-bearing) evidence, which gives absolute knowledge of 
Sharīʿa precepts, but also ẓannī evidence, which is always prone to error. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 For detail on the role ʿAllāma played in the development of Shiite legal theory, see 
Moussavi, Ahmad K. “Usuliyya” in Martin, Richard C (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Islam and the 
Muslim World, 2 vols. (USA: Macmillan Reference, 2004), vol. 2, pp. 717-718 
46 It is vital to note that for ʿAllāma, ijtihād does not equate to the personal opinion (raʾy) of a 
mujtahid, rather it indicates on the mujtahids maximum efforts in acquiring knowledge of legal 
precepts from evidence that are deemed to be epistemologically valid. See Calder, “Doubt and 
Prerogative,” p. 67 
47 The four-fold characterisation of sources within Sunni Schools includes the Qurʿān, sunna, 
ijmāʿ, and qiyās (analogical reasoning). It should be noted that not all Sunni Schools agree on 
the epistemic validity of all these sources. For a detailed study of the Sunni discourse on the 
epistemic validity of these sources, see Zysow, Aron. The Economy of Certainty: An 
Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: Harvard 
University, 1984) 
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It is possible to assert that the epistemological shift initiated by ʿAllāma was 
not only due to the emergence of evolving societal factors that had not 
previously arisen during the formative era, but was also due to the influence of 
the highly effective combination of formal logic and traditional epistemology 
that was presented in Sunni legal theory. ʿAllāma’s legal theory was endorsed, 
and dominated the works of subsequent writers of Shiite legal theory. Calder 
argues that this widespread acceptance was because it enhanced the authority 
of the opinion of the mujtahid, and since writers of Shiite legal theory were all 
recognised as mujtahids, ʿAllāma’s legal epistemology granted their derivation 
of Sharīʿa precepts with legitimacy48. For example, one of the most prominent 
works that followed the efforts of ʿAllāma was entitled Maʿālim al-Dīn by 
Ḥasan b. Shahīd al-Thānī. Ibn Shahīd Thānī supported and emphasised 
ʿAllāma’s acknowledgment of conjuncture in the derivation of law, and indeed 
went further to propose that the acquisition of certain knowledge was relatively 
impossible in legal rulings that were not already widely established and 
accepted (such as ṣalāt and zakāt)49.  
 
The writings of ʿAllāma and Ibn Shahīd al-Thānī were studied as textbooks 
within circles of Shiite seminary studies, and a number of commentaries and 
super-commentaries were written in order to explain the legal epistemology 
that they proposed. Accordingly, although there remained menial differences of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 See Calder, Norman. “The Structure of Authority in Imāmī Shīʿī Jurisprudence” 
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, 1980) 
49 Ibn Shahīd al-Thānī’s understanding of how there is no access to certain knowledge 
(qaṭʿ/ʿilm) of Sharīʿa precepts is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
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opinion regarding the remit and scope of legal epistemology, mainstream Shiite 
jurists during this era accepted the epistemic validity of ẓann, by reinforcing 
the epistemic validity of evidence such as the isolated reports and ijtihād. 
 
Nonetheless, ʿAllāma’s epistemological division of knowledge into ʿilm and 
ẓann was met with opposition, and particularly received significant hostility 
from Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1036/1627), who is arguably 
recognised as the initiator of the Akhbārī movement50. In his al-Fawāʾid al- 
Madaniyya, al-Astarābādī provided an extensive critique of the rationalist 
school, which by now was composed of mujtahids who sought to maintain 
ʿAllāma’s juristic system. Indeed, it was during this era that the rationalist 
school, and followers of ʿAllāma’s legal theory, were categorically recognised 
as belonging to the Uṣūlī School. Therefore, approximately three hundred 
years following the death of ʿAllāma, the Shiite Muslim tradition witnessed the 
inauguration of a legal schism that produced two distinct schools of 
jurisprudence, namely the Akhbārī School and the Uṣūlī School51. 
 
One of the major contentions that Astarābādī and the Akhbārī movement had 
against the Uṣūlī School related to the latter’s acceptance and adoption of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Some argue that the initial phases of the Akhbārī movement predated Astarābādī, However, 
it is vital to note that Gleave claims that although there was use of the term Akhbārī in works 
prior to that of Astarābādī, it is not conclusive enough to suggest that it referred to the same 
intellectual trend initiated after Astarābādī.  For instance, see Gleave, Scripturalist Islam, pp. 
1-30 
51 For a detailed study of the Akhbārī movement, its intellectual trend and its interaction with 
the Uṣūlīs, see Newman, The Formative Period of Twelver Shīʿism; Gleave, Scripturalist 
Islam; Modarressi, “Rationalism and Traditionalism”; Mutahhari, Murtada “The Role of 
Ijithad in Legislation” Al-Tawhid: A Quarterly Journal of Islamic Thought and Culture, 4.2, 
(n.d.) 
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Sunni legal theory. The Akhbārīs claimed that the legal epistemological 
typology of qaṭʿ and ẓann was flawed, and they argued that anything based 
upon ẓann was not epistemologically valid, by identifying this supposed 
epistemic validity as a Sunni innovation that had been dishonourably accepted 
by the Uṣūlīs within the folds of Shiite jurisprudence. The Akhbārīs argued that 
evidence that emanated ẓann did not have any epistemic value and thus they 
rejected evidence that gave rise to mere conjecture of Sharīʿa precepts, through 
maintaining that it was only possible to attain knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts 
through evidence that emanates qaṭʿ. In turn, the Akhbārīs rejected the four-
fold categorisation of evidence that had been presented by ʿAllāma, and they 
venomously denied the epistemic validity of ijmāʿ, dalīl al-ʿaql and at times 
even the Qurʿān. Alternatively, the Akhbārīs limited the epistemic discovery of 
law exclusively to the sunna, or more particularly the reports (akhbār) of the 
maʿṣūm. They maintained that only the maʿṣūm and their reported sunna 
possessed the ability to reveal knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, on the basis that 
their transmitted akhbār were historically accurate and authentic, and that only 
the maʿṣūm, due to their ʿiṣma (infallibility), possessed the ability to 
understand the absolute ordinance and will of the Divine Lawgiver. 
 
In addition to their rejection of the four-fold categorisation of evidence, the 
Akhbārīs also rejected the epistemic validity of ijtihād or the juristic process of 
the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts by a mujtahid. They argued that the concept 
of ijtihād once again implied a false Uṣūlī distinction between ʿilm and ẓann. 
Instead, Gleave highlights that in place of ijtihād, the Akhbārī School proposed 
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a legal methodology that attempted to ensure that Sharīʿa precepts could only 
be derived from certainty-bearing inviolable evidence (i.e. akhbār or at times 
the Qurʿān) whose function was to reveal knowledge of the divine ordinances 
to the extent and manner in which their intended meaning or purpose could be 
interpreted with certainty52. 
 
The Akhbārī position proved to be immensely popular in the Shiite world, and 
various prominent scholars, both in Safavid Iran and outside Iran, began to 
identify themselves as Akhbārīs. Gleave notes that it was supposedly so 
popular within the shrine cities of Iraq that those who still adhered to ʿAllāma’s 
position were afraid to voice their opinion in the public sphere. Nevertheless, 
during the thirteenth/eightieth century, the popularity of the Akhbārī School 
began to diminish53. This was predominantly due to the efforts of Muḥammad 
Bāqir al-Bihbihānī (d. 1205/1790-1), who, together with his disciples54, is 
famously recognised to have initiated the widespread acceptance of the Uṣūlī 
thought within the Shiite tradition. In a remarkably short amount of time 
following Bihbihānī’s works, the Uṣūlī School once again regained its 
prominence, and dominated the academic circles of Shiite seminaries. Training 
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52 See Gleave, Scripturalist Islam, pp. 60-101 
53 It should be noted that Gleave points out that the Akhbārī influence has in the present day 
survived in parts of southern Iran, the Gulf and the Indian subcontinent. However, its adherents 
are not intellectually active to a great degree. See Gleave, Scripturalist Islam, p. xxi 
54 For a detailed analysis of al-Bihbihānī and his encounter with the “neo-Akhbārī” Yūsuf b. 
Aḥmad al-Baḥrānī, see Gleave, Inevitable Doubt. It is vital to note that Baḥrānī is recognised 
as a “neo-Akhbārī” due to him following a moderate approach by not accepting some of the 
radical arguments of the early Akhbārīs and accepting some the arguments of the Uṣūlīs. Also, 
see Cole, Juan R I. “Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa’I on the Sources of Religious Authority” in 
Walbridge, Linda S (ed.) The Most Learned of the Shiʿa: The Institutions of the Marjaʿ Taqlid 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 83 
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mujtahids were now following the curricula that emphasised the Uṣūlī 
epistemological underpinnings. Nonetheless, the Akhbārī influence upon the 
Shiite tradition was so significant that a significant portion of Uṣūlī legal 
epistemology is in fact devoted to clarifying and refuting the theoretical and 
epistemological misconceptions that were charged against the Uṣūlīs by the 
Akhbārīs. 
 
Nonetheless, approximately a decade following the restitution of the Uṣūlī 
stronghold, Shaykh Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī (d. 1280/1864) implemented a further 
radical shift in the Shiite juristic discourse by introducing a range of new and 
developed elements from Muslim philosophy and logic55. One of Anṣārī’s 
major contributions to legal epistemology, which arguably sealed his 
prominent position in the academic circles of Shiite seminaries that exists until 
the present day, was his clarification that the contemporary discourse of Uṣūlī 
epistemology was rooted within the Shiite tradition. As a result, Anṣārī and his 
contemporaries established the non-validity of any evidence that gave rise to 
ẓann (conjecture per se) in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts, and 
rather they advocated that only evidence that emanated especial ẓann (or ẓann 
al-khāṣ) could be deemed as epistemologically valid, as the juristic utility of 
such evidence has been permitted by the Divine Lawgiver Himself. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 For a detailed discussion on the impact of the Anṣārī legal theory on his contemporaries, see 
Faḍlī, ʿAbd al-Hādī. Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh al-Imāmiyya 2 vols. (Beirut: Markaz al-Ghadīr, 2007) 
vol. 1, pp. 81-83 
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Apart from being one the chief pioneers who critically argued for a distinction 
between ẓann and ẓann al-khāṣ, Anṣārī was also the first Uṣūlī scholar to 
systematically provide a rational framework upon which he elucidated that 
apart from obtaining knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts by referring to the 
traditional typology of qaṭʿ or ẓann, it was also possible to obtain this 
knowledge in cases of shakk (doubt). Bearing this in mind, Anṣārī 
systematically organised a four-fold categorisation of procedural principles 
(uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya), whose function was to provide a mukallaf – or more 
specifically, a mujtahid – with a practical standpoint, or “knowledge” of a 
Sharīʿa precept, in situations where he possesses doubt due to a lack of 
sufficient evidence that either emanates qaṭʿ or especial ẓann of the Sharīʿa 
precept56. 
 
Undoubtedly, Anṣārī’s contribution to legal epistemology extended the remit 
of the jurisprudence discourse, and effectively increased the authority of 
mujtahids, as they were now able to broaden the authority of their own 
profession into a wider sphere of human activity57. Anṣārī’s efforts made him 
prominently recognised as the most learned mujtahid, and he was termed as the 
“supreme exemplar” (marjaʿ al-taqlīd). His methodology of teaching subjects 
like fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh attracted a large number of students, and his work on 
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56 This is further discussed in this chapter under The Difference between Substantiated 
Evidence and Procedural Principles. For a detailed analysis of Anṣārī’s contribution to the 
discourse of Shiite legal theory, in particular his four-fold categorisation of uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya, 
see Anṣārī, al-Shaykh Murtaḍā. Farāiʾd al-uṣūl 2 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Nuʾmān, 1991), 
vol. 2, pp. 308-402 
57 See Litvak, Shiʿi scholars of nineteenth-century Iraq, pp. 71-74.  
!!! 43!
legal theory entitled Farāiʾd al-uṣūl (also known as Rasāʾil) is a core part of 
the curriculum in present day traditional Shiite seminaries. More importantly, 
Anṣārī’s influence and contribution to the development of Shiite legal 
epistemology has generally remained unchallenged within the orthodoxy. 
 
Nevertheless, amongst the more contemporary influential Uṣūlī scholars who 
originate from the intellectual heritage of Anṣārī is Muḥammad Riḍā Muẓaffar 
(d. 1384/1964). Muẓaffar was trained as a mujtahid at the religious seminary of 
Najaf in Iraq, and his teachers included the respected Mirzā Ḥusayn al-Naʾīnī 
(d. 1355/1936) and Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Gharawī al-Iṣfahānī (also known as 
Ayatollah Kompāni) (d. 1365/1945). Upon qualifying as a mujtahid, Muẓaffar 
played a pivotal role in developing the religious seminary of Najaf, by making 
a novel contribution in producing an organised and regulated curriculum that 
till date is used in Shiite religious seminaries to train mujtahids. Muẓaffar made 
a particularly significant contribution to the orthodox Shiite scholastic 
endeavour by writing about the significant deliberations made by influential 
Shiite scholars on subjects such as uṣūl al-fiqh, logic (manṭiq), theology 
(kalām) etc. in an accessible and modern style. Indeed, in his works on legal 
theory, Muẓaffar provides a comprehensive and well-written systematic 
framework, which elucidates upon the most important and influential 
arguments proposed by the orthodox protagonists of Shiite legal epistemology. 
As a result, Muẓaffar’s Uṣūl al-Fiqh is an essential textbook that must be 
completed by a trainee mujtahid at the intermediary (suṭuḥ) level as a 
necessary requisite before he is able to progress to the final stage of baḥth al-
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khārij (graduate research), and formally be recognised as a qualified 
mujtahid58.  
 
In essence, the importance and reasoning behind focusing an in-depth study on 
Muẓaffar’s Uṣūl al-Fiqh stems not only from the fact that his work on legal 
theory and his influential thought is studied at the intermediary level, but also 
because his work clearly elucidates upon key areas, such as the relevant ideas, 
arguments, terminologies, and categories that have been proposed over the 
general historical development of Shiite legal epistemology. Therefore, 
although this research specifically focuses on the epistemological 
underpinnings that are maintained in contemporary post-Anṣārī Uṣūlī legal 
theory, it primarily refers to the Uṣūlī framework provided by Muẓaffar. 
 
 
1.1 The Discourse of Legal Epistemology in Uṣūl al-Fiqh 
 
The contemporary discourse of uṣūl al-fiqh can broadly be divided into four 
key parts59. The first part focuses on mabāḥith al-alfāẓ (literally: the discussion 
on expression) or the discourse of semantics. The discussion of semantics is 
commonly found in all works of Muslim legal theory, irrespective of whether 
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58 It should be noted that prior to baḥth al-khārij a trainee mujtahid is required to undertake 
two levels of studies, al-muqaddima (prelude) and suṭuḥ (intermediary studies). Muẓaffar’s 
Uṣūl al-Fiqh is taught at both these levels. For the common curriculum taught at Shiite 
religious seminaries, see Mallat, The renewal of Islamic law, pp. 39-43 
59 For the categorisation of the common division of chapters found in the discourse of uṣūl al-
fiqh, see Faḍlī, Durūs fi uṣūl al-fiqh al-Imāmiyya vol. 1, p. 12 
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they adhere to the Sunni doctrine or the Shiite doctrine. It focuses on a wide 
range of key orthodox hermeneutical methods that are used to interpret the 
linguistic indications or significations of the apparent meaning obtained from 
textual evidence that reveals knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. For instance, a 
common example of a semantic discussion found in works of uṣūl al-fiqh 
relates to the signification of the verbal commands (awāmir) that are found in 
textual evidence. Here, the Uṣūlīs consider whether or not the apparent 
indication of the verbal command of the Divine Lawgiver denotes an 
obligation, insofar as it is necessary for the mukallaf to enact it, or whether it 
merely denotes a recommendation, insofar as it is not necessary to be enacted. 
Other similar discussions in mabāḥith al-alfāẓ include studies on the textual 
significations of al-nawāhī (the verbal prohibitions), al-manṭūq wa-l mafhūm 
(explicit and implicit textual indications), al-ʿām wa-l khāṣ (general and 
specific textual indications), al-muṭlaq wa-l muqayyad (unrestricted and 
restricted textual indications), and al-mubayyan wa-l mujmal (clear and 
ambiguous textual indications) etc. 
 
The second part of contemporary uṣūl al-fiqh focuses on the mabāḥith al-ʿaql 
(literally: discussion on rationality) or the discourse of rational judgments. This 
discussion focuses on the rational judgments or precepts (aḥkām al-ʿaql) that 
are obtained by the human intellect, and a distinction is  made between rational 
precepts that are independently inferred from reason (mustaqilāt al-ʿaqliyya), 
and rational precepts that are not inferred independently from reason (ghayr 
mustaqilāt al-ʿaqliyya) but rather are based on textual evidence. For instance, a 
common example given for the former type is the rational precept that deems 
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that “justice is obligatory (wājib).” This precept is arrived at through reason 
without the aid of any textual evidence, as it is upheld within the Shiite 
ʿAdliyya tradition that the human intellect can independently judge that the act 
of justice carries the intrinsic property of praiseworthiness (ḥusn), and since 
anything that is judged as “praiseworthy” by reason is also judged the same by 
the Divine Lawgiver, reason (ʿaql) independently judges the act of justice to be 
“obligatory.” On the other hand, an example for the latter type is the rational 
precept that deems that “it is obligatory to obtain correct travel documents 
prior to performing the obligation of religious pilgrimage (ḥajj).” In this case, 
the rational precept of the obligation of obtaining the correct travel documents 
is dependent upon the religious precept (ḥukm al-sharʾī) of the obligation of 
religious pilgrimage, and thus cannot be intellectualised independently60. 
 
The third part of contemporary uṣūl al-fiqh focuses on the mabāḥith al-ḥujja 
(literally: discussion on authority) or the discourse of legal epistemology. This 
discussion focuses on the epistemological underpinnings that are accepted in 
the discourse of Shiite legal theory, and evaluates the ḥujjiyya (authority, or 
epistemic validity) of specific evidence (adilla) – whether they are independent 
sources or hermeneutic methods - from which it is possible to obtain 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. Muẓaffar begins his discourse on legal 
epistemology by stating that: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 There are various types of ghayr mustaqilāt al-ʿaqliyya. The example mentioned here is of 
muqadimāt al-wājib (literally “preliminary of an obligation”). For a detailed discussion on 
ghayr mustaqilāt al-ʿaqliyya, see Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 1, pp. 212-312; For a concise 
introductory discussion, see Faḍlī, Mabādī al-uṣūl, pp. 95-111'
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Indeed our objective from this discussion – the “discussion on 
authority” - is to determine what is suitable in being an evidence and 
authoritative in [deriving] Sharīʿa precepts, so that we can reach the 
precepts of God the Most High, that are in the objective reality (al-
wāqiʿī). If through the evidence [which are evaluated] we are able to 
reach the objective reality [or the Sharīʿa precept], then this is what we 
intend, and this is the ultimate objective. However, if we commit a 
mistake, then we are excused (maʿḍūrīn) and are not chastised for 
acting in contradiction to the objective reality61. 
 
This statement clearly indicates that the primary function of legal epistemology 
is to determine or evaluate the epistemic validity of evidence that gives 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts that exists in the Mind of the Divine Lawgiver 
or in the objective reality (wāqiʿī). Thus, if by following and acting in 
accordance with evidence whose epistemological validity is determined, a 
mukallaf  - or more accurately a mujtahid - is to in actual fact reach the 
objective reality, then undoubtedly this is the “ultimate objective.” However, if 
on the other hand, a mujtahid does not obtain knowledge of the Sharīʿa precept 
that exists in the Mind of the Divine Lawgiver, then in line with the Uṣūlī 
understanding, he cannot be held accountable and be subjected to chastisement 
in the hereafter. This illustrates that the discourse of Uṣūlī epistemology not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-Fiqh vol. 2, p. 7 
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only establishes how it is possible to attain knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, but 
also clarifies how it is possible to have immunity against accountability.  
 
In light of this, Muẓaffar explicates the post-Anṣārī Uṣūlī view, which 
advocates that unlike the maʿṣūm, it is possible for a mujtahid to err in the 
juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts.  However, since a true mujtahid is 
one who exerts maximum effort in following a methodology (ṭarīq) from 
which he only derives legal precepts based on evidence that he knows – with 
certainty - has been prescribed by the Divine Lawgiver, he is granted with 
excusability and cannot be held accountable. Muẓaffar clarifies this position by 
giving the example that if a mujtahid acts in accordance with the indication of 
an isolated report – which, as discussed above, became commonly accepted as 
an epistemologically valid evidence amongst all Shiites – then it is possible for 
him to arrive at knowledge of the Sharīʿa precept that exists in the objective 
reality. However, due to the nature of the isolated report, it is also possible for 
a mujtahid to err and thus derive a Sharīʿa precept that in fact is contrary to the 
objective reality. In this instance, Muẓaffar concludes that a mujtahid would be 
granted with excusability, and be immune from being held accountable or 
subject to cherishment, because the epistemic validity of the isolated report has 
been evaluated and accepted in the discourse of legal epistemology62. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Ibid 
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It can be argued that the matter of accountability and excusability in itself is 
not a feature of epistemology, because the function of epistemology is to 
explain what knowledge is and how it is acquired. As a result, it can be claimed 
that the function of legal epistemology is to seek the best possible method by 
which absolute knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts can be acquired, and 
collaborating this with the matter of accountability and excusability can 
potentially distract a mujtahid. This is because rather than striving to acquire 
the best possible knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, he may be more drawn to 
acquiring Sharīʿa precepts that merely guard him with immunity.  
 
Indeed, during the formative period of its historical development, the 
fundamental debates within legal epistemology centered on proving whom 
from the Muslim tradition had access to true knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, 
and what evidence emanated such knowledge. However, following ʿAllāma’s 
acceptance of ẓann and the subsequent onslaught by the Akhbārī School, it 
appears that Shiite legal epistemology became defensive in its approach and as 
a result, the focus shifted from analysing evidence that bought about 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, to how a mujtahid could be granted with 
excusability and legal immunity from being punished. This supports Calder’s 
claim that the main function of Shiite legal epistemology has been to maintain 
the juristic authority of a mujtahid over the mukallaf who imitates him, for if it 
is established that a mujtahid is granted with legal immunity then by priority 
those who imitate him are also granted with legal immunity. 
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Nevertheless, irrespective of this, Muẓaffar in his prelude of mabāḥith al-ḥujja, 
correctly proclaims that legal epistemology is indeed the most important part of 
legal theory, as it discusses the epistemic validity of the orthodox 
hermeneutical methods of textual interpretation that are discussed in the first 
part, and the epistemic validity of the rational precepts that are discussed in the 
second part. By using a logical syllogistic framework of reasoning, whereby a 
conclusion is inferred from a major premise (kubrā) and a minor premise 
(ṣughrā), Muẓaffar highlights that the discourse on legal epistemology 
provides the major premise upon which the minor premises from the first two 
parts are assessed. As a result, this makes it possible to arrive at a conclusion 
that in effect establishes a Sharīʿa precept. For example: 
 
Minor premise: The grammatical form of ʿifal linguistically signifies a 
command, which is apparent in indicating an obligation 
(wujūb) 
  
Major Premise:  Every apparent indication (ẓāhir) is epistemologically 
valid (ḥujja)  
 
 
Conclusion:  The grammatical form of ʿifal is epistemologically valid 
in indicating upon an obligation 
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As illustrated in this example, the minor premise is composed of the juristic 
deliberations that have been obtained from the analysis in the first part of 
Muẓaffar’s legal theory, whereas the major premise is composed of the juristic 
deliberations that have been obtained from the analysis in the third part of 
Muẓaffar’s legal theory. As a result, the conclusion that is obtained establishes 
the epistemic validity of a specific hermeneutical method, which can be used 
by a mujtahid in the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. Accordingly, if and when a 
mujtahid comes across the grammatical form of ʿifal from the textual evidence 
that reveals knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, then he necessarily derives a legal 
precept that denotes an obligation. 
 
It should be noted that an identical relationship exists between the second and 
third part of Muẓaffar’s legal theory i.e. the minor premise is composed of the 
jurist’s deliberations that have been obtained from the analysis in the second 
part of Muẓaffar’s legal theory, whereas the major premise is composed of the 
juristic deliberations that have been obtained from the analysis in the third part. 
As a result, the conclusion that is obtained establishes the epistemic validity of 
specific rational precepts, such as the independent rational precept that justice 
is obligatory, or the dependent rational precept that it is obligatory to perform 
all the rational prerequisites of an obligation.  
 
Therefore, Muẓaffar’s prelude situates the specific discourse of legal 
epistemology in relation to the general discourse of legal theory. He 
categorically establishes that all other juristic deliberations discussed in legal 
!!! 52!
theory are contingent upon the “discussion of authority”, for as illustrated 
above, it is this discourse which either affirms or denies the epistemic validity 
of the evidence used in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
1.2 The Subject Matter of Legal Epistemology 
 
A common trend found within the traditional texts of different disciplines 
studied at Shiite religious seminaries is that they all discuss the subject matter 
(mawḍūʿ) of a discipline and distinguish it from other disciplines through the 
distinction of its subject matter63. Accordingly, the subject matter of every 
discipline is an expression of what exactly is studied within it, and indeed 
when there is a subject there necessarily follows a predicate (maḥmūl), which 
in turn somewhat defines the subject. The predicate in the discipline of Shiite 
legal epistemology is clearly the evaluation of what is deemed as 
epistemologically valid (ḥujja). Thus, if the predicate is centred on the 
evaluation “what is deemed as epistemologically valid”, then the predicated 
term, or the subject matter, of such an evaluation is necessarily the “evidence,” 
or “dalīl,” which has the essential properties of being worthy of such an 
evaluation64. In other words, the subject matter of Shiite legal epistemology is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 For Muẓaffar’s further discussion on the meaning and the function of the subject matter 
(mawḍūʿ) and the role it plays in a particular discipline in his discourse of logic, see Muẓaffar, 
al-Shaykh Muḥammad Riḍā, al-Manṭiq (Beirut: Dār al-Taʿarif al-Maṭbūʿāt, 2006) pp. 347-355 
64 An example to clarify this would be that we commonly find that the Uṣūlīs conclude “the 
Qurʾān is a source of authority in the juristic process of deriving law.” In this case, the 
“Qurʾān” is the subject matter that is the evidence, whereas the sentence “authority in the 
process of deriving law” is the predicate. See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 9 
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evidence, whereas the predicate is the epistemic evaluation of their evidentiary 
validity (dalāla). 
 
However, one of the most debated issues in Shiite legal theory surrounds the 
identification of the exact subject matter of legal epistemology, as there 
appears to be confusion within the Uṣūlī jurisprudential literature regarding 
what evidence has the essential properties of being worthy of epistemic 
evaluation. It can be argued that the intensity of this debate was infused by 
Astarābādī, when the Akhbārī School heavily critiqued the four-fold 
categorisation of evidence that was initially proposed by ʿAllāma. As discussed 
above, the Akhbārīs upheld that the subject matter of legal epistemology was 
restricted to the evaluation of evidence that revealed absolute knowledge and 
certainty. 
 
Nonetheless, following the post-Bihbihānī/Anṣārī resurgence of the Uṣūlī 
camp, valid evidence that produced conjecture of Sharīʿa precepts was once 
again accepted within the bounds of Shiite jurisprudence. However, despite 
this it is found that Muẓaffar extensively discusses the subject matter of Shiite 
legal epistemology, and this is undoubtedly because many of his Uṣūlī 
predecessors continued to dispute what evidence was worthy of being 
evaluated in the discourse of legal epistemology. Muẓaffar points out that 
numerous Uṣūlīs have insisted on restricting the subject matter of legal 
epistemology to the evaluation of al-uṣūl al-arbaʿa, i.e. the four-fold 
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categorisation of evidence, which includes the Qurʾān, sunna, ijmāʿ and ʿaql. 
However, Muẓaffar defines the subject matter as: 
 
Everything that fits, or is potentially competent, in establishing a legal 
precept is deemed as an evidence, and is valid in [deriving] it [i.e. the 
Sharīʿa precept]. Indeed, if in this [third] part we are able to establish 
with, certainty (dalīl al-qaṭʿī), that an evidence, is for instance, valid 
then we [are required to] take from it and refer to it to establish the 
precepts of Sharīʿa65. 
 
When compared to the orthodox Uṣūlī position, it can clearly be seen from 
Muẓaffar’s statement that his approach in legal epistemology is very much 
progressive, as he upholds that the subject matter of Shiite legal epistemology 
encapsulates a wide range of evidence. Thus, in accordance with Muẓaffar, 
every source or hermeneutical method that can potentially disclose a Sharīʿa 
precept is worthy of being evaluated in Shiite legal epistemology66. Muẓaffar 
does however clarify that such evidence can only actually be used in the 
juristic process of derivation when its epistemological validity is established 
with qaṭʿ (certainty). If the epistemic validity of an evidence is not established 
with certainty, then it cannot be used by a mujtahid. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Ibid. 
66 It should be noted that Muẓaffar also maintains the same stance in his overall introduction to 
legal theory, where he categorically points out that there is no specific subject matter for the 
discipline of legal theory. Rather, he claims that its subject matter is diverse, as it includes the 
examination of everything that enables a mujtahid to extrapolate Sharīʿa precepts. See 
Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-Fiqh vol. 1, pp. 6-7  
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Thus according to Muẓaffar, not only does the commonly accepted four-fold 
categorisation of evidence form part of the subject matter of legal 
epistemology, but more contentious evidence such as qiyās (analogy) and raʾy 
(personal opinion) are also included. Muẓaffar elaborates on his understanding 
by providing a philosophical analysis, whereby using philosophical jargons he 
argues that the subject matter of Shiite legal epistemology is the evaluation of  
“evidence per se” (dalīl bi-mā hiya hiya)67, as opposed to “evidence as 
evidence” or evidence that is pre-assumed as being epistemologically valid 
(dalīl bi-mā huwa dalīl). 
 
Muẓaffar categorically attributes the latter position to Abū Qāsim al-Qummī 
(d. 1232/1817), who is held as being the first Shiite mujtahid to analytically 
categorise the subject matter of legal epistemology as dalīl bi-mā huwa dalīl 68. 
In his Qawānīn al-uṣūl, Qummī suggests that the subject matter of legal 
epistemology is confined to the examination of evidence that is pre-assumed to 
be epistemologically valid, and accordingly he claims that the only evidence 
worthy of being evaluated is the four-fold categorisation of evidence, i.e. the 
Qurʾān, sunna, ijmāʿ and ʿaql69. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Another translation for “dalīl bi-mā hiya hiya” is “evidence qua evidence.” Muẓaffar also 
notes that another Arabic term used to denote dalīl bi-mā hiya hiya is “dhāt al-dalīl”, which 
can be literally translated as “the essence of evidence.” Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 9 
68 Ibid, p. 10 
69 See al-Qummī, Mīrzā Abī Qāsim, al-Qawānīn al-ḥukama fi-l uṣūl 2 vols. (Beirut Dār al-
Murtaḍā, 2009) vol. 1, pp. 47-48 
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Qummī’s position is criticised by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Iṣfahānī al-Ḥāirī 
(d.1261/1845) in his Fuṣūl fil-uṣūl, where he correctly assesses that by 
claiming that the subject matter of legal epistemology is dalīl bi-mā huwa dalīl, 
the likes of al-Qummī treat the epistemic validity of evidence as a basic 
presumption (mabādī al-taṣawwuriyya)70. In logic, a basic presumption is 
described as a proposition that is pre-supposed, or is taken for granted, in one 
discipline because it is an issue (masāʾil) that is analysed in another discipline. 
For instance, a simpler example of a proposition that is presupposed in the 
discipline of Shiite legal theory is the legitimacy and authority of the maʿṣūm 
as the appointed representatives of the Divine Lawgiver. This proposition is 
not a jurisprudential issue, rather it is a theological one, and thus is discussed 
and extensively analysed in the discipline of Shiite theology. As such, although 
this proposition also has relevance to the Shiite jurisprudential discourse, it is 
only discussed here in a supplementary manner, and many of the significant 
discussions pertaining to it are taken as basic presumptions.  
 
Therefore, with the aid of analytical jargoning, Ḥāirī expounds that Qummī, 
alongside other Uṣūlī mujtahids who similarly restrict the subject matter of 
Shiite legal theory to the evaluation of dalīl bi-mā huwa dalīl, are in fact pre-
assuming and accepting the epistemic validity of set evidence prior to 
evaluating it within the discourse of legal epistemology. In essence, it can be 
affirmed that for the likes of Qummī, a complete discussion on the epistemic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 Ḥāirī’s view is elucidated by Muẓaffar himself, see Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp.10-11'
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validly of evidence is an area that is outside the scope of legal epistemology or 
legal theory. 
 
As an alternative, al-Ḥāirī proposes that the subject matter of legal 
epistemology is the evaluation of dalīl bi-mā huwa dalīl. He therefore 
concludes that it is inaccurate to pre-assume the epistemic validity of evidence 
prior to evaluating the potential evidence within legal epistemology, as the sole 
purpose of this discourse is to provide the correct forum for evaluating 
evidence per se71. However, it is important to note that Muẓaffar criticises 
Hāirī for failing to evaluate the epistemic validity of a broader range of 
sources, as he too – similar to those he has critiqued - restricts the epistemic 
evaluation to the commonly accepted four-fold categorisation of evidence72. 
 
Nevertheless, it can be asserted that Ḥāirī was one of the first Shiite mujtahids 
who argued, using analytical philosophical jargoning, that the subject matter of 
the discourse of legal epistemology is dalīl bi-mā hiya hiya. Undoubtedly, his 
analysis impressed many of the post-Anṣārī Uṣūlī mujtahids, including 
Muẓaffar. Indeed, it is found that following his extensive introduction to legal 
epistemology, Muẓaffar moves on to individually evaluate the epistemic 
validity of not only the commonly accepted four-fold categorisation of 
evidence, but also qiyās, which is indeed a key evidence whose epistemic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Ibid, p.11 
72 Ibid. 
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validity has historically been severely opposed in the Shiite jurisprudential 
tradition. 
 
In essence, it becomes apparent that the subject matter of legal epistemology 
has evolved with time within the historical discourse of Shiite legal theory. A 
great number of contemporary Uṣūlīs are of the opinion that the subject matter 
of legal epistemology is the study of evidence per se or evidence qua 
evidence73. As a result, it can be affirmed that they uphold that it is, at the very 
least, possible to incorporate the evaluation of a wider range of evidence within 
the discourse of Shiite legal epistemology. Therefore, apart from the accepted 
traditional four-fold categorisation of evidence, and the traditional evidence 
such as qiyās, istiḥsān (juristic preference), maṣlaḥa (public interest) etc. that 
have been rejected in the Shiite jurisprudential discourse, contemporary Uṣūlī 
epistemology can theoretically assent to the epistemic evaluation of modern 
evidence, such as sociological findings, political findings, economic findings 
etc. Indeed, it must be reemphasised that by accepting the epistemic evaluation 
of a wider range of evidence as the subject matter of legal epistemology, this 
does not automatically imply that they can be used in the juristic derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts, as this is only permissible once their epistemic validity has 
been established. Accordingly, in light of the fact that contemporary Uṣūlī 
epistemology theoretically permits the epistemic evaluation of a wider range of 
evidence as its core subject matter, the remainder of this research will focus on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Faḍlī notes that apart from Muẓaffar, other contemporary post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs too agree that 
the subject matter of legal epistemology or legal theory is evidence qua evidence. See Faḍlī, 
Durūs fi uṣūl al-fiqh al-Imāmiyya vol. 1, pp. 111-112 and pp. 141-147!
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critically analysing the epistemological underpinnings maintained in 
contemporary Uṣūlī legal theory. In doing so, this research will explore 
whether contemporary Uṣūlī legal theory is able to legitimise the epistemic 
validity and the utility of a wider range of evidence in the juristic process of 
deriving Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
 
1.3 The Meaning of Epistemic Validity (Ḥujjiyya) 
 
In line with the fact that the subject matter of the contemporary discourse of 
Uṣūlī legal epistemology is to evaluate the epistemic validity of evidence qua 
evidence that can be used in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, it is 
necessary to understand what is exactly meant by the concept of epistemic 
validity in legal epistemology. The Arabic term used to denote the concept of 
“epistemic validity” is “ḥujjiyya74 ,” and when evidence is proven to be 
“epistemologically valid” it is termed as “ḥujja.” Although a corresponding 
synonym to the term ḥujja does not exist in the English language, it is found 
that the concept of ḥujja is not difficult to comprehend. This is largely 
attributable to Muẓaffar’s detailed description of how the term ḥujja, and the 
concept of ḥujjiyya, is understood across inter-related Muslim disciplines. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 There is no exact English synonym for the term ḥujjiyya. However, it is usually translated as 
“authoritativeness”, see Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, p. 126 or “probative 
force”. See Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, p. 31.  Henceforth, it will be translated as “epistemic 
validity”. 
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Muẓaffar firstly explains the understanding of ḥujjiyya by explicating its 
lexical meaning. He clarifies that Al-Ẓāhirī, a tenth century CE Arabic 
lexicographer, defined that anything that is potentially competent in abnegating 
or arguing against another thing is termed as ḥujja75. Muẓaffar elaborates on 
this definition by way of the following example; if two parties are involved in a 
dispute, then the party that possesses ḥujja – i.e. argument over another party - 
is always deemed to be victorious, as this party has ḥujjiyya – i.e. the ability to 
correctly argue. Moreover, Muẓaffar notes that the party that possesses ḥujja 
can be victorious over the party that does not possess ḥujja in one of two ways; 
firstly, by completely silencing or disproving the other party, or secondly, by 
being able to convince the other party of its point of view. Muẓaffar describes 
– without making it clear whether it is his opinion or the opinion of Ẓāhirī – 
that in either instance, the possessor of ḥujja is granted with excusability and 
thus cannot be held accountable76. Therefore, it can be seen that there is a 
necessary correlation between the lexical meaning of ḥujjiyya and the notion of 
accountability and excusability. 
 
Nonetheless, following his analysis of the lexical meaning of the term ḥujja 
and the concept of ḥujjiyya, Muẓaffar demonstrates its usage in the Muslim 
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75 Muẓaffar does not provide a direct reference to al-Ẓāhirī. However, this reference is 
provided by Shaykh Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl al-Shaharkānī in his commentary (sharḥ) of Muẓaffar’s 
Uṣūl al-Fiqh. It should be noted that Al-Ẓāhirī is famously recognised as one of the early 
writers of the Arabic dictionary, Lisān al-ʿArab. See Shaharkānī, al-Shaykh Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl. 
al-Mufīd fi sharḥ uṣūl al-fiqh, 2 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Hidāya, 2003) vol. 2, p. 14 
76 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 11-12 
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discourse of logic (manṭiq)77. In accordance with the logicians, the term ḥujja 
is another expression that is used to describe logical reasoning and 
argumentation. It technically refers to a set of syllogistically constructed 
premises - the minor premise and the major premise - which bring about 
knowledge of something unknown from something known, irrespective of 
whether such knowledge is acquired through inductive argumentation or 
deductive argumentation. For instance, an example of a deductive argument, 
which can also be termed as ḥujja, is: 
 
Minor premise:  John is a human being 
 
Major premise:  Every human being is mortal 
 
Conclusion:   Therefore, John is mortal 
 
Furthermore, the term ḥujja is also used by logicians to describe the common 
denominator, or the middle limit (al-ḥad al-awsaṭ), in syllogistic reasoning78. 
The middle limit is something which is common to both the major and the 
minor premise, and thus can be described as the connecting factor between 
both premises in order to arrive at an argument or a conclusion. For instance, 
the middle limit in the aforementioned example is “human being,” as it is a 
common feature of both the major and the minor premise. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Ibid, p. 12''
78 See Muẓaffar, al-Manṭiq, pp. 201-202 and pp. 209-210 
!!! 62!
 
Therefore, in essence, in the Muslim discourse of logic the term ḥujja is either 
referred to as a syllogistically constructed argument, or the middle limit which 
is consistent in both the major and minor premises of a syllogistically 
constructed argument. In both cases, ḥujja, or the concept of ḥujjiyya, is 
recognised as something which causes or discloses knowledge through 
syllogistic argumentation, irrespective of whether such knowledge is caused in 
cases of disputation or not. It becomes apparent from the logical definition of 
ḥujja that the notion of accountability and excusability is not mentioned. It is 
thus arguable that the discourse of logic, which by nature is very particular in 
defining things, does not include the aspect of accountability and excusability 
as being an integral part of the definition of ḥujja. In other words, unlike the 
lexical definition of ḥujja, the logical definition of ḥujja does not claim that the 
property of accountably and excusability forms part of the definition or the 
nature of ḥujjiyya. 
 
Following its lexical and logical definitions, Muẓaffar moves on to explain 
how the term ḥujja and the concept of ḥujjiyya, is understood in the discourse 
of legal epistemology. He explains: 
 
For the Uṣūlīs, the meaning of ḥujja [as it is] in accordance with their 
normal usage [refers to] “Everything that is competent in establishing 
its referent and does not reach the level of certainty (qaṭʿ).” Inasmuch 
as, the referent is not caused [or established] with certainty, because if 
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it is [established] with certainty, then [that] certainty is [in itself] ḥujja, 
but ḥujja in the literal sense79. 
 
This statement establishes that there are two key characteristics of the Uṣūlī 
definition of ḥujja. On one hand, the term ḥujja is described as something that 
establishes its referent. On the other hand, it is described as something that 
does not reach the level of qaṭʿ (epistemic certainty), as qaṭʿ in itself is deemed 
as ḥujja.  
 
Therefore, it becomes apparent that in legal epistemology, there are two 
distinct usages of the term ḥujja. Firstly, the term ḥujja is referred to in its real 
(ḥaqīqī) sense, whereby it is used to describe something that gives rise to qaṭʿ. 
Although the epistemic validity of qaṭʿ is thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 
Three, it is vital to note at this juncture that in Shiite legal epistemology, qaṭʿ is 
undisputedly recognised to be ḥujja (epistemologically valid) in its literal 
sense. This is because by its very nature, qaṭʿ essentially establishes or 
discloses another thing, and thus it is naturally incumbent upon the person who 
attains qaṭʿ to follow it and act in accordance with its disclosure. Thus, for 
example, if in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts, a mujtahid is to 
come across al-dalīl al-qaṭʿī (certainty-bearing evidence) then the disclosure, 
or the evidentiary nature, of such evidence is essentially ḥujja or 
epistemologically valid in the literal sense, because the Uṣūlīs uphold that a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p.12'
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certainty-bearing evidence by its very essence discloses the Sharīʿa precept and 
makes it naturally incumbent upon the mujtahid to follow its disclosure. 
 
Secondly, the term ḥujja is more widely referred to in its metaphorical (majāzī) 
sense or the technical Uṣūlī sense, whereby it is ascribed to something that 
does not give rise to qaṭʿ, but instead gives rise to ẓann (conjecture) that is 
substantiated. In other words, it refers to evidence that is not essentially ḥujja 
or epistemologically valid in the literal sense, but nevertheless discloses 
conjectural knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. In accordance with the post-Anṣārī 
Uṣūlī thought, the epistemic validity of such evidence is postulated, or 
prescribed, by the Divine Lawgiver, who Himself deems such evidence as  
“ḥujja”80. Thus, for example if in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa 
precepts, a mujtahid is to come across prescribed evidence, then he is required 
to abide by its indication or disclosure, because it has been postulated, or more 
accurately, substantiated, by the Divine Lawgiver Himself, and thus discloses 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
Therefore, the contemporary discourse of Shiite legal epistemology has two 
usages of the term ḥujja. On one hand, the concept of ḥujjiyya refers to the 
epistemological validity of certainty-bearing evidence, whilst on the other 
hand, it refers to the epistemological validity of substantiated evidence.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 The evidence that is substantiated by the Divine Lawgiver Himself is further explained in 
detail in Chapter Four. 
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The definition of ḥujjiyya is of pivotal importance, for by determining what is 
meant by epistemic validity naturally enables the evaluation of what evidence 
is epistemologically valid in the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. As shown, the 
Shiite tradition has historically understood the concept of ḥujjiyya in different 
ways. During the formative period, the concept of ḥujjiyya was restricted only 
to evidence that gave certainty or absolute knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. This 
understanding was then modified within the Shiite jurisprudential discourse 
after ʿAllāma’s introduction of ẓann, wherein it broadened the definition of the 
concept of ḥujjiyya to not only include certainty-bearing (qaṭʿī) evidence, but 
also conjectural (ẓannī) evidence that disclosed Sharīʿa precepts. However, this 
definition was once again further transformed following the works of the 
Akhbārīs, who maintained that knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts could 
predominantly only be derived from the reports of the maʿṣūm, as in 
accordance with their understanding, these reports were the only 
epistemologically valid (ḥujja) evidence that gave knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts.  
 
Due to the constant change of the exact meaning of ḥujjiyya, Muẓaffar deemed 
it necessary to discuss both its lexical and logical definitions. The two 
definitions emphasise the validity of Muẓaffar’s epistemological 
underpinnings, as they establish that something that is recognised as ḥujja does 
not necessarily have to give certain knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, but rather 
may establish a correct method of argumentation. As a result, this strengthens 
the contemporary Uṣūlī position in justifying that Sharīʿa precepts cannot only 
be derived from qaṭʿī evidence, but can also be derived from ẓannī evidence 
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that has been substantiated by the Divine Lawgiver, so long as this evidence 
provides the correct method of argumentation. This once again highlights that 
the contemporary Uṣūlī discourse of legal epistemology is not only 
preoccupied with how it is possible to acquire knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts 
from the best possible means, but also focuses on how a mujtahid is granted 
with excusability and not held accountable and subjected to chastisement for 
deriving Sharīʿa precepts that are in fact contrary to the objective reality.  
 
Nonetheless, Muẓaffar notes that in the Shiite discourse of legal theory, the 
technical meaning of ḥujja is also referred to as “imāra,” “ṭarīq,” and “dalīl.” 
In the technical sense, all these terms refer to any substantiated evidence that 
produces conjectural knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts81. As established, in the 
post-Anṣārī Uṣūlī discourse, substantiated evidence is deemed as 
epistemologically valid because it is recognised as being prescribed or 
substantiated by the Divine Lawgiver Himself. Thus, the conjecture it produces 
is especial conjecture (ẓann al-khāṣ), insofar as although there is a possibility 
of being misled by its evidentiary nature, a mujtahid is always granted with 
legal immunity. Therefore, if a mujtahid is to derive Sharīʿa precepts based on 
the indication of substantiated evidence, then he is not held accountable if its 
indication leads him to err and overlook the precept that is in the objective 
reality. Conversely, if a mujtahid does not abide by the indication of the 
substantiated evidence, and as a result errs in his derivation of a Sharīʿa precept 
and overlooks that which is in the objective reality, then he can be held !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-Fiqh vol. 2, p. 13 
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accountable and also subjected to chastisement. Therefore, in accordance with 
the former, the mujtahid possesses the “ḥujja” that prevents him from being 
punished, whereas in accordance with the latter, God possesses the “ḥujja” to 
justify chastisement. In essence, although the likes of Muẓaffar who belong to 
the contemporary Uṣūlī School, significantly broaden the subject matter of 
legal epistemology to include a wider range of evidence that can potentially 
disclose Sharīʿa precepts, in practice they restrict the actual derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts to evidence that is deemed as ḥujja, inasmuch as it not only 
discloses knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, but also grant mujtahids with 
excusability.  
 
 
1.4 The Evidentiary Nature of Substantiated Evidence  
 
Following his clarification of the Uṣūlī technical usage of the term ḥujja being 
synonymous with the aforementioned terms that can collectively be translated 
as “substantiated evidence,” Muẓaffar moves on to discuss the evidentiary 
nature of substantiated evidence. Indeed, substantiated evidence plays a pivotal 
role in the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, and thus a detailed examination of its 
evidentiary nature and concept is of paramount importance in legal 
epistemology. This is further heightened by the fact that the understanding of 
substantiated evidence has been greatly disputed, and at times even caused 
confusion, within the discourse of Shiite legal epistemology. Accordingly, 
through a systematic analysis, Muẓaffar firstly clarifies the difference between 
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conjecture itself (ẓann) and conjecture produced from substantiated evidence 
(al-ẓann al-muʾtabar). Secondly, Muẓaffar clarifies that one of the most 
essential properties of substantiated evidence is its ability to create generic 
conjecture (ẓann al-nuʾwī) as opposed to individual conjecture (ẓann al-
shakṣī). Finally, he distinguishes between the evidentiary nature of 
substantiated evidence and the practical principles (uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya). 
 
 
1.4.1 The Difference Between Substantiated Conjecture and Conjecture Per Se 
 
Muẓaffar cites that one of the major confusions found in the discourse of Shiite 
legal theory relates to the slack tendency of some Uṣūlī mujtahids to loosely 
use the term substantiated evidence synonymously with ẓann. He clarifies that 
by the term ẓann, these mujtahids do not refer to conjecture per se, but rather 
they refer to al-ẓann al-muʾtabar82. In legal epistemology, the term ẓann al-
muʾtabar (literally: substantiated conjecture) is used synonymously with the 
term ẓann al-khāṣ (especial conjecture), and both these terms refer to 
conjecture that is produced from evidence that has been substantiated, or 
prescribed, as epistemologically valid by the Divine Lawgiver Himself. As a 
result, this type of conjecture can be used in the juristic process of deriving 
Sharīʿa precepts, as it is not the same as ẓann in its conventional meaning, 
which is conjecture per se. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Ibid. 
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Moreover, Muẓaffar also condemns mujtahids who have demonstrated a 
tendency of using the term “substantiated evidence” (whether it is as “imāra,” 
“ṭarīq,” or “dalīl”) synonymously with the term ẓann al-muʾtabar. Using a 
semantic argument, Muẓaffar accurately emphasises that in the discourse of 
legal epistemology, the term “substantiated evidence” has not been postulated 
to indicate conjecture in itself, but rather refers to substantiated evidence that 
has the ability to produce conjecture. Thus, it is only correct to claim that 
substantiated evidence is a source of al-ẓann al-muʾtabar as opposed to being 
synonymous with it. 
 
It is noted that Muẓaffar highlights a clear distinction between ẓann and al-
ẓann al-muʾtabar, because the outcome of ẓann, or conjecture per se, has 
always been opposed in the Shiite jurisprudential discourse, particularly by the 
Akhbārī School. However, by maintaining the epistemological validity of 
substantiated conjecture and denying the epistemological validity of conjecture 
per se, Muẓaffar establishes that his understanding of legal epistemology is 
widely in sync with the Shiite jurisprudential tradition. In other words, in line 
with the post-Anṣārī thought, Muẓaffar clarifies from the outset that Sharīʿa 
precepts cannot be derived from evidence that solely gives rise to conjecture 
per se. Rather, alongside other contemporary post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs, he claims that 
Sharīʿa precepts can only be derived from that which is ḥujja, i.e. evidence that 
produces ẓann al-muʾtabar. Therefore, this illustrates that according to the 
contemporary Uṣūlī thought, the conjecture that is produced from a wide range 
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of evidence that can potentially reveal knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts is in fact 
invalid, unless it has been substantiated by the Divine Lawgiver Himself as 
especial conjecture (ẓann al-khāṣ) that can be used in the juristic derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
 
1.4.2 The Necessity of Producing Generic Conjecture 
 
The knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts that is disclosed from potential evidence 
can either lead to generic conjecture (ẓann al-nuʾwī) or individual conjecture 
(ẓann al-shakṣī). The former arises when potential evidence produces 
conjectural knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts in the minds of a majority of human 
beings, whilst the latter arises when potential evidence produces conjectural 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts in the minds of a minority of human beings, or 
particular individuals. Accordingly, Muẓaffar points out that evidence is only 
correctly deemed as epistemologically valid (ḥujja), or as ”substantiated 
evidence”, if and when it is able to produce generic conjecture of Sharīʿa 
precepts. In contrast, if the evidence fails to produce generic conjecture, and 
instead only produces individual conjecture, then it cannot be held as 
epistemologically valid, or as “substantiated evidence83.” In essence, evidence 
is only recognised as being prescribed by the Divine Lawgiver if it is able to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Ibid, p.14  
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produce knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts in the minds of a majority of human 
beings. 
 
It is evident that Muẓaffar bases this claim on a particular conception of 
rational knowledge, which states that in order to validate some kind of rational 
reasoning, the usual criterion used by a rational agent is to distinguish whether 
such reasoning can potentially produce conjecture in the minds of a majority of 
people in normal circumstances or not. If it is able to produce conjecture in the 
minds of a majority of people, then undoubtedly such reasoning is valid. In the 
same way, owing to the ʿAdliyya theological thought, in Shiite jurisprudential 
discourse, the Divine Lawgiver is assumed to be a rational agent, and indeed is 
considered as the Chief of all rational agents (ra’is al-ʿuqalā), as He is 
Omniscient (ʿālim). As a result, He too uses the same rationalist criterion for 
substantiating evidence. In other words, the Divine Lawgiver only prescribes 
those evidence that He knows have the ability to produce generic conjecture.  
 
Muẓaffar further elaborates on what is meant by generic conjecture by 
highlighting that the epistemic validity of a substantiated evidence is never 
affected or diminished if it fails to give rise to conjecture in the minds of all 
human beings. For example, if in a particular case, certain individuals are 
found to disagree with the indication of a particular substantiated evidence, 
then this does not in any way restrict its epistemic validity. Instead, it is 
epistemologically valid even upon such individuals, as it is not only something 
that the Divine Lawgiver has substantiated as an accepted method (ṭarīq) that 
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leads to knowledge of the objective reality, but also because its disclosure has 
been accepted by a majority of human beings84. 
 
A common example that is usually given in the contemporary Uṣūlī discourse 
of Shiite legal epistemology is that of an isolated report (khabar al-wāḥid). An 
isolated report – if and when it is established as being transmitted by a chain of 
trustworthy narrators – is recognised by post-Anṣārī mujtahids as substantiated 
evidence, whose evidentiary nature is prescribed by the Divine Lawgiver 
Himself. The reason for this is because the Omniscient Divine Lawgiver 
identifies that an isolated report has the ability to produce universal conjectural 
knowledge. Accordingly, if a mujtahid follows and acts in accordance with its 
disclosure, then he is granted with legal immunity, whereas if he refrains from 
following and acting in accordance with it, and as a result fails to derive that 
which is in the objective realty, then he can be held accountable and subject to 
chastisement. 
 
In essence, even if one is to remain sceptical regarding the universal indication 
of substantiated evidence, he or she has no choice but to follow or act in 
accordance with its generic indication. It can be argued that Muẓaffar has 
strongly upheld the epistemic validity of generic conjecture over individual 
conjecture, because by abiding with evidence that produces generic conjecture, 
the possibility of ikthilāf (differences) arising within Shiite jurisprudential 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 Ibid.  
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circles is prevented. It is important to note that the issue of ikthilāf was a 
serious concern during the formative period of Shiite jurisprudence85, as a 
uniform set of epistemic criteria for evaluating evidence did not exist. As a 
result, in order to curtail ikthilāf, Shiite legal theory was forced to prove the 
epistemic validity of certain evidence by evaluating their ability in producing 
universal conjecture. In other words, if Shiite legal epistemology supposedly 
permitted the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts based on individual conjecture, 
then this could possibly lead to major legal schisms within the Shiite 
community, and effectively also significantly impact upon the authority of the 
mujtahid. Consequently, in order to prevent this from occurring, contemporary 
Uṣūlī epistemology deems it necessary to only accept the epistemic validity of 
evidence that has the ability to produce generic conjecture. 
 
 
1.4.3 The Difference Between Substantiated Evidence and Procedural 
Principles 
 
The discourse on procedural principles (uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya) within Shiite 
jurisprudence was significantly developed by Anṣārī, who suggested that it was 
not only possible to derive knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts by referring to the 
Uṣūlī typology of qaṭʿ and ẓann, but that such knowledge could also be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Ṭūsī was the first Shiite jurist to admit a lot of ikhtilāf existed within the juristic circles of 
Shiite Islam. See Calder, “Doubt and Prerogative,” p. 63!
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attained in cases of shakk (doubt)86. Accordingly, procedural principles have 
been applied in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts in situations 
where there is doubt about the level of certainty surrounding a Sharīʿa precept, 
or indeed when a Sharīʿa precept is entirely unknown, due to there being a lack 
of either certainty-bearing evidence or specifically substantiated evidence that 
discloses the Sharīʿa precept. In such cases, a mukallaf - or a mujtahid - is 
required to adopt a practical stance, which consequently leads to the 
application of procedural principles. For instance, on the issue of smoking, 
Ṣadr states: 
 
Let us take as our point of departure the probability that it [smoking] is 
forbidden by the Sharīʿa. We [the mujtahid] first endeavor to find 
evidence for a sharʿi ruling on the issue of smoking, and when we are 
unable to do so, we ask ourselves about the practical stance to be 
adopted towards the unknown – and unknowable - ruling. Is it 
incumbent upon us to observe caution (iḥtiyāṭ) in the matter? This is a 
basic question the jurist now has to answer, and he attempts to do so by 
having recourse to the practical procedure (al-uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya)87. 
 
This clearly illustrates that since there is no disclosure of a Sharīʿa precept 
from either certainty-bearing evidence or substantiated evidence regarding the 
issue of smoking, a mujtahid is necessarily required to take a practical stance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 For the complete discussion of Anṣārī, see Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl, pp. 308-402 
87 Ṣadr, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 112; also see Ṣadr, Durūs vol. 1, p. 129''
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by applying the procedural principles. It is important to note that the procedural 
principles that are commonly discussed in Shiite legal theory include: 
 
1. The principle of caution (aṣālat al-iḥtiyāṭ), which is a principle that is 
applied in cases where the mukallaf only has ambiguous knowledge (al-
ʿilm al-ijmālī) of a Sharīʿa precept. In such cases, the mukallaf is 
required to fulfill or carry out the maximum duties required. An 
example of this would be where a mukallaf has two cups in front of 
him, and possesses knowledge that one of the two cups is contaminated 
with a substance that is prohibited by the Divine Lawgiver, but does not 
have the exact knowledge of which one of the two cups is contaminated 
i.e. the mukallaf only has ambiguous knowledge. In this case, the 
principle of caution would suggest that the mukallaf is required to 
remain cautious and consequently abstain from drinking from any of 
the two cups. In this way, the mukallaf has carried out the maximum 
duty required, and is immune from being held accountable for doing 
that which is prohibited. 
 
2. The principle of exemption (aṣālat al-barāʾa), which is a principle that 
is usually applied in cases where a mukallaf has an initial or basic doubt 
(shakk al-badawī) about a Sharīʿa precept. In such cases, a mukallaf is 
not required to perform any duty towards the Divine Lawgiver; rather 
he is exempt from performing any duties. For instance, a Sharīʿa 
precept does not exist with regards to the issue of smoking, as there is 
not any certainty-bearing evidence or substantiated evidence available 
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that upholds its legal status. Therefore, a mukallaf has basic doubt on 
what the opinion of the Divine Lawgiver on the issue of smoking is, 
and in such a case, a mukallaf is required to abide by a general rule, 
which declares that everything is permissible until it is proven 
impermissible88. By abiding by this general rule, a mukallaf knows that 
he has no duty towards the Divine Lawgiver, and consequently cannot 
be held accountable even if he is to act against that which is in the 
reality. 
 
3. The principle of continuity (aṣālat al-istiṣḥāb) is a principle that is 
usually applied in cases where a mukallaf starts doubting something 
that he previously knew with certainty (qaṭʿ). In such a case, the 
practical stance a mukallaf takes in order to resolve the doubt is to abide 
by, or act in accordance with, his previous certainty. It should be noted 
that the rational justification normally given in Shiite legal theory to 
substantiate the principle of continuity is that doubt can never 
overpower certainty. This is because certainty is always 
epistemologically superior to doubt. An example of where the principle 
of continuity is applicable is in the situation where a mukallaf has doubt 
about his state of ritual ablution (wuḍūʿ), knowing the fact - with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 It is found that the Uṣūlīs have argued for this position by using both textual and non-textual 
evidence. The non-textual evidence will be detailed in Chapter Two. Regarding the textual 
evidence, the Uṣūlīs normally point towards the Qurʾān 17:15 “and never would We punish 
until We sent a messenger.” In addition, the Uṣūlīs also quote the well-known reported 
tradition of the Prophet, which says “My community is not held responsible for what it does 
not know.” See ibid, p. 129; Faḍlī, Durūs uṣūl fiqh al-Imāmiyya vol. 2, p. 515 
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certainty - that he previously did perform the ritual ablution. In this 
case, the principle of continuity would suggest that the mukallaf is 
required to follow his previous certainty, and consequently assume that 
he is in the state of ritual ablution. In other words, after acting in 
accordance with the principle of continuity, even if the mukallaf is not 
in a state of ritual ablution, he cannot be held accountable, as he has 
acted in accordance with his certainty rather than his doubt. 
 
4. The principle of option (aṣālat al-takhīīr), which is a principle that is 
usually applied in cases where a mukallaf has doubt about two 
conflicting Sharīʿa precepts. In such a case, the practical stance a 
mukallaf takes is to choose one of the two conflicting Sharīʿa precepts, 
and this principle is only actively applied in cases where he is unable to 
apply any of the aforementioned principles of caution, exemption, and 
continuity. An example would be in the case where there are two 
equally substantiated evidence that indicate on two conflicting Sharīʿa 
precepts, inasmuch as one evidence suggests that it is obligatory (wājib) 
to perform a particular action, whilst the other evidence suggests that it 
is prohibited (ḥarām) to perform that particular action. In such a 
situation, a mukallaf is in doubt about which indication he is required to 
follow, however he knows that he has to follow one of the two 
conflicting evidence, for if the act is obligatory in the objective reality, 
then it is forbidden to avoid it, and if it is prohibited in the objective 
reality, then it is obligatory not to perform it. Therefore, a mukallaf 
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cannot ignore both the evidence, nor can he abide by the indication of 
both the evidence simultaneously, and consequently he is faced with the 
decision of choosing one evidence. In such a case, even if the mukallaf 
was to choose a Sharīʿa precept which in actual fact is conflicting with 
that which is in the objective reality, he cannot be held accountable, as 
he has no choice but to follow one of the two conflicting evidence that 
have been substantiated by the Divine Lawgiver Himself89. 
 
It is apparent that the key difference existing between the evidentiary nature of 
procedural principles and the evidentiary nature of substantiated evidence is 
that a mujtahid only resorts to using or acting in accordance with procedural 
principles in cases where he is unable to derive Sharīʿa precepts from the 
substantiated evidence. In light of this, it can be affirmed that the juristic 
process of legal reasoning in post-Anṣārī jurisprudential discourse consists of 
two stages - in the first stage, a mujtahid exerts the maximum effort to derive 
Sharīʿa precepts through utilising the substantiated evidence. However, if he is 
unable to attain sufficient indication of Sharīʿa precepts from the substantiated 
evidence, then he progresses to the second stage, whereby he resorts to 
applying the procedural principles. Accordingly, Muẓaffar points out that: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 It is vital to note that although Muẓaffar claims that there is a four-fold categorisation of 
procedural principles, in his Uṣūl al-fiqh he only critically discusses the procedural principle of 
istiṣḥāb (continuity), see Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 231-288. The reason for this is 
because Muẓaffar wrote his treaties of legal theory during the last part of his life, and due to 
this he was not permitted with time to complete his work, see ibid, p. 230. Nonetheless, for a 
detailed study of the four-fold categorisation of procedural principles in the contemporary 
Uṣūlī thought, see Faḍlī, Durūs uṣūl fiqh al-Imāmiyya vol. 2, pp. 463-531 
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The term imāra [or substantiated evidence] does not include uṣūl al-
ʿamaliyya (procedural principles), such as [the principles of] 
exemption, caution, option and continuity. Rather the procedural 
principles are on one side and the imāra are on the opposite side. 
Indeed, a mukallaf only resorts to the [procedural] principles if the 
imāra is missing, or in other words if he [the mukallaf] is unable to 
establish for himself a ḥujja [which indicates] on the ruling of the 
Sharīʿa as it is in the objective reality (wāqiʿī)90. 
 
This statement clearly discloses that according to Muẓaffar, the imāra 
(substantiated evidence) categorically differs to the uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya (practical 
principles). In essence, the procedural principles are only used in the juristic 
process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts when a mukallaf, or more specifically a 
mujtahid, is unable to obtain ḥujja. It is important to understand that by ḥujja, 
Muẓaffar refers to the technical Uṣūlī sense of ḥujja. This is clarified by the 
fact that the Shiite jurisprudential discourse categorises juristic derivations of 
Sharīʿa precepts into two types - real Sharīʿa precepts (al-ḥukm al-wāqiʿī) and 
apparent Sharīʿa precepts (al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī).  
 
The ḥukm al-wāqiʿī is recognised as the “real” Sharīʿa precept because it is 
derived using substantiated evidence. As discussed earlier, substantiated 
evidence is recognised as ḥujja because it has the ability to potentially disclose 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 14-15 
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knowledge of the objective reality. Meanwhile, the ḥukm al-ẓāhirī is 
recognised as the “apparent” Sharīʿa precepts because it is derived using the 
procedural principles. The procedural principles are not recognised as ḥujja in 
the technical Uṣūlī sense, because they do not have the ability to potentially 
disclose knowledge of the reality; rather they are only able to determine an 
apparent precept, or a practical standpoint, in cases where the “real precept” is 
not found91. It is vital to note that this does not however imply that the 
procedural principles are not epistemologically valid (ḥujja), as epistemic 
validity is attributed to them in the literal sense of ḥujja, inasmuch as 
procedural principles by their very nature have the ability to grant a mujtahid 
with legal immunity. In essence, if a mujtahid is to derive an apparent Sharīʿa 
precept by using the procedural principles, then he is granted with excusability 
and cannot be held accountable or subjected to chastisement, even if his 
derived Sharīʿa precept is in contradiction to that which is in the objective 
reality. 
 
Muẓaffar also notes that there exist some differences within the Uṣūlī camp 
regarding the evidentiary nature of the principle of continuity (istiṣḥāb). Some 
Uṣūlīs have claimed it to be akin to substantiated evidence as opposed to being 
a procedural principle92. The reason for this is because they maintain that the 
application of the principle of continuity only becomes active when a mukallaf 
has doubt over something that he previously knew with certainty. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 For a detailed discussion on the ḥukm al-wāqiʿī and ḥukm al-ẓāhirī see Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-
fiqh vol. 1, pp. 5-6; Faḍlī, Mabādī al-uṣūl, pp.8-9; Ṣadr, Durūs 3 vol. 2, pp. 15-17 
92 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 15 
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Consequently, certain mujtahids have concluded that this previous certainty is 
equivalent to substantiated evidence, because like substantiated evidence, the 
previous certainty has the ability to create conjecture (ẓann) in the mind of the 
mukallaf with regards to his current state. For example, if a mukallaf is certain 
that he has performed ritual ablution in the morning, but by the afternoon he 
does not know whether he is or is not in the state of ritual ablution, then his 
previous certainty acts like a substantiated evidence and provides him with 
conjectural knowledge that he is still in the state of ritual ablution.  
 
Meanwhile, Uṣūlīs who uphold that the principle of continuity is in fact a 
procedural principle, claim that there is a subtle difference between the 
evidentiary nature of the principle of continuity and other procedural 
principles. Accordingly, it is found that certain Uṣūlī mujtahids conclude that 
the evidentiary nature of the principle of continuity lies between the 
evidentiary nature of substantiated evidence and the evidentiary nature of 
practical principles.  
 
Indeed, the discussion on procedural principles holds significant implications 
for the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts. In particular, the level of 
priority that the principle of continuity is given in this process is important, as 
if its evidentiary nature is deemed akin to substantiated evidence, then it 
ultimately has the potential of revealing knowledge of the objective reality and 
a mujtahid is required to use it before referring to any of the other procedural 
principles. Muẓaffar does not explicitly provide his opinion on the evidentiary 
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nature of the principle of continuity, however it can be suggested that since he 
does not discuss it in his discourse of legal epistemology, this strongly suggests 
that he categorises it as a procedural principle as opposed to a substantiated 
evidence. 
 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
The Shiites maintained that they had access to absolute knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts owing to the presence of the impeccable (maʿṣūm) imams, and as a 
result it is found that their development of legal theory/epistemology was 
relatively stagnant in comparison to the mainstream Sunni discourse. Indeed, it 
was only following the greater occultation that the Shiites, similarly to the 
mainstream Sunnis, realised the necessity of developing a legal theory that was 
based upon their own theological understanding. As such, during the formative 
period, Shiite mujtahids firmly maintained that knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts 
could only be derived from evidence that emanates certainty (qaṭʿ), and as a 
consequence they exclusively endorsed the epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) of 
qaṭʿī (certainty-bearing) evidence in the jurist derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. 
However, following the emergence of evolving social factors, as well as the 
influence of the highly effective combination of formal logic and traditional 
epistemology that was offered in Sunni legal theory, this initial standpoint 
underwent a significant transformation. ʿAllāma became the first Shiite 
mujtahid to also accept the epistemic validity of evidence that emanated 
conjecture (ẓann) of Sharīʿa precepts, and as a result he argued for, and went 
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on to establish, the epistemic validity of the four-fold categorisation of 
evidence. 
 
ʿAllāma’s efforts resulted in a significant influence upon Shite Uṣūlī 
jurisprudence, which was severely criticised by the Akhbārīs. Their main 
argument centred on the claim that the Uṣūlīs were uncritically accepting 
mainstream Sunni innovations, and consequently were failing to remain true to 
the Shiite primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann in the juristic derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts. The Akhbārīs argued that knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts 
could only be derived from evidence that emanated qaṭʿ, and went as far as 
claiming that the only epistemologically valid (ḥujja) evidence that was 
available were the reports of the maʿṣūm. 
 
This Akhbārī standpoint played a significant role in moulding the subsequent 
Uṣūlī thought. However, their dominance over Shiite jurisprudential circles 
eventually came to an end following the efforts of scholars such as Bihbihānī 
and Anṣārī. The post-Anṣārī discourse of legal epistemology has played a 
pivotal role in the subsequent development of the Uṣūlī thought, which has 
continued till the present day. One of the major contributing factors of this 
discourse has undoubtedly been the safeguarding of the primary axiom of the 
non-validity of ẓann in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts; however, in 
line with their understanding, instead of wholly dismissing the epistemic 
validity of the four-fold categorisation of evidence proposed by ʿAllāma, post-
Anṣārī mujtahids have maintained that knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts can be 
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attained from the especial conjecture (ẓann al-khāṣ) that is emanated, by 
arguing that the Divine Lawgiver Himself has substantiated the epistemic 
validity of their juristic utility. 
 
In light of this, Muẓaffar maintains in his work that the discourse of legal 
epistemology is in fact the most important discussion in the whole of legal 
theory. He advocates that this is primarily because legal epistemology 
evaluates, and effectively substantiates, the epistemic validity of a wide range 
of evidence that can potentially reveal knowledge, or produce ẓann, of Sharīʿa 
precepts. Indeed, as elucidated in this chapter, an evaluation of the epistemic 
validity of evidence is of significant importance in the contemporary Uṣūlī 
discourse, as it emphasises that only when a particular evidence is deemed as 
ḥujja (epistemologically valid) in the technical Uṣūlī sense, can it be used in 
the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. By attaining this status, it is 
established that not only does the evidence reveal knowledge of the Sharīʿa 
precept, but it also grants a mujtahid with excusability, whereby the Divine 
Lawgiver cannot hold him accountable and subject him to chastisement.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Primary Axiom of the Non-validity of Ẓann 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the primary axiom proposed in Shiite 
legal epistemology is the denial of the epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) of ẓann. 
This is undoubtedly the most significant epistemological underpinning of the 
contemporary discourse of Shiite legal epistemology, as the non-validity of 
ẓann was not only initially proposed during the formative period of Shiite legal 
theory, but it is a view that has been unwaveringly maintained and reinforced 
in post-Anṣārī legal epistemology. As a result, the mainstream position within 
the Shiite legal tradition has predominately been recognised to have denied the 
epistemic validity of any evidence that emanate mere ẓann of Sharīʿa precepts 
in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts.  
 
It must be noted that by the term ẓann, Shiite legal epistemology – particularly 
the post-Anṣārī discourse - refers to ẓann bi-mā huwa ẓann as opposed to ẓann 
al-khāṣ, and as such upholds the non-validity of conjecture qua conjecture or 
conjecture per se, rather than especial conjecture that is substantiated by the 
Divine Lawgiver Himself. It can therefore be stated that in accordance with the 
contemporary discourse of Uṣūlī epistemology, the primary axiom is of the 
non-validity of “conjecture qua conjecture” or “conjecture per se.” As such, 
post-Anṣārī mujtahids have offered various different arguments to establish 
and prove the non-validity of ẓann, and in general these arguments are grouped 
into two categories – textual and non-textual. 
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Thus, this chapter will critically analyse how contemporary legal epistemology 
has endeavoured to infer the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann through 
using the textual evidence from the Qurʾān and sunna. It will also consider the 
methods used within the mainstream (mashhūr) opinion amongst contemporary 
Uṣūlīs to justify the primary axiom using both non-textual and (or) rational 
evidence. This analysis will thus investigate whether the primary axiom of the 
non-validity of ẓann is a concept that is theological or religious, or whether it is 
purely rational. Indeed, if it is found that the primary axiom is religious i.e. 
directly inferred from the revelation of the Divine Lawgiver, then it is 
religiously or theologically binding upon every mukallaf to accept it, insofar as 
a mukallaf considers himself to be a Shiite Muslim. On the other hand, if it is 
found that the primary axiom is based on reason, then it is required to be 
established using rational reasoning and evidence, and as a result it can be 
asserted from the outset that the primary axiom is not necessarily binding upon 
a mukallaf. This is because in the hypothetical situation where rational 
reasoning or evidence is not found to prove the primary axiom, a mukallaf 
would not be required to abide by it. In essence, through analysing the textual 
and non-textual arguments provided within the discourse of Shiite legal theory, 
this chapter will elucidate the primary epistemological underpinning or axiom 
that is maintained in the contemporary Uṣūlī discourse, and evaluate how this 
impacts the utility of a wider range of evidence in the juristic derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts. 
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2.1 Textual Argument to Prove the Primary Axiom 
 
A range of different disciplines studied within the Shiite, or in fact Muslim, 
tradition all display a common tendency of seeking to prove and establish their 
intellectual expositions by taking recourse to the textual sources, namely the 
Qurʾān and sunna. Evidently, this is because both of these sources are 
theologically accepted to be either directly or indirectly inspired by God – or 
the Divine Lawgiver – Himself. Whilst the Qurʾān is accepted by all Muslims 
as being a direct revelation from God Himself, the Shiites specifically accept 
that the maʿṣūm are the Divine agents of God, and therefore theologically 
acknowledge that they only act, endorse, and speak in accordance with God. 
Owing to this, Shiite legal theory takes recourse to these textual sources in 
order to establish its epistemic position with regards to ẓann in the juristic 
process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
The verse of the Qurʾān that is most commonly quoted in Shiite jurisprudence 
to establish and prove the non-validity of ẓann (or conjecture qua conjecture) 
is: “Verily, ẓann does not take the place of truth93.” Muẓaffar seemingly 
proposes this verse as the primary proof that invalidates the indication of ẓann. 
In his analysis of this verse, Muẓaffar points out that its apparent indication 
explicitly signifies that the Divine Lawgiver does not permit mankind to follow 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Qurʾān 10:36, this verse is largely quoted by a number of Shiite mujtahids either to prove, or 
to support, the non-validity of ẓann. See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp.15-16; Faḍlī, Durūs 
uṣūl fiqh al-Imāmiyya vol. 2, p. 269 
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or act in accordance with ẓann, because ẓann does not take the place of 
“truth94.”  
 
It is noted that all major exegetes of the Qurʾān - both Shiite and Sunni - have 
unanimously agreed that in the context of this verse, God is referring to those 
non-believers (kufār) who insisted on imitating the conjectural knowledge 
provided by their forefathers, rather than following and acting in accordance 
with the “truth” (ḥaqq) that was revealed to them by the Prophet. Moreover, 
they also explain that by the word “truth”, God means absolute knowledge 
(ʿilm), and thus it is held that God uses the word “truth” equally and 
synonymously with absolute knowledge95. Consequently, in line with this 
understanding, whenever one possesses absolute knowledge of a particular 
thing, he or she necessarily knows the truth or reality of that particular thing, 
and based on the apparent indication of the aforementioned verse, Shiite 
mujtahids primarily conclude that in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa 
precepts, anything that does not bring about absolute knowledge does not 
reveal the truth. Consequently, it is advocated that the Divine Lawgiver 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 It must be noted that the reason why Muẓaffar “seemingly” establishes this verse as the 
primary proof for the non-validity of ẓann is because as it will become apparent in the next 
chapter (Chapter Three) he gives a rational argument to establish the epistemic validity of qaṭʿ 
(certainty), which in itself rationally proves the non-validity of ẓann. Therefore, Muẓaffar 
discusses both the textual and the rational proofs for the non-validity of ẓann, but since he 
gives the textual argument first, it suggests that he uses it as the primary proof. 
95 See Ṭabrisī, Abū ʿAlī al-Faḍl. Majmaʿ al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān 10 vols. (Beirut: Dār wa 
Maktaba Hilāl, 2005) vol. 5, p. 183; Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn. Al-Mīzān fi tafsīr 
al-Qurʾān (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-ʿilmī li-l Maṭbūʿāt, 1997), vol. 19, pp. 41-42; Qurṭubī, 
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Bakar. Al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 25 vols. (Beirut: 
Muʾassasat al-Risālat, 2006), vol. 10, p. 502: Ibn Kathīr, Ismāʿīl b. ʿUmar.  Tafsīr al-Qurʾān 
al-ʿaẓīm, 9 vols. (Saudi: Dār al-Ṭayyiba li-l Nashar wa-l Taūzīm, 1999), vol.4, pp. 267-268 
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Himself dismisses the epistemic validity of ẓann, as it does not possess the 
same epistemic value as absolute knowledge. 
 
However, although the apparent indication of this verse is primarily used to 
prove the non-validity of ẓann, it is not sufficient in establishing that it is 
impermissible or prohibited to follow and act in accordance with it. Therefore, 
in support of this verse, Muẓaffar quotes the following verse: “They follow 
nothing but conjecture: they do nothing but lie96”. Muẓaffar concludes that this 
Qurʾānic verse clarifies that the Divine Lawgiver is critical of those who 
follow or act in accordance with ẓann, as He classifies them as liars. Moreover, 
Muẓaffar also cites the following verse:  
 
“Say: Have you seen what Allah has sent down to you of provision of 
which you have made [some] lawful and [some] unlawful?” Say, Has 
Allah permitted you [to do so], or do you invent [something] about 
Allah?97”  
 
Muẓaffar suggests that this verse indicates that God despises those who forge 
or invent a lie against Him or attribute a lie to Him. He therefore concludes that 
in the context of the jurisprudential discourse, this verse signifies that a 
mujtahid cannot derive God’s law – or derive a law and attribute it to God - 
without His permission, as such an act would tantamount to forgery against !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Qurʾān 6:116 
97 Qurʾān 10:59 
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God, which in itself is sinful and prohibited. Consequently, Muẓaffar maintains 
that in line with both the aforementioned verses, there is no doubt that 
following or acting in accordance with ẓann is prohibited, as the Divine 
Lawgiver Himself has categorically not given such permission, and 
consequently by failing to comply with His prohibition, a mukallaf would sin 
and possibly be subject to chastisement98. 
 
Thus, it becomes apparent that based on Muẓaffar’s interpretation of the 
apparent indication of these verses of the Qurʾān, the Divine Lawgiver 
dismisses the epistemic value of ẓann. Moreover, He also refrains from 
permitting a mukallaf to follow and act in accordance with it. Therefore, 
conforming to the predominant Shiite tradition, Muẓaffar not only maintains 
the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann, but he also expounds that a 
mukallaf is in fact prohibited to follow or act in accordance with its indication. 
 
It is clear that by implying that it is prohibited (ḥarām) to follow or act in 
accordance with ẓann, Muẓaffar – together with other Uṣūlīs who use the 
aforementioned verses as proofs that support the primary axiom99 - necessarily 
indicates that the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann is a Sharīʿa precept 
(ḥukm al-Sharīʿa)100, which is directly inferred from the apparent indication of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 16 
99 For instance, it is found that Anṣārī also supports the non-validity of ẓann using the 
aforementioned verses. Indeed, it can be said that Muẓaffar was in fact inspired by Anṣārī to 
include these verses. See Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 2, p. 49!
100 It must be noted that in the Shiite jurisprudential discourse, Sharīʿa precepts are either 
categorised as: Wājib (obligatory), whereby a mukallaf is obliged to perform a certain action, 
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the textual evidence.  However, a major criticism given against the 
categorisation of the primary axiom as a Sharīʿa precept, based solely on the 
apparent indication of the textual sources, is that it causes a circular argument 
that in itself is a logical fallacy. 
 
This is explained as follows. As discussed in the previous chapter, Muẓaffar 
claims that the primary purpose of Shiite legal epistemology is to evaluate the 
epistemic validity of evidence that can potentially reveal knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts. Accordingly, all evidence that possess the potential to achieve this are 
included within the subject matter of legal epistemology, and if they are 
established to be epistemologically valid (ḥujja), they may be used in the 
juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts. As such, one of the key evidence 
that is evaluated within this discourse is the hermeneutical primacy of apparent 
meaning (ḥujjiyya aṣālat al-ẓuhūr) of the textual sources. However, it is found 
that prior to evaluating its epistemic validity, Muẓaffar has in fact used the 
apparent meaning of the aforementioned verses of the Qurʾān to infer the 
primary axiom. This clearly highlights that Muẓaffar infers the Sharīʿa precept 
of the prohibition of following and acting in accordance with ẓann by 
following and acting in accordance with the apparent meaning of the Qurʾān, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and held accountable for acting contrary; Ḥarām (prohibited), whereby a mukallaf is forbidden 
to perform a certain action, and can be held accountable for acting contrary; Mustaḥab 
(recommended), whereby a mukallaf is recommended to perform a certain action, but is not 
held accountable for acting contrary; Makruh (discouraged), whereby a mukallaf is 
discouraged from performing a particular action, but is not held accountable for acting 
contrary; Mubāḥ (optional), whereby a mukallaf has an option or a choice to perform a 
particular action or not, and is not held accountable either way. For further discussion on this, 
see Faḍlī, Mabādī al-uṣūl, pp. 10-15 
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which itself is conjectural (ẓannī) until it is proven to be epistemologically 
valid. 
 
As such, it can be suggested that either Muẓaffar presupposes the epistemic 
validity of the hermeneutical primacy of apparent meaning as a basic 
presumption of another discipline, and therefore does not admit that it is 
evaluated within the discourse of legal epistemology, or he considers that the 
primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann is in itself a basic presumption, 
indicating that this judgement is not primarily established or proven in legal 
epistemology, but instead has been established within another discipline and 
merely assumed in legal epistemology. 
 
Clearly, the former proposition is not true, as Muẓaffar advocates that any 
evidence that can potentially reveal knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts is included 
within the bounds of the subject matter of legal epistemology. Indeed, 
Muẓaffar devotes a large section of his legal epistemology to the evaluation of 
the epistemic validity of the hermeneutical primacy of apparent meaning of 
textual sources. On the other hand, although Muẓaffar does not categorically 
state that the primary axiom is specifically established and proven within 
another discipline, he also does not explicitly elucidate that it is established 
within the discourse of legal epistemology. Therefore, although highly 
unlikely, by suggesting that Muẓaffar accepts the primary axiom of the non-
validity of ẓann as a basic presumption, the risk of creating a circular argument 
is avoided. 
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In support of the aforementioned verses of the Qurʾān, the other textual 
evidence that is usually applied in Shiite legal epistemology is the transmitted 
reports that emanate the sunna of the maʿṣūm. There are numerous reports that 
either directly or indirectly indicate upon the non-validity of ẓann, and imply 
the prohibition of following and acting in accordance with it. Amongst these 
traditions, al-Faḍlī in Durūs fil Uṣūl Fiqh al-Imāmiyya highlights the following 
report that is commonly quoted by Shiite mujtahids to prove the primary 
axiom: 
 
“A person who judges with injustice, and has knowledge (ʿilm) of it, 
then he is [destined] for fire. A person who judges with injustice, and 
has no knowledge of it, then he is [destined] for fire. A person who 
judges truthfully, and has no knowledge of it, then he is [destined] for 
fire. A person who judges truthfully, and has knowledge of it, then he is 
in paradise101.” 
 
Although this reported tradition is in the context of legal arbitration that is 
carried out by a judge (qāḍī), its apparent indication interestingly shows that in 
accordance with the maʿṣūm, the Divine Lawgiver even condemns those who 
arrive at a truthful arbitration by mere coincidence, without taking recourse to 
evidence that gives full disclosure of absolute knowledge. Therefore, this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 See al-Faḍlī, Durūs uṣūl fiqh vol. 1, p. 270 
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tradition is interpreted and utilised within Shiite legal epistemology to support 
the aforementioned verses of the Qurʾān, as it clearly emphasises that anything 
less than absolute knowledge, or anything that is effectively conjectural, has no 
epistemic value102. This is enhanced by the notion that conjecture is not even 
sufficient in granting legal immunity to judges who deal with worldly 
arbitration, let alone to mujtahids who endeavour to derive the Divine Sharīʿa 
precepts.  
 
However, as discussed, by relying on the apparent meaning of this tradition, 
whether by itself or in support of the other verses of the Qurʾān, the same 
circular argument is created. In order to avoid this, it must either be admitted 
that the primary axiom is established and proven in another discipline and 
merely pre-assumed within the discourse of legal epistemology, or that the 
textual indications are not the primary evidence that establish the non-validity 
of ẓann, rather they are supporting evidence. 
 
Nevertheless, a further criticism posed against mujtahids who arrive at the 
primary axiom based purely upon the apparent indication of the textual sources 
is provided by Ṣadr in Durūs fi-l ʿilm al-uṣūl. Ṣadr specifically mentions that 
amongst the post-Anṣārī mujtahids, Shaykh Mīrzā Ḥusayn al-Naʾīnī (d. 
1355/1936), who as mentioned was one of Muẓaffar’s most prominent 
teachers, explicitly proclaimed that it is prohibited to follow and act in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Ibid. 
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accordance with ẓann based on the apparent general indication (iṭlāq) of the 
verses of the Qurʾān. Ṣadr criticises al-Nāʿinī’s approach by arguing that it is 
inaccurate to infer the primary axiom solely from the general indication of the 
verses, as he suggests that the apparent indication of the verses – or other 
textual indicators - do not indicate such a prohibition (taḥrīm). Ṣadr reaches 
this argument by classifying the Divine Lawgiver’s command against ẓann (as 
interpreted from the aforementioned verses) as an amr al-irshādī as opposed to 
an amr al-mawlawī103.  
 
In Shiite legal theory, a command (amr) can either lead to a “devotional” or 
“religious” precept (ḥukm al-mawlawī), or a “directive” or “instructive” 
precept (ḥukm al-irshādī). The former refers to a precept that is directly 
commanded by the Divine Lawgiver in the textual sources, and therefore such 
a command can only be inferred from the Qurʾān and sunna. As such, it is 
binding upon a mukallaf, whereby if he intentionally disobeys such a command 
then he has committed a sin and can be held accountable in front of the Divine 
Lawgiver104. An example of a religious precept that is inferred from the textual 
sources is the command to pray (ṣalāt). This command is directly explicated in 
the verse of the Qurʾān that states “establish prayer.” In accordance with the 
apparent indication of this verse, the Divine Lawgiver directly commands the 
mukallaf to pray; therefore it is devotionally or religiously binding upon him to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 See Ṣadr, Durūs 3 vol. 2, p. 49 
104 For a detailed explanation of amr al-irshādī and amr al-mawlawī, see Ṣanqūr, Shaykh 
Muḥammad. Muʿjam al-Uṣūl 2 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Tarīkh al-ʿArabī, 2011), vol. 1 pp. 
330-334 and pp. 337-338 
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pray, and if he was to intentionally disobey this command, the mukallaf has 
committed a sin and would be held accountable. 
 
Meanwhile, ḥukm al-irshādī refers to a precept that is primarily inferred from 
reason, and yet is also found in the textual sources. Therefore, instead of 
simply being inferred from the command of the Divine Lawgiver, it is a 
command that is independently discerned or judged by reason (also known as 
ḥukm al-ʿaql) that is correspondingly mentioned or commanded within the 
Qurʾān and sunna. Thus, such a precept is described as an instructive 
command, for its primary function is to direct and guide mankind towards that 
which they already rationally comprehend. An example of a precept that is 
independently discerned by reason is “the obligation of being just,” inasmuch 
as reason independently – i.e. without the aid of the Divine Lawgiver - has the 
ability to infer the moral property of “praiseworthiness” of justice and arrive at 
this rational precept. However, when the command of being just is also 
indicated within the textual sources of the Qurʾān and sunna, then it is 
recognised as an instructive or directive command, whose function is not only 
to guide mankind but to also confirm the dictates of reason. 
 
Although this is an area of discrepancy, the view that is predominately held 
within Shiite jurisprudential circles is that the difference between an instructive 
command and a religious command is that when a mukallaf intentionally 
disobeys a religious command, this tantamounts to sinning and he can be held 
accountable. However, if a mukallaf intentionally disobeys an instructive 
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command, then this does not tantamount to sinning and the mukallaf is not held 
accountable, but has to face the consequence of not following or acting in 
accordance with the command. For example, an instructive command that is 
commonly discussed within the Shiite jurisprudential discourse is the 
command of reciting the name of God prior to slaughtering a chicken. In such a 
case, if a mukallaf was not to recite the name of God prior to slaughtering, then 
he has not committed a sin, nor can he be held accountable. However, the 
consequence of this is that the chicken is no longer edible for him, nor is the 
mukallaf permitted to feed it to other Muslims105. 
 
Based on this distinction, Ṣadr maintains that the command that proves the 
primary axiom is an instructive command as opposed to a religious command. 
As such, Ṣadr advocates that the command is rational, inasmuch as it is 
primarily discerned using reason, and correspondingly is also confirmed within 
the religious textual sources. Indeed, it can be argued that this observation is 
correct, as whenever a rational mukallaf has the option to choose between two 
conflicting evidence - whereby one is certainty-bearing (qaṭʿī) and the other is 
conjectural (ẓannī) - then he rationally chooses to follow and act in accordance 
with the qaṭʿī evidence, and completely disregard the ẓannī evidence. This is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 It must be noted that Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi in The Infallibility of the Prophets in the 
Qurʾān points out that if a mukallaf disobeys an instructive command then he is not 
committing a sin. He substantiates this point by giving an example of a doctor, who advises his 
patient to drink a certain medicine; if the patient ignores the doctor’s advice, then he is not 
committing a sin or a “crime”, but he will surely suffer the consequence, inasmuch as his 
illness can be prolonged and his health might further deteriorate. See Rizvi, The Infallibility of 
the Prophets in the Qur’an, pp.23-24; also for further information on the implication of the 
distinction between amr al-mawlawī and amr al-irshādī on other Sharīʿa precepts, see Yazdi, 
“Islam and Different Forms of Government” at 
http://www.imamreza.net/eng/imamreza.php?id=8912 
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unmistakeably because by following and acting in accordance with a qaṭʿī 
evidence, a rational mukallaf is certain and has satisfaction (iṭmʾinān) that he 
has fulfilled the maximum responsibility (taklīf) required. In essence, reason 
has the ability to independently discern the non-validity of ẓann, and the 
textual or religious sources merely confirm this rational judgement.  
 
Moreover, by upholding that the primary axiom is an instructive command, 
Ṣadr, in contrast to Naʾīnī, advocates that following or acting in accordance 
with ẓann is not prohibited by the Divine Lawgiver, insofar as the mukallaf 
does not commit a sin and be held as accountable. Rather, Ṣadr proposes that 
the mukallaf has to face the consequence of following and acting in accordance 
with ẓann106. This implies that if a mukallaf is to act in accordance with ẓann, 
and as a result acts in contradiction to that which is in the objective reality 
(wāqiʿī) then he can be held accountable. However, if by following ẓann, a 
mukallaf is to attain that which is required or in the objective reality, then he 
cannot be held accountable. 
 
In essence, it becomes apparent that there exists a discrepancy amongst the 
contemporary Shiite mujtahids with regards to the exact nature of the textual 
command that is used to determine the epistemic validity of ẓann. For some 
mujtahids, such as Naʾīnī and seemingly Muẓaffar, the command issued by the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 See Ṣadr, Durūs 3 vol. 2, p. 49 
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Divine Lawgiver is an amr al-mawlawī (religious command)107, and as a result 
they claim that not only is it invalid for a mukallaf to follow and act in 
accordance with ẓann, but it is also prohibited. Accordingly, if a mukallaf 
disobeys this command and chooses to act in accordance with ẓann, then he 
can be held accountable for it. An obvious implication of this understanding is 
that it restricts the juristic utility of a wider range of evidence in the derivation 
of Sharīʿa precepts, as it is essentially limited to evidence that emanate qaṭʿ, or 
evidence that emanates especial conjecture (ẓann al-khāṣ).  
 
On the other hand, mujtahids such as Ṣadr argue that the command issued by 
the Divine Lawgiver is an amr al-irshādī (instructive command), thus 
indicating that the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann is primarily and 
independently inferred from reason, and correspondingly confirmed within the 
religious sources. This understanding is accepted by the mainstream opinion 
(mashhūr) within the post-Anṣārī jurisprudential discourse i.e. it acknowledges 
that the primary axiom is inferred from reason, and considers the apparent 
indication of the textual sources as confirming the dictates of reason108. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 It must again be emphasised that the reason why I suggest that Muẓaffar ‘seemingly’ 
establishes the primary axiom as a religious command is because he does not categorically 
specify that it is a religious command. Moreover, based on the argument he has provided to 
establish the epistemic validity of certainty (qaṭʿ) in the following Chapter, it can also be 
concluded that in line with his understanding the primary axiom is something that is rational.'
108 See Ḥaydarī, Kamāl. Uṣūl al-istinbāṭ al-fiqhī: al-Ẓann dirāsat fi ḥujjiyyati-hi wa aqsāmi-hi 
wa aḥkāmi-hi (Qum: Dār al-Farāqid, 2008), p. 26 
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2.2 Non-Textual Argument to Prove the Primary Axiom 
 
The core non-textual argument offered by mainstream Uṣūlīs to prove the 
primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann is that, in comparison to qaṭʿ 
(certainty), ẓann is unable to provide full explication (bayān al-tām), and as a 
result most post-Anṣārī mujtahids do not consider it to be epistemologically 
valid in the Uṣūlī sense. In other words, due to the lack of explication or 
disclosure that is attained through using evidence that emanates ẓann, a 
mukallaf can be held accountable for acting in accordance with its indication; 
moreover, his right of excusability is also taken away. This contemporary 
mainstream Uṣūlī opinion regarding the epistemic validity of ẓann is 
exemplified by Shaykh Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Khurāsānī (d.1329/1911), who 
in Kifāyat al-Uṣūl109 claims that: 
 
There is no doubt that substantiated evidence (imāra) do not provide 
absolute knowledge, and are not like qaṭʿ, whose epistemic validly 
(ḥujjiyya) is necessarily correlated to its essence. Indeed the 
establishment of the epistemic validity of it [i.e. substantiated evidence] 
is [either] dependent on postulation [of the Divine Lawgiver], or [on 
whether] the preludes of the argument of insidād are satisfied... 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 It must be noted that Khurasānī’s al-Kifāyat al-Uṣūl is one of the key Uṣūlī textbooks 
studied in Shiite seminaries. It is usually undertaken by a student at an advanced level after 
they have completed studying Muẓaffar’s Uṣūl al-Fiqh. 
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[Therefore,] it is clear that other than qaṭʿ nothing can be 
epistemologically valid without [further] proof.110 
 
This highlights that in accordance with the mainstream opinion, the epistemic 
validity of qaṭʿ is necessarily correlated to its essence, and thus it does not need 
to be proved further. On the other hand, ẓann, by default, is not considered as 
epistemologically valid until its epistemological validity is proven, and at this 
juncture, it can be pointed out that as proposed by Khurāsānī, the Uṣūlī School 
has offered two distinctive methods to prove or substantiate the epistemic 
validity of ẓann. They have either argued that certain ẓann is especial 
conjecture (ẓann al-khāṣ), in that the Divine Lawgiver Himself has directly 
postulated its epistemic validity, or alternatively used the theory of insidād 
(also known as dalīl al-insidād), which unrestrictedly substantiates the 
epistemic validity of conjecture qua conjecture. Both of these methods are 
discussed further in the forthcoming chapters. Nonetheless, the statement 
proposed by Khurāsānī maintains that the mainstream Shiite position regarding 
the primary axiom is heavily dependant upon the unmistakeable epistemic 
validity of qaṭʿ. 
 
Based on the mainstream belief that only full explication, or qaṭʿ, has the 
ability to indicate on the characteristics of epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) i.e. 
accountability and excusability, mainstream Uṣūlīs have formulated the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 See Khurāsānī, Muḥammad Kāẓim. Al-Kifāyat al-Uṣūl 2 vols. (Qum: Majmaʿ al-Fikr al-
Islāmī, 2009), vol. 2, p. 38'
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principle of “qubḥ al-ʿiqāb bi-lā bayān” (the blameworthiness of chastisement 
without explication)111. This is claimed to be a rational principle, insofar as in 
accordance with its indication, it is rationally blameworthy or repulsive for the 
Divine Lawgiver to hold a mukallaf accountable for not abiding by a duty or 
responsibility (taklīf) that He Himself has not fully explicated or disclosed. 
Accordingly, the mainstream conclude that only when full explication – or 
qaṭʿ- about a taklīf is available, can a mukallaf act in accordance with it and be 
held accountable. In contrast, if there is no explication, or mere conjectural 
(ẓannī) explication available, then a mukallaf cannot be held accountable. 
 
It must be noted that the mainstream opinion has formulated this principle due 
to its theological affiliation with the ʿAdliyya thought. In accordance with this 
thought, the Divine Lawgiver judges the intrinsic moral properties of acts in 
the same way as rational people do, as the Divine Lawgiver is the Chief of all 
rational agents (ra’is al-ʿuqalā). Thus, it is concluded that the Divine 
Lawgiver, by priority, also acts in line with the principles of rational beings, 
which effectively indicates that the extent of the Divine Lawgiver’s right over 
the mukallaf is equivalent to the extent of the right a human master possesses 
over his subject112. Accordingly, just as the principle of “blameworthiness of 
chastisement without explication” applies to a human master, it too applies to 
the Divine Master, and therefore the Divine Master only has the right to hold a 
mukallaf accountable in cases where He has given full explication or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 See Ḥaydarī, al-Ẓann, pp. 27-28 
112 Ibid, pp. 28-32 
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disclosure. In essence, according to the mainstream view, the epistemic validity 
of a command issued by the Divine Master is equal to the command issued by 
a human master, and just as it is immoral for a human master to hold his or her 
subject accountable based on a ẓannī explication, it is also immoral for the 
Divine Master to hold His mukallaf accountable based on a ẓannī explication. 
 
 
2.2.1 Ṣadr’s Critique of the Mainstream Non-Textual Argument 
 
Although Ṣadr too maintains that the primary axiom is rational, he criticises the 
mainstream view regarding the non-validity of ẓann by pointing out that by 
formulating the principle of “blameworthiness of chastisement without 
explication”, the mainstream has falsely analogised the mastership that is 
possessed by the Divine Master as univocally parallel to the mastership that is 
possessed by a human master. Instead, Ṣadr endeavours to prove the falseness 
of this analogy by elucidating that the property of mastership attributed to the 
Divine Lawgiver is theologically accepted as an essential part of His essence in 
the Shiite belief. However in contrast, the mastership that is possessed by a 
human master is merely accidental i.e. it is possible to conceptualise a human 
being without possessing the property of mastership, however it is not possible 
to conceptualise the Divine Master without the property of mastership. Based 
on this distinction, Ṣadr proclaims that the rational principle of 
“blameworthiness of chastisement without explication” is only rational when it 
is applied to a human master. However, it is irrational when it is applied to the 
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Divine Lawgiver, for it is possible that the mastership of the Divine Master 
might differ significantly to the rationally comprehended mastership of the 
human master.  
 
Consequently, Ṣadr suggests that it is inaccurate to claim that the principle of 
“blameworthiness of chastisement without explication” applies to the Divine 
Master in the same way that it does to the human master, which in turn restricts 
the extent of His mastership - or the extent of the right He has of obedience 
(ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa) - to only those instances in which He gives full disclosure113. 
Alternatively, Ṣadr proposes that the parameter or the extent of the mastership 
of the Divine Lawgiver cannot be proved through logical or rational 
demonstration, rather he suggests that it is simply known through rational 
intuition114. According to Ṣadr, rational intuition is able to recognise that since 
the Divine Lawgiver is the Creator (khāliq) of all things, He, by His very 
essence, is the Master (mawla) and the Proprietor (mālik) of all things, and due 
to his proprietorship He necessarily possesses the absolute right of obedience 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 This view of Ṣadr is explained in detail in Sayyid Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī Shārwadī’s Buḥuth fi 
ʿilm al-uṣūl which is a commentary on the thought of Ṣadr, see Shārwadī, Sayyid Muḥammad 
Hāshimī. Buḥūth fi ʿilm al-uṣūl 7 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasat Dāʾira Maʿārif al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, 
2005) vol. 4, pp.186-187; Ṣadr’s criticism against the Uṣūlī mainstream can also be found in 
Ḥaydarī, al-ẓann, pp. 26-32; and Ṣadr, Durūs 3 vol. 2 pp. 35-38 
114 It must be noted that Ḥaydarī elaborates that in line with Ṣadr’s understanding, it is not 
possible to prove the mastership of the Divine Lawgiver by using rational demonstration 
because it leads to endless inconclusive questions. For instance, if it is accepted that the 
criterion for the mastership of the Divine Lawgiver is due to Him being the Creator (Khāliq), 
then this leads to a series of further questions; firstly, what evidence is there to suggest that a 
creator possesses mastership and the right of obedience? Secondly, does the Divine Creator 
require the permission of the mukallaf before charging him with responsibility (taklīf)?  For his 
deliberations on this, see Ḥaydarī, al-Ẓann, p. 29!
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(ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa)115. Owing to this, Ṣadr claims that intuitively it is fully rational 
that the extent of His mastership is extended to not only include those instances 
in which He gives full disclosure or qaṭʿ, but also to those instances in which 
He gives less than qaṭʿ, i.e. conjectural (ẓannī) disclosure or doubtful 
disclosure (shakk or iḥtimāl)116.  
 
In essence, due to the Divine Lawgiver’s creatorship (khāliqiyya) and 
proprietorship (mālikiyya), the principle of “blameworthiness of chastisement 
without explication” does not apply to Him in the same way that it does to a 
human master. As a result, Ṣadr proposes that the Divine Lawgiver can not 
only hold a mukallaf accountable for acting contrary to full disclosure, but He 
can also hold him accountable for acting contrary to conjectural or doubtful 
disclosure. In the same way, the Divine Lawgiver can not only grant a mukallaf 
with excusability for acting in accordance with full disclosure, but He can also 
grant him with excusability for acting in accordance with conjectural or 
doubtful disclosure. Therefore, the extent of the right or mastership of the 
Divine Lawgiver is unrestricted, and it is entirely dependent upon the Divine 
Lawgiver whether He wishes to make disclosure epistemologically valid 
(ḥujja) or not. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 Apart from the fact that the Divine Lawgiver is the Creator (khāliq) and the Proprietor 
(mālik) of all things, another argument that Ṣadr gives to prove that the Divine Lawgiver has 
absolute right of obedience (ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa) is that of wujūb al-shukr al-munʿim. In accordance 
with this argument, it is rationally obligatory upon every human to thank or show gratitude 
towards the one who bestows or the one who is recognised as the bestower. Therefore, since 
the Divine Lawgiver is the Bestower of all things, intuition recognises that He must be offered 
gratitude for all that He has bestowed, and owing to this He has the absolute right of 
obedience. See Shārwadī, Buḥuth fi ʿilm al-uṣūl vol. 4, p. 28 
116 See Ṣadr, Durūs 3 vol. 2, pp. 36-37 
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Therefore, it has become apparent that Ṣadr views the primary axiom of the 
non-validity of ẓann as inaccurate. Instead, he proposes that as far as a 
mukallaf is concerned, every disclosure (inkishāf) from the Divine Lawgiver – 
whether it is certain or conjectural in nature - is epistemologically valid, and 
therefore unless stipulated otherwise, the mukallaf is required to follow and act 
in accordance with every disclosure if there exists even the slightest possibility 
that it has been revealed by the Divine Lawgiver. This understanding is upheld 
by the primary principle of aṣālat al-ishtighāl (the principle of pre-occupancy). 
In accordance with this principle, a mukallaf is required to undertake or be 
“pre-occupied” with every possible duty disclosed by the Divine Lawgiver, 
irrespective of whether it is revealed with full disclosure or conjectural 
disclosure, and he can only be relieved of performing such duties if the Divine 
Lawgiver decides to stipulate otherwise117. It is clear that Ṣadr’s proposed 
theory differs significantly to the mainstream opinion, as the primary principle 
proposed by the latter is aṣālat al-barā’a (the principle of exception), which 
indicates that a mukallaf is exempt from following or acting in accordance with 
every disclosed duty from the Divine Lawgiver, with the exception of those 
duties that are explicated by full disclosure. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 Ibid, pp. 37-38; also see Ḥaydarī, al-Ẓann, p. 31!
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It is important to note that in his book entitled al-Ẓann, Kamāl Ḥaydarī118 
admits that Ṣadr accurately criticises the mainstream position for constructing a 
false analogy that univocally equates the mastership of the Divine Master to 
the mastership of a human master. However, he also points out that it is 
inaccurate of Ṣadr to conclude that the extent of the Divine Lawgiver’s 
mastership is absolute due to Him having the attributes of being the Creator 
and the Proprietor. Rather, Ḥaydarī argues that the Divine Lawgiver is also 
recognised through other divine names and attributes, which lead to the 
cancelation of the aforementioned attributes. For example, he suggests that 
rational intuition is not only able to consider that the Divine Lawgiver can hold 
a person accountable through His attributes of being the Creator and the 
Proprietor, but it also has the ability to consider that the Divine Lawgiver can 
grant a person with excusability through His attributes of being All Merciful 
(raḥmān) and All Just (ʿādil)119. Ḥaydarī exemplifies this by pointing out that: 
 
It is possible to consider that the Divine Lawgiver can recompense a 
sinner in two distinct ways; if we look at the Divine Lawgiver as being 
the Most Decisive Judge (ḥakīm), then it is more than likely to conclude 
that the Divine Lawgiver would punish the sinner. However, if we look 
at the Divine Lawgiver as the Most Merciful (raḥmān), then it is more 
than likely to conclude that the Divine Lawgiver would pardon the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 It must be noted that Kamāl Ḥaydarī is one of the most prolific students of Ṣadr, and is 
currently deemed as one of the most prominent seminary teachers of uṣūl al-fiqh. 
119 Ibid, p. 31 
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sinner. Effectively, it is found that there is somewhat a conflict between 
the respective names and attributes of the Divine Lawgiver120. 
 
This clearly illustrates that there is no set rule on how the Divine Lawgiver can 
choose to deal with a mukallaf. As a result of this, Ḥaydarī provides a 
pragmatic theological conclusion in which he asserts that the extent of the 
mastership that the Divine Lawgiver possesses over a mukallaf only reaches to 
the point where His Divine attributes do not convene and contradict, or cancel 
out the effects of, one another. In accordance with Ḥaydarī, the only instances 
where the attributes of the Divine Lawgiver do not lead to contradictory effects 
are when He explicates a duty with full disclosure 121 . Based on this 
understanding, if a mukallaf has full disclosure of a duty, and yet acts contrary 
to it, then the Divine Lawgiver – through being the Creator and the Proprietor - 
can hold him accountable. However, if a mukallaf has conjectural disclosure of 
a duty, then the various attributes of the Divine Lawgiver can lead to a 
contradictory effect i.e. it is possible for the Divine Lawgiver to either hold the 
mukallaf accountable based on Him being the Creator and the Proprietor, or 
alternatively grant the mukallaf excusability based on Him being All Merciful.  
 
In essence, it is arguable that by modifying Ṣadr’s theological underpinnings, 
Ḥaydarī effectively establishes the mainstream position, by maintaining that 
the mastership of the Divine Lawgiver only reaches to the extent of when He !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid, p. 32!
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gives full disclosure. Consequently, Ḥaydarī upholds the primary axiom of the 
non-validity of ẓann.  
 
In essence, it is found that the mainstream position maintains that in theory 
(maqām al-thubūt), it is impossible for the Divine Lawgiver – due to Him 
being the Head of all rational beings - to hold a mukallaf accountable without 
providing him with full disclosure. Accordingly, it is upheld that epistemic 
validity (ḥujjiyya) is necessarily correlated to the essence of full disclosure, or 
qaṭʿ, and cannot be separated from it. Furthermore, the mainstream position 
denies the epistemic validity of anything other than qaṭʿ, and upholds the 
primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann. This view is supported by Ḥaydarī, 
who concludes that the mastership of the Divine Lawgiver only reaches the 
extent to when He gives full disclosure, as in the event of conjectural 
disclosure, His Divine attributes would contradict one another. Although 
Ḥaydarī’s understanding may be viewed as theologically more accurate, it 
nonetheless leads to the same implication that anything other than full 
disclosure should be rejected. 
 
On the other hand, Ṣadr maintains that in theory, it is possible for the Divine 
Lawgiver – due to Him being the Creator and the Proprietor - to hold a 
mukallaf accountable with or without giving him full disclosure. As a result, 
Ṣadr upholds that epistemic validity is not necessarily correlated to the essence 
of full disclosure, rather he argues that it is entirely dependent upon the Divine 
Lawgiver whether He wishes to make a disclosure epistemologically valid 
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(ḥujja) or not. In other words, the Divine Lawgiver possesses the mastership to 
either choose to hold a mukallaf accountable or abstain from holding a 
mukallaf accountable, based on the disclosure He explicates. In effect, Ṣadr 
does not uphold the mainstream position with regards to the primary axiom of 
the non-validity of ẓann; instead he proposes that ẓann is as valid as qaṭʿ. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Practical Implications of Ṣadr’s Legal Epistemology 
 
It can be suggested that perhaps the key implication of Ṣadr’s theoretical 
theological disposition is that every disclosure from the Divine Lawgiver is 
epistemologically valid, irrespective of whether it is qaṭʿī or ẓannī. On the 
outset, this implies that in light of Ṣadr’s analysis, a wider range of evidence – 
whether they are independent sources of Sharīʿa precepts or hermeneutical 
methods - can be used in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts. 
However, Ṣadr points out that: 
 
The subject matter of verifiability [or epistemological validity] is 
everything that can disclose duty, even if the disclosure is conjectural. 
This is because of the broad parameter of the right of obedience 
[possessed by the Divine Lawgiver]. However, this right of obedience 
and verifiability of duty is based on the non-attainment of permission 
from the [Divine] Master to act in contradiction with the duty. This 
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[permission is given] by [the Master] issuing serious amnesty (tarkhīṣ 
jādd) that permits acting contrary to the disclosed [duty]122. 
 
Therefore, Ṣadr suggests that whilst the default position is that every disclosed 
duty -whether qaṭʿī or ẓannī - is epistemologically valid, since epistemic 
validity (ḥujjiyya) is not necessarily correlated to the essence of disclosure, the 
Divine Lawgiver has the right and the choice to either grant or abstain from 
granting a disclosure with epistemic validity. As a consequence, the Divine 
Lawgiver may issue an amnesty, which effectively undermines the epistemic 
validity of a particular disclosure and therefore grants a mukallaf with the 
permission to not follow or act in accordance with it. 
 
However, this raises the question of when, and at what level, is it possible for 
the Divine Lawgiver to issue such amnesty? Ṣadr proposes that in practice, or 
in the “realm of physical occurrence” (maqām al-ithbāt), it is only logically 
possible for the Divine Lawgiver to issue a mukallaf with an amnesty that 
permits him to act in contrary to a duty when that duty is conjecturally 
disclosed. He points out that such amnesty is usually issued by the Divine 
Lawgiver by way of Him issuing another disclosure, which is 
epistemologically superior to the conjectural disclosure that the mukallaf 
already possesses. Ṣadr points out that the Divine Lawgiver usually issues or 
discloses such amnesty through the procedural principles (uṣūl al-
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122 See Ṣadr, Durūs 3 vol. 3, p. 35 
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ʿamaliyya)123. For example, the principle of exemption (aṣālat al-barāʾa) 
enables a mukallaf to be ‘exempted’ from performing a duty that has not been 
fully disclosed to him, whilst the principle of permissibility (aṣālat al-ibāḥa) 
proposes that everything is permissible until it is proven – or fully disclosed - 
otherwise.  
 
Therefore, if for example, it is hypothetically assumed that a mukallaf has 
conjecture of a Sharīʿa precept that states that “it is obligatory to perform 
supplication (duʿā) each time one witnesses the moon”, then in such a case the 
mukallaf cannot follow this conjectural duty, because the amnesty that is issued 
by the Divine Lawgiver – i.e. the principle of exemption – will necessarily 
judge that he is exempted from performing a duty that is not fully disclosed. 
Therefore, although Ṣadr does not explicitly state this, it can be argued that he 
clearly holds the epistemic validity of evidence that grants amnesty as being 
epistemologically superior to conjectural disclosure, and accordingly takes 
precedence over it. 
 
Meanwhile, Ṣadr points out that it in practice (maqām al-ithbāt) it is not 
logically possible for the Divine Lawgiver to issue a mukallaf with amnesty 
that permits him to act in contrary to a duty that has been revealed to him by 
full disclosure or qaṭʿ. He maintains that the Divine Lawgiver can only issue 
an amnesty to act in contrary to full disclosure by issuing a disclosure that is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 Ibid, p. 36 
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epistemologically superior to full disclosure, and this can only be achieved in 
one of two ways; by issuing either a ḥukm al-wāqiʿī (real Sharīʿa precept) or a 
ḥukm al-ẓāhirī (apparent Sharīʿa precept). The former refers to a precept that 
discloses knowledge of the ‘reality’ or that which is in the mind of the Divine 
Lawgiver, and it is unanimously accepted in contemporary Shiite 
jurisprudential circles that knowledge of ḥukm al-wāqiʿī can only be attained 
through evidence that is either itself certainty-bearing (qaṭʿī) or has been 
substantiated by certainty (i.e. ẓann al-khāṣ or imāra). On the other hand, the 
latter refers to those precepts that provide a practical standpoint in 
circumstances where the al-ḥukm al-wāqiʿī is not known124. Again, it is 
unanimously accepted that knowledge of ḥukm al-ẓāhirī is derived by acting in 
accordance with the practical principles (uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya). In essence, a ḥukm 
al-wāqiʿī is deemed as a primary Sharīʿa precept, whereas a ḥukm al-ẓāhirī is 
deemed as a secondary Sharīʿa precept, which comes into effect when there is 
no disclosure of a primary precept. 
 
Therefore, if the Divine Lawgiver was to issue an amnesty to act against full 
disclosure by issuing a ḥukm al-wāqiʿī, this would effectively imply that the 
mukallaf has been given two fully disclosed duties at the same time whose 
respective subject matters conflict. For instance, a mukallaf may have full 
disclosure of a ḥukm al-wāqiʿī that establishes the obligation to perform the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 This distinction has also been made in Chapter One under “The Difference Between 
Substantiated Evidence and Procedural Principles”. For a detailed discussion on the differences 
between ḥukm al-wāqiʿī and ḥukm al-ẓāhirī, see ibid pp. 15-17; Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 1, 
pp. 5-6; Faḍlī, Mabādī al-uṣūl, pp. 8-9 
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Friday congregational prayers (ṣalāt al-jumuʿā). However, if it is then 
hypothetically assumed that the Divine Lawgiver issues another ḥukm al-
wāqiʿī that also fully discloses to the mukallaf that it is not obligatory to 
perform the Friday congregational prayers, then effectively the mukallaf is 
faced with two contradicting certainties. On one hand, he has certainty (qaṭʿ) of 
performing a particular duty, but on the other hand he also has certainty of not 
performing that particular duty. This brings about a logical impossibility, for it 
is not possible for two contradictory things to be in agreement at the same time 
e.g. it is logically impossible for something to be both ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ at the 
same time, or to be both ‘black’ and ‘white’ at the same time. Therefore, Ṣadr 
proclaims that in practice it is not logically possible for two contradicting 
disclosures regarding a particular duty to exist at the same time in the mind of 
the mukallaf125. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that Ṣadr also briefly elucidates that the 
criterion (milāk) ordained by the Divine Lawgiver to make a particular action 
obligatory is when He ‘loves’ that particular action. Meanwhile, the Divine 
Lawgiver only prohibits a particular action when He ‘hates’ it. Therefore, if He 
was to issue two contradicting precepts, whereby one indicates upon an 
obligation and the other indicates upon a prohibition, this would evidently 
suggest that there is confusion within the mind of the Divine Lawgiver, for He 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 See Ṣadr, Durūs 3 vol. 2, pp. 40-42 
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is deeming the same action to be ‘good’ and ‘bad’ at the same time126. Ṣadr 
clarifies that this is impossible, as there can never be confusion or contradiction 
in the mind of the Divine Lawgiver, therby concluding that it is logically 
impossible for the Divine Lawgiver to issue an amnesty that undermines the 
epistemic validity of full disclosure through issuing another full disclosure127. 
 
Ṣadr moves on to consider whether the Divine Lawgiver can issue an amnesty 
that permits a mukallaf to act contrary to full disclosure by issuing a ḥukm al-
ẓāhirī. However, he concludes that that this too is not possible, because a ḥukm 
al-ẓāhirī is only active in cases when the ḥukm al-wāqiʿī is not known, and as 
such it is merely a secondary precept that comes into effect when there is no 
disclosure of the primary precept128. For example, if a mukallaf has full 
disclosure that he is required to perform ṣalāt five times a day, then it is not 
logically possible for him to abide by the procedural principle of exemption 
(aṣālat al-barā’a), as this principle is only applicable when there is no 
disclosure of the al-ḥukm al-wāqiʿī, or there is doubt or conjecture regarding 
the disclosure of the ḥukm al-wāqiʿī. Therefore, when a mukallaf has access to 
full disclosure, it is logically impossible for ḥukm al-ẓāhirī to become active in 
issuing an amnesty that permits the mukallaf to act contrary to it. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 Ṣadr’s deliberations here are pointed out by Kamāl Ḥaydarī, see Ḥaydarī, al-Ẓann, pp. 33-
34 
127 It must be noted that in the hypothetical situation where a mukallaf believes that he has full 
disclosure of a particular Sharīʿa precept, but then finds that the Divine Lawgiver Himself, or 
the maʿṣūm, fully discloses a Sharīʿa precept that is contrary to that particular Sharīʿa precept, 
it can be claimed that the latter Sharīʿa precept will cancel or abrogate the former Sharīʿa 
precept. In such an instance, rather than implying that there are two contradicting precepts in 
the Mind of the Divine Lawgiver, it can be said that the Divine Lawgiver is simply revealing a 
new precept, because He deems it to be more effective. 
128 See Ṣadr, Durūs 3 vol. 2, pp. 40-42 
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Thus, it becomes apparent that although in theory – or in maqām al-thubūt - it 
is possible for the Divine Lawgiver to grant, or abstain from granting, 
epistemic validity to both full disclosure and conjectural disclosure, in practice 
– or in maqām al-ithbāt - it is logically impossible for the Divine Lawgiver to 
issue an amnesty (tarkhīṣ) which leads to undermining the epistemic validity of 
the qaṭʿ – or full disclosure - that is possessed by the mukallaf. Indeed, the only 
occasion where it is possible for an amnesty to take effect, and undermine the 
epistemic validity of a disclosure, is when a mukallaf possesses ẓann – or 
conjectural disclosure. This implies that even though Ṣadr advocates that it is 
theoretically possible for ẓann to be epistemologically valid, he admits that in 
practice only qaṭʿ can be unequivocally held as epistemologically valid.  
 
Thus, whilst Ṣadr believes that in theory it is possible to utilise a wider range 
of evidence in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts, in practice the 
Divine Lawgiver has in fact issued an amnesty that undermines the disclosure 
that is attained from conjectural (ẓannī) evidence. This effectively signifies that 
the only evidence from which it is possible to derive Sharīʿa precepts is that 
which either fully discloses Sharīʿa precepts, or that which has not been 
undermined by the amnesty issued by the Divine Lawgiver. Ṣadr summarises 
the practical implication of his thought in the following statement: 
 
Evidence, if it is certainty-bearing (qaṭʿī), is epistemologically valid 
(ḥujja) on the basis of the epistemic validity of certainty (ḥujjiyyat al-
!!! 117!
qaṭʿ). If this is not the case, but rather if there is certainty-bearing 
evidence, which establishes [or substantiates] it’s [i.e. an evidence’s] 
epistemic validity, then [one is required to] act in accordance with it. 
As for the case in which there is no certainty-bearing evidence, and 
there is doubt whether the Divine Lawgiver has postulated something to 
be epistemologically valid, due to there being no evidence for it, then 
the primary principle (al-aṣl) is of non-validity (ʿadam al-ḥujjiyya). 
Therefore, by this we mean that when there is doubt on the epistemic 
validity [of an evidence], it does not have a practical effect (athar al-
ʿamalī)129. 
 
Undoubtedly, the implication of Ṣadr’s understanding is reminiscent to the 
mainstream opinion, which concludes that only certainty – whether in theory or 
in practice - is epistemologically valid (ḥujja), and the epistemic validity of 
anything other than certainty is required to be postulated by the Divine 
Lawgiver Himself. As a result of this, the mainstream opinion denies the 
epistemic validity of a wide range of evidence, such as those which produce 
ẓann per se. Rather, it maintains that the only evidence that can be used in the 
juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts is that which is certainty-bearing 
(qaṭʿī), or that which has been directly permitted by the Divine Lawgiver.  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 Ibid, p. 47'
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2.3 Conclusion 
 
It becomes clear from the discussion in this chapter that the primary axiom of 
the non-validity of ẓann has been unanimously accepted within the post-Anṣārī 
contemporary discourse of Shiite legal epistemology. Meanwhile, the key 
differences that exist amongst Shiite mujtahids relate to the epistemic 
foundations upon which this primary axiom has been established. 
 
On one hand, scholars such as Naʾīnī, and seemingly his student Muẓaffar, 
claim that the primary axiom is theologically or religiously founded. Based on 
the apparent indication of the textual sources, they have argued that it is clear 
that the non-validity of ẓann, and the prohibition (ḥurmā) of following and 
acting in accordance with it, has been directly postulated by the Divine 
Lawgiver Himself. Accordingly, these scholars propose that the primary axiom 
is a necessary aspect of the Shiite theological or religious belief, and 
consequently if a mukallaf is to disobey it by following and acting in 
accordance with the indication of ẓann, then he will sin and can be held 
accountable. A key implication of this understanding is that a wider range of 
evidence cannot be used in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts, as 
it is maintained that a particular type of evidence can only be used if the Divine 
Lawgiver Himself has permitted it. As a result, this signifies that a mujtahid 
can only utilise evidence that is qaṭʿī (certainty-bearing), as qaṭʿ is intrinsically 
epistemologically valid (ḥujja), or evidence that emanates especial conjecture 
(ẓann al-khāṣ), as the Divine Lawgiver Himself substantiates such evidence. 
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However, it has been argued that this understanding supports the primary 
axiom of the non-validity of ẓann by relying solely on the apparent indication 
of the textual sources, which itself is conjectural (ẓannī) until it has been 
proven to be epistemologically valid. Thus, scholars such as Naʾīnī and 
Muẓaffar have been criticised for providing a circular argument by disproving 
the epistemic validity of ẓann by using ẓann. 
 
Alternatively, the mainstream opinion within the Shiite jurisprudential 
discourse upholds that the primary axiom is actually rationally founded, 
inasmuch as reason is independently able to discern that apart from certainty 
(qaṭʿ) or full disclosure (bayān al-tām), no other evidence can be deemed as 
epistemologically valid. The mainstream have established this thought based 
on the theological belief that the Divine Lawgiver is a rational Master, who can 
only indicate on the characteristics of epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) – i.e. 
accountability and excusability - when He fully discloses a duty. 
 
The theological standpoint of the mainstream opinion is however criticised by 
Ṣadr. Ṣadr argues that the concept of epistemic validity is not necessarily 
correlated to the essence of full disclosure, and alternatively he maintains that 
in theory it is theologically possible for the Divine Lawgiver to choose whether 
or not He wishes to postulate epistemic validity to a disclosure. Thus, owing to 
the principle of pre-occupancy (aṣālat al-ishtighāl), Ṣadr proposes that a 
mukallaf is required to follow and act in accordance with every disclosure, 
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irrespective of whether it is certain or conjectural in nature. Nevertheless, Ṣadr 
too eventually concludes on the non-validity of ẓann, by claiming that in 
practice it is impossible for a mukallaf to not act in accordance with something 
that he knows with certainty, as it is logically impossible for the Divine 
Lawgiver to issue an amnesty against the full disclosure that is possessed by 
the mukallaf. 
 
It is apparent that both the mainstream opinion and Ṣadr have established the 
primary axiom by providing different rational reasoning and evidence, which is 
based on two differing theological conceptions of the nature of the Divine 
Lawgiver. On one hand, the mainstream opinion fully adheres to the ʿAdliyya 
understanding of God, whereby it is impossible for an All Just (ʿādil) God to 
hold a mukallaf accountable without giving him full explication or disclosure, 
thus leading to conclude on the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann. On 
the other hand, Ṣadr demonstrates a strong inclination towards what can be 
described as a somewhat Ashʿarite understanding of God, whereby he claims 
that theoretically God can hold a mukallaf accountable without fully disclosing 
a duty. However, in practice, Ṣadr’s understanding also leads to conclude on 
the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann. 
 
Therefore, by maintaining the primary axiom through rational reasoning and 
evidence, the epistemological underpinning maintained within both the post-
Anṣārī mainstream opinion and Ṣadr’s opinion effectively holds the same 
implication as to those who conclude that the primary axiom is a fundamental 
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aspect of the Shiite theological or religious belief. As a result, the juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts is restricted solely to the utilisation of evidence 
that is either certainty-bearing or has been substantiated and permitted by the 
Divine Lawgiver Himself. 
 
Thus, although the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann is unanimously 
agreed upon, Shiite mujtahids propose differing views on whether the primary 
axiom is an integral part of the Shiite theological belief, or whether it is purely 
rational. Furthermore, whilst the mainstream position upholds that the primary 
axiom is rationally established, as opposed to being solely commanded by the 
Divine Lawgiver, scholars such as Ṣadr have given an alternative rational 
reasoning to establish the same primary axiom. This indicates that the rational 
foundation that establishes the primary axiom is an area of dispute within 
contemporary Shiite legal theory, and consequently it can be argued that if 
alternative reasoning and evidence is sought to conversely disprove the 
primary axiom - and therefore prove the validity of ẓann - then a wider range 
of evidence could be incorporated in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa 
precepts. However, in order to do this, it is first necessary to analyse the Shiite 
understanding of full disclosure, or certainty (qaṭʿ), as the rational reasoning of 
both the mainstream and Ṣadr is heavily reliant upon their respective 
understandings of certainty. Therefore, the next chapter will critically examine 
how the concept of qaṭʿ plays a fundamental role in the discourse of Shiite 
legal epistemology, and accordingly evaluate whether or not it restricts the 
juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts to only particular types of evidence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Epistemic Validity of Certainty (qaṭʿ) in 
Shiite Legal Epistemology 
 
 
It has become apparent that the concept of certainty (qaṭʿ) plays a pivotal role 
in the discourse of Shiite legal epistemology. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the primary axiom that is unanimously maintained in Shiite legal 
theory is that of the non-validity of ẓann, and Shiite mujtahids have 
predominantly upheld that knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts can only be derived 
from evidence that is certainty-bearing (qaṭʿī) or evidence that is conjectural 
(ẓannī) but has been substantiated by certainty-bearing evidence (i.e. al-ẓann 
al-khāṣ or imāra). Certainty (qaṭʿ) is recognised to differ significantly to 
conjecture (ẓann), as Shiite mujtahids unanimously accept that certainty is 
epistemologically valid (ḥujja) in nature, and thus deem it obligatory (wājib) 
upon a mukallaf to follow and act in accordance with its indication. Muẓaffar 
clarifies this understanding by stating:  
 
Indeed, the great Shaykh al-Anṣārī (may God bless his soul) has 
beautifully elaborated this discussion by justifying the obligatory nature 
(wujūb) of following [or acting in accordance with] certainty (qaṭʿ), for 
indeed after he states that “there is no problem [regarding] the 
obligatory nature of following certainty and acting upon it as long as it 
is existent,” he justifies this by saying “for indeed it [i.e. certainty] by 
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itself is a path [or way] (ṭarīq) towards the objective reality (al-wāqiʿī), 
and its path cannot be affirmed or negated by the Divine Lawgiver.130 
 
Although Anṣārī expounds that qaṭʿ is a ṭarīq (path/way) towards the wāqiʿī 
(objective reality), and concludes that there is no doubt regarding the 
obligatory nature of following or acting in accordance with qaṭʿ, he does not 
explain how he has reached this conclusion; thus, post-Anṣārī mujtahids have 
debated at great length in their endeavour to support Anṣārī’s claim. 
Undoubtedly, such explanation is of paramount importance in establishing or 
proving the epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) of qaṭʿ, in order to justify the assumed 
epistemic validity of certainty-bearing (qaṭʿī) evidence that is used to derive 
Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
This chapter will firstly examine how post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs have technically 
defined the meaning of qaṭʿ, and critically analyse the existential nature of qaṭʿ 
by specifically considering the post-Anṣārī Uṣūlī understanding of Anṣārī’s 
claim that qaṭʿ is a ṭarīq towards the wāqiʿī. This chapter will then 
diagnostically examine the explanations provided by post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs to 
support Anṣārī’s claim that it is obligatory to follow and act in accordance with 
the indication of qaṭʿ.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 Muẓaffar, uṣūl al-fiqh, vol. 2, pp. 19-20 
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A detailed study of qaṭʿ will determine whether epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) is 
an essential property or a postulated property of qaṭʿ. If the former is found to 
be true, then this necessarily implies that epistemic validity cannot be affirmed 
to or negated from the essence of qaṭʿ. However, if the latter is found to be 
true, then this necessarily implies that the epistemic validity of qaṭʿ can either 
be affirmed or negated by the postulator, which holds a significant implication 
upon the evidence that is used to derive Sharīʿa precepts. If the property of 
epistemic validity can be affirmed to or negated from the essence of qaṭʿ, then 
the supposed differences between qaṭʿ and ẓann would need to be reassessed, 
and if it was found that in the realm of legislation, qaṭʿ does not differ to ẓann, 
then this would undoubtedly impact the range of evidence – whether they are 
sources of law of hermeneutical methods – that can be used. 
 
 
3.1 The Definition of Qaṭʿ in Legal Theory 
 
The term qaṭʿ is derived from the Arabic root word qa-ṭa-ʿa, which literally 
means “to cut” or “to chop off 131 .” However, in the context of the 
jurisprudential discourse, qaṭʿ is a technical jargon and its definition differs to 
its etymological or literal meaning. In Uṣūlī legal theory, qaṭʿ is synonymously 
used with terms such as “jazm”, “yaqīn”, and “ʿilm”, which collectively define 
what the Uṣūlī School recognises as qaṭʿ.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 See Wehr, Hans, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic: Arabic = Muʿjam al-Lugha al-
ʿArabiyya al-Muʿāṣira (Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān, 1980), pp. 774-778 
!!! 125!
 
In Durūs uṣūl fiqh al-Imāmiyya, Faḍlī claims that Uṣūlī mujtahids have 
predominantly described qaṭʿ in the context of jazm132. This appears to be true, 
as after quoting Anṣārī’s statement that “there is no problem [regarding] the 
obligatory nature of following certainty (qaṭʿ) and acting upon it as long as it is 
existent,” Muẓaffar notes that Anṣārī uses the term “qaṭʿ” equivalently to 
“jazm133.” This view is also maintained by Ṣadr, who states that:  
  
The right of obedience [that is possessed by the Divine Lawgiver] is 
upon those duties (takālīf) that are certain (maqṭʿu), and this is what is 
meant by the accountability of qaṭʿ. Also, the right of obedience does 
not extend to include [those duties] that which a mukallaf has certitude 
is not [included] among the duties, [in both cases] he has jazm, and this 
is what is meant by the excusability of qaṭʿ.134 
 
Ṣadr proposes that when a mukallaf possesses qaṭʿ or jazm of a duty, then he is 
required to follow and act in accordance with it, otherwise he can be held 
accountable. However, if the mukallaf does not possess qaṭʿ or jazm then he is 
granted with excusability. This clearly establishes Faḍlī’s view, by confirming 
that when Uṣūlī mujtahids discuss qaṭʿ they predominantly use it in the context 
of jazm.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 Faḍlī, Durūs fi Uṣūl Fiqh al-Imāmiyya vol. 1, p. 260 
133 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-Fiqh vol. 2, p. 20 
134 See Ṣadr, Durūs 3 vol. 2, p. 28 
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The term jazm is described as the psychological state that is acquired by a 
person when they acquire knowledge (ʿilm) of a thing (i.e. the jāzim). This 
psychological state has the effect of creating an utmost belief that eliminates or 
“cuts off” any other contradictory possibility135. For instance, if a person has 
knowledge of the proposition that “a whole is greater than a part,” then by 
possessing such knowledge, they acquire the psychological state of utmost 
belief that leaves no room for doubt that this proposition is correct, and that 
anything contrary to it cannot be true. To further explain this in the context of 
the jurisprudential discourse, Faḍlī notes that:  
 
If there is an explicit evidence, which is utilised by the jurist in the 
process of deriving a legal precept (ḥukm) – whether it is a verse [of the 
Qurʾān] or a tradition - we say that its indication (dalāla) is certainty-
bearing (qaṭʿī), and hence for this reason a jurist uses it to derive a legal 
precept, and [effectively] is led to the state of jazm... [Thus] the 
psychological state that is acquired by a jurist after he has acquired 
knowledge [of a legal precept] is referred to as jazm.136 
 
It is clear that in Uṣūlī jurisprudence, qaṭʿ predominantly refers to the 
psychological state that is attained by a mujtahid – or a mukallaf137 - when he 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 See Faḍlī, Durūs 1 vol. 1, p. 259; and Muẓaffar, Uṣūl vol. 2, p. 20 
136 Faḍlī, Durūs 1 vol. 1, p. 259!
137 It must be noted that a mukallaf does not need to be a mujtahid to obtain qaṭʿ; rather a 
mukallaf can himself obtain certainty in particular issues. For instance, a mukallaf can be 
certain that he has some impurity on his clothes, in which case he is required to wash off the 
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has acquired knowledge of a Sharīʿa precept, whereby he possesses the utmost 
belief (iʾtiqād) that his acquired understanding corresponds to the objective 
reality, and hence as far as he is concerned no other contradictory possibility is 
true. However, the contemporary Uṣūlī camp does not essentially uphold that 
knowledge attained by a mujtahid must necessarily correspond to the objective 
reality. Rather, its definition of qaṭʿ is much more broad, as it also includes 
those instances where the knowledge attained by a mujtahid does not actually 
correspond to the objective reality.  
 
Faḍlī elaborates by pointing out that in cases where qaṭʿ – or more precisely 
jazm - corresponds to the objective reality, it is understood as “yaqīn” (literally: 
certainty). Accordingly, he defines yaqīn as the psychological state that is 
attained by a mukallaf or a mujtahid after he has acquired knowledge of 
something that in actuality does correspond to the objective reality. On the 
other hand, in cases where qaṭʿ does not correspond to the objective reality, it 
is understood as jahl al-murakab (compound ignorance)138. In the discourse of 
logic, the concept of compound ignorance has been described as: 
 
This [compound ignorance] is ignorance about a thing, but combined 
with ignorance about ones ignorance. Such a person believes that he 
has knowledge where he does not. Thus, one does not know that one 
does not know. [Like] all the people with false beliefs would fall into !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
impurity before he can establish prayers (ṣalāt). Therefore, in such a case the mukallaf has qaṭʿ 
or jazm that it is prohibited for him to pray until he has purified his clothes. 
138 Ibid, pp. 260-261 
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this category; they believe that they have knowledge about the 
objective reality of things, but are ignorant in reality. We call this 
compound ignorance because it is actually two kinds of ignorance 
joined together: ignorance about reality, and ignorance about 
ignorance139. 
 
Accordingly, based on the Uṣūlī understanding of qaṭʿ, compound ignorance is 
deemed as being the psychological state that is attained by a mukallaf after he 
has acquired knowledge of something that he believes is true, but in actuality 
does not correspond to the objective reality.  
 
However, when discussing the epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) of qaṭʿ, the Uṣūlīs 
have displayed a tendency to define qaṭʿ in the context of ʿilm (knowledge)140 
instead of jazm. As elucidated by Faḍlī: 
 
Under the title of the epistemic validity of qaṭʿ (ḥujjiyyat al-qaṭʿ), they 
[the Uṣūlī mujtahids] have utilised qaṭʿ in the meaning of ʿilm as 
opposed to jazm. We can clarify this from their remarks in this 
discourse. For instance, the remark of Shaykh al-Anṣārī [which states 
that] “there is not problem [regarding] the obligatory nature of 
following qaṭʿ and acting in accordance with it, as long as it is existent” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139 Muẓaffar, al-Manṭiq, p. 20 
140 For instance, although Muẓaffar defines qaṭʿ as jazm, we find that he categorically uses qaṭʿ 
in the context of ʿilm, in that he actually titles his chapter that discusses the epistemic validity 
(ḥujjiyya) of qaṭʿ as ‘ḥujjiyyat al-ʿilm al-dhatiyya,’ which literally translates as “the essential 
epistemic validity of ʿilm.”   
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you can see that he intends [to mean] jazm from qaṭʿ. [However] he 
completes his remark with the following: “this is because it – i.e. qaṭʿ- 
is a way/path (ṭarīq) towards the reality (wāqiʿī)141.”  
 
Faḍlī points out that by claiming, “qaṭʿ is a path/way towards the reality,” 
Anṣārī implies that the concept of qaṭʿ is different to jazm. Faḍlī explains that 
this is because if it is accepted that qaṭʿ leads one towards the reality, then it 
cannot be strictly defined as jazm, as jazm by definition does not always have 
to correspond to the objective reality. Accordingly, Faḍlī concludes that in 
attempting to establish the epistemic validity of qaṭʿ, the Uṣūlīs have displayed 
a tendency to define qaṭʿ in the context of ʿilm as opposed to jazm. 
 
Although Faḍlī does not explicitly define what is meant by the term ʿilm, he 
supports his conclusion by highlighting that numerous post-Anṣārī scholars 
have also maintained such discrepancy in their definition of qaṭʿ142. Among 
such post-Anṣārī mujtahids is Muẓaffar, who Faḍlī directly quotes as stating: 
 
Indeed, the truth of qaṭʿ is that it discloses the reality (inkishāf al-
wāqiʿī), for in actuality it is nothing but enlightening, and there is no 
bewilderedness in [following and acting in accordance with] it, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Faḍlī, Durūs vol. 1, p. 261 
142 Faḍlī supports this by quoting Sayyid Khūʾī, who explicitly states:  “In summary: 
[obtaining] qaṭʿ of a precept (ḥukm) is nothing but the disclosure of the precept. Indeed, that 
what is implied from this is ʿilm, for indeed ʿilm is something that corresponds to the ḥukm as 
it discloses it. As for jazm, indeed it is a pyschological state (or belief) and a truth-value cannot 
be assigned to its disclosure.” See ibid; also see Khūʾī, Abū Qāsim. Miṣbāḥ al-uṣūl 3 vols. 
Edited by Sayyid Muḥammad Surūr al-Wāiʿẓ  (Qum: Maktabat al-Dāwarī, 1992) vol. 2, p. 9 
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there is no possibility of erring by associating with it. Accordingly, only 
ʿilm is light by its essence and light for other things, and thus it by its 
very essence [has the ability to] disclose (inkishāf)143. 
 
This highlights that Muẓaffar defines ʿilm as having the ability to disclose the 
objective reality, and as Faḍlī does not contest this view, it is arguable that he 
too concurs with Muẓaffar’s definition of ʿilm. It is important to note that 
Muẓaffar clearly equates qaṭʿ with ʿilm, as he proposes that both qaṭʿ and ʿilm 
share the property of being enlightening and thus of disclosing the objective 
reality. This establishes that Muẓaffar does not consider that qaṭʿ leads to 
compound ignorance, as the latter does not have the ability to reveal the 
objective reality. As stated by Muẓaffar in al-Manṭiq: 
 
There are those that contend that compound ignorance is actually a kind 
of knowledge (ʿilm), since it is predicated upon some sort of belief, 
even though it is a belief that is in contrast with reality. But when we 
analyse knowledge in a refined fashion, we will see the distance these 
claims have from reality, and that such a claim is itself a kind of 
compound ignorance. The meaning of [our definition of knowledge] 
“the presence of something’s image in the intellect” is that there is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143Ibid.; also see Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-Fiqh vol. 2, p. 21 
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present within the mind an image that is the same as the thing it 
represents144. 
 
Muẓaffar maintains that whilst ʿilm possesses the property of being 
“enlightening”, compound ignorance can be described as possessing the 
property of being “bewildering,” and thus the latter is unable to disclose the 
objective reality. This discussion highlights that there is ambiguity in 
Muẓaffar’s thought, as although he initially defines qaṭʿ as being synonymous 
with jazm, he later describes qaṭʿ as being equivalent to ʿilm. Thus, despite 
proposing that the definition of qaṭʿ includes both yaqīn and jahl al-murakab, 
Muẓaffar then advocates that qaṭʿ only results in yaqīn.  
 
In essence, this discrepancy exists amongst the majority of contemporary 
Uṣūlīs, as on one hand qaṭʿ is seen as being synonymous to jazm, however, 
when the epistemic validity of qaṭʿ is considered, it is then defined within the 
context of ʿilm. It may be suggested that such discrepancy is due to the 
onslaught targeted towards the Uṣūlīs by the Akhbārīs. As elucidated in 
Chapter One, the Akhbārīs were critical of the Uṣūlī acceptance of ẓann in the 
juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts, and in order to justify the Uṣūlī 
heritage, post-Anṣārī Uṣūlī legal theory contains a number of references to the 
Akhbārī School in an attempt to clarify the misconceptions that exist against 
them. Consequently, it is arguable that the purpose of post-Anṣārī legal theory 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 See Muẓaffar, al-Manṭiq, p.20 
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has been two-fold, as it not only intends to provide principles for a mujtahid in 
his derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, but it also aims to clarify the misconceptions 
held by the Akhbārīs.  
 
The lexical order of these two purposes is undoubtedly beyond the scope of 
this study; however it is apparent that the Akhbārī School has had a major 
influence on the development of post-Anṣārī Uṣūlī legal theory. The Uṣūlīs are 
aware that by legitimising the epistemic validity of compound ignorance, there 
exists the risk of also legitimising the epistemic validity of ẓann through 
compound ignorance, thus in order to avoid this, they have defined qaṭʿ as 
being synonymous to ʿilm when discussing its epistemic validity. 
Consequently, the Uṣūlīs conclude that only ʿilm is epistemologically valid, 
and that ẓann can only be used in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa 
precepts when it is substantiated by ʿilm. Through defining qaṭʿ as ʿilm, the 
Uṣūlīs have maintained that their legal theory is in line with the Shiite juristic 
heritage, and as a result they too adhere to the primary axiom of the non-
validity of ẓann145.  
 
 
Faḍlī concludes that: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 It must be noted that in support of this argument, it is found that Anṣārī in fact begins his 
treaties on legal theory in Farāiʾd al-uṣūl with a discussion on ʿilm. He does not adhere to the 
statuesque conventional writing on uṣūl al-fiqh, which usually begin with the discourse of 
mabāḥith al-alfāẓ, rather from the outset Anṣārī defines and explains the Uṣūlī concept of ʿilm 
and qaṭʿ, see Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, pp. 4-38 
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We understand that their intention [i.e. the intention of the Uṣūlī 
mujtahids] by certainty-bearing indication (dalāla al-qaṭʿī) is the 
indication that gives us ʿilm about the reality of a thing, inasmuch as we 
acquire yaqīn from [following and acting in accordance with] it146. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the Uṣūlīs maintain a corresponding association 
between qaṭʿ, ʿilm and yaqīn. As such, whenever a mujtahid has qaṭʿ (or 
certainty) regarding a Sharīʿa precept, he necessarily has ʿilm (or knowledge) 
of that precept, and likewise when he has ʿilm of a Sharīʿa precept, he 
necessarily has qaṭʿ regarding that precept. In such instances, the ʿilm or qaṭʿ 
that is possessed by the mujtahid is at the level of yaqīn, inasmuch as it 
accurately corresponds to that which is in the objective reality. 
 
 
3.2 The Nature of Qaṭʿ  
 
3.2.1 The Essential Properties of Kashfiyya and Ṭarīqiyya 
 
The Uṣūlīs describe qaṭʿ synonymously with ʿilm or yaqīn, and as such the 
nature of qaṭʿ is described as being the same as the nature of ʿilm and yaqīn. 
This understanding is clearly expounded by Muẓaffar, who states that qaṭʿ, like 
ʿilm, possesses the essential property of kashfiyya i.e. the property of disclosing 
the objective reality (wāqiʿī). However, this view is not explicitly maintained !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 Faḍlī, Durūs 1 vol. 1, p. 268 
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by Anṣārī, as from his statement that “qaṭʿ is a ṭarīq (path/means) towards the 
objective reality,” it is possible to elucidate that this does not necessarily imply 
that qaṭʿ always leads to the objective reality, and by following and acting in 
accordance with qaṭʿ there always exists the possibility of erring. 
 
In order to clarify Anṣārī’s explanation, his contemporaries have argued that 
when Anṣārī claimed that qaṭʿ is a path/means towards the wāqiʿī, he meant 
that it is a “reflective” path/means, inasmuch as qaṭʿ has the property of 
reflecting the objective reality. In other words, just as a mirror accurately 
reflects an objects’ reflection, so does qaṭʿ accurately reflect the objective 
reality, and thus by following and acting in accordance with it there is no 
possibility of erring147. Therefore, it is claimed that qaṭʿ has the property of 
kashfiyya i.e. it discloses the objective reality, and the property of ṭarīqiyya i.e. 
it is a reflective means towards the objective reality. However, it remains to be 
established whether kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are properties that are essential 
(dhātī) to the nature of qaṭʿ, or whether they are necessary correlatives to the 
essence (lawāzim al-dhat) of qaṭʿ. 
 
If the properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are deemed to be essential 
properties of qaṭʿ then they establish or define the very existence or essence of 
qaṭʿ. For example, in the discourse of metaphysics in Muslim philosophy, a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
147 This view is unanimously concurred by the Uṣūlīs, see Ḥaydarī, Kamāl. Uṣūl al-istinbāṭ al-
fiqhī: al-Qaṭʿ dirāsat fi ḥujjiyyati-hi wa aqsāmi-hi wa aḥkāmi-hi (Qum: Dār al-Farāqid, 2006), 
pp. 110-112; also see Iṣfahānī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Gharawī. Nihāyat al-dirāya fi sharḥ al-
Kifāya 6 vols. (Qum: Muʾassasat Āl-Bayt, 1995), vol. 3, p. 18 
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human being (insān) is defined as a rational animal (al-ḥaywān al-nāṭiq), 
inasmuch as the properties of ḥaywāniyya (animality) and nāṭiqiyya 
(rationality) are essential properties that establish the actual existence of a 
human being. Therefore, when a human being is created, the properties of 
ḥaywāniyya and nāṭiqiyya are inevitably created with it, in the sense that the 
essence of a human being can never be devoid of these properties, for if any 
one of the two essential properties were not to exist then a human being qua 
human being would not be defined as a human being qua human being148. 
Similarly, when qaṭʿ is created, so are its essential properties of kashfiyya and 
ṭarīqiyya, in the sense that it can never be devoid of these properties, for if it 
was, then qaṭʿ qua qaṭʿ could not be defined as qaṭʿ qua qaṭʿ. 
 
On the other hand, if the properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are established 
instead to be necessary correlatives to the essence of qaṭʿ, then although these 
properties necessarily exist whenever qaṭʿ exists, they do not establish the very 
existence or essence of qaṭʿ. For instance, the property of laughter is something 
that necessarily exists when a human being exists, however it does not 
establish the existence or the essence of a human being, and therefore as long 
as a human being exists, its property of laughter accompanies his existence, 
and the two never separate. Another example is the relationship between 
“evenness” and the number “four”. As long as the “four” exists, so does its 
property of being “even,” as the latter is not something that can be separated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 See Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn. Bidāyat al-Ḥikma (Qum: Muʾassasat al-
Nashar al-Islāmī, 2004), pp. 76-77 
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from the existence of the essence of “four,” – however, it is not something 
which establishes the existence or the essence of “four.” In the same way, 
although the properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are necessary correlatives of 
qaṭʿ, they are other than qaṭʿ. 
 
The general consensus amongst the Uṣūlīs is that the properties of kashfiyya 
and ṭarīqiyya are essential properties of qaṭʿ, and thus establish and define its 
existence and essence 149 . Therefore, as soon as qaṭʿ exists, its essential 
properties of disclosing the objective reality and being a reflective means 
towards the objective reality also exist. However, irrespective of whether 
kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are considered as being essential properties of qaṭʿ, or 
as being necessary correlatives to the essence of qaṭʿ, it is apparent that these 
properties are not treated as being postulated to the nature of qaṭʿ. This 
signifies that the nature of qaṭʿ wholly differs to the nature of ẓann, as based on 
the mainstream Uṣūlī understanding, the primary axiom of the non-validity of 
ẓann qua ẓann can be retracted by the explicit consent of the Divine Lawgiver. 
In doing this, Divine Lawgiver effectively postulates or adds the properties of 
kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya to ẓann, which transforms it into especial conjecture 
(ẓann al-khāṣ) that can be utilised in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts.  
 
Therefore, as the properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are held to be amongst 
the essentialities of qaṭʿ, the Divine Lawgiver cannot postulate or negate them, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 This is explicitly maintained by the Uṣūlīs, for instance see Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, pp. 112-114; 
Iṣfahānī, Nihāyat al-dirāya, vol. 3, p. 18; Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, vol. 2, pp. 19- 23 
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for if He was to do this then qaṭʿ could not be defined as qaṭʿ qua qaṭ’. 
However, it is arguable that in the realm of legislation (ʿālam al-tashrīʿī), God 
being the Omnipotent Divine Lawgiver possesses the absolute authority to 
exploit the principles or laws of legislation, irrespective of how such laws are 
created in the realm of creation (ʿālam al-takwīnī). Accordingly, although it is 
accepted by the Uṣūlīs that, in the realm of creation, qaṭʿ is created with its 
essential properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya, which cannot be negated from 
itself, in the realm of legislation, it is possible to say that God – or the Divine 
Lawgiver - has the authority to negate these essential properties from the 
existence of qaṭʿ. Thus, in the realm of legislation, the nature of qaṭʿ can be 
analogised to the nature of ẓann, whereby the Divine Lawgiver has the 
authority to postulate the properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya to ẓann. In 
essence, it is arguable that just as the Uṣūlīs accept that the Divine Lawgiver 
has the right to postulate the properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya to ẓann in 
the realm of legislation, He too has the right to negate these properties from 
qaṭʿ in the realm of legislation. 
 
However, in response to this argument, Muẓaffar advocates that even in the 
realm of legislation, it is not possible for the Divine Lawgiver to either 
postulate or negate the properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya from qaṭʿ. 
Muẓaffar applies the philosophical typology between simple creation (al-jaʿl 
al-basīṭ) and composite creation (al-jaʿl al-ta’līfī)150, where the former refers to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 21-23 
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an existence that is only created with its essential properties, whilst the latter 
refers to an existence that is created as a compound, insofar as it includes both 
its essential properties and its accidental properties151. He claims that qaṭʿ is a 
simple creation, which implies that in the realm of legislation, it is created with 
its essential properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya. On the other hand, Muẓaffar 
categorises ẓann - or more specifically substantiated ẓann, or ẓann al-khāṣ - as 
a composite creation, which signifies that it is created with its essential 
properties and its accidental properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya. Muẓaffar 
concludes that in the realm of legislation, the Divine Lawgiver does not 
possess the authority to postulate or negate the essential properties from an 
existence; rather, the parameters of His authority are limited to modifying 
Sharīʿa precepts152. Thus for instance, it is logically possible for the Divine 
Lawgiver to prohibit a mukallaf from following and acting in accordance with 
the qaṭʿ he has. However, it is not logically possible for Him to negate the 
properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya from the essence of qaṭʿ. 
 
At this juncture, it must be clarified that the Uṣūlīs do not propose that God 
cannot create qaṭʿ in the mind of a human being, they simply concur that He 
cannot separate it from its essential properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya. The 
Uṣūlī understanding of the nature of qaṭʿ is summarised by Iṣfahānī, who states 
that: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 See Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Bidāyat al-Ḥikma, pp. 111-112 and pp. 133-135 
152 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 23 
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Qaṭʿ is an illuminating pure reality whose nature is ṭarīqiyya, in that it 
reflects the objective reality. It is not that qaṭʿ is one thing, and that its 
necessary correlatives [of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya] are another thing, 
rather kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are among the essential properties of qaṭʿ 
itself153. 
 
However, this understanding is problematic, as if it is supposed that the 
properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are essential to the nature of qaṭʿ, this 
necessarily implies that qaṭʿ always discloses and reflects the objective reality 
accurately. However, it is evident that the knowledge (ʿilm) or qaṭʿ that is 
possessed by an individual is not always accurate, inasmuch as it does not 
necessarily always correspond to the objective reality, due to the existence of 
compound ignorance (jahl al-murakab). Therefore, how can an individual who 
possesses qaṭʿ know that his or her qaṭʿ accurately discloses and reflects the 
objective reality? In Tahdhīb al-Uṣūl, Sayyid Rūḥallāh Khumaynī 
(d.1409/1989) describes this uncertainty by stating: 
 
Ṭarīqiyya and kashfiyya are believed to be the essentialities of qaṭʿ, not 
through the postulation of a postulator, because it is not possible to 
have a composite creation between an object and its essentialities, for 
when an object is created so are its essentialities… However, we find 
that qaṭʿ is at times accurate and at other times inaccurate. If this is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153Iṣfahānī, Nihāyat al-dirāya vol. 3, p. 18 
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case, then how can you say that kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are from the 
essence qaṭʿ, or are the necessary correlatives of qaṭʿ? Therefore, [this 
shows that] ṭarīqiyya and kashfiyya are not qaṭʿ; neither are they the 
necessary correlatives of qaṭʿ. This is simply a convolution of mixing 
[the discourses of] logic and philosophy within the realm of [the 
discourse of] uṣūl154. 
 
The epistemological criticism that is posed by scholars such as Khumaynī is 
not explicitly answered in the major works of post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs155, as the 
majority of Uṣūlīs have simply referred to the discourses of logic and 
philosophy to elaborate on what is meant by Anṣārī’s statement that qaṭʿ is “a 
ṭarīq to the wāqiʿī, and its ṭarīq cannot be affirmed not negated by the Divine 
Lawgiver.” As such, they have not epistemologically explained how qaṭʿ is 
always accurate in disclosing the objective reality or the external world. 
Accordingly, the next section will critically examine how Kamāl Ḥaydarī156, 
who too agrees that the properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are among the 
essentialities of qaṭʿ, responds to the criticism posed by Khumaynī in his book 
entitled al-Qaṭʿ. This analysis will effectively highlight the key 
epistemological presumption(s) of contemporary Uṣūlī legal theory. 
3.2.2 The Epistemic Justification for the Essential Properties of Qaṭʿ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 Khumaynī, Sayyid Rūḥallāh. Tahdhīb al-uṣūl 3 vols. Edited by Shaykh Jaʿfar Subḥānī 
(Qum: Muʾassasat Ismāʿīlīyān , n.d.) vol. 2, pp. 84-85 
155 Similar criticism is also found by Khūʾī, see Khūʾī, Miṣbāḥ al-uṣūl, vol. 2 p. 5 
156 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Kamāl Ḥaydarī was one of the most prolific students 
of al-Ṣadr, and is currently deemed as one of the most prominent seminary teachers of Uṣūl al-
Fiqh. 
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In the Shiite tradition, the discourse on epistemology, or the theory of 
knowledge (naẓariyyat al-maʿrifa), is not specifically studied within traditional 
Shiite seminary curricula157. Rather, epistemology is parenthetically studied 
within the discipline of philosophy (al-falsafa) - or more specifically Muslim 
metaphysics - and the discipline of logic (ʿilm al-manṭiq). However, prior to 
discussing the epistemic presumptions within Uṣūlī legal epistemology, it is 
important to note that both philosophy and logic were originally inspired by 
Greek philosophy during the Eight Century-Golden Age of the Abbasid 
Caliphate. The introduction of the Greek thought within the bounds of Islam 
was at first dismissed by conservative Muslim theologians and legal scholars, 
as they believed it to be malicious and unnecessary. However, as Fakhry 
elucidates: 
 
By the middle of the eighth century ad the picture had changed 
somewhat, with the appearance of the rationalist theologians of Islam 
known as the Mu'tazilites, who were thoroughly influenced by the 
methods of discourse or dialectic favoured by the Muslim philosophers. 
Of those philosophers, the two outstanding figures of the ninth and 
tenth centuries were al-Kindi and al-Razi, who hailed Greek philosophy 
as a form of liberation from the shackles of dogma or blind imitation 
(taqlid). For al-Kindi, the goals of philosophy are perfectly compatible !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
157 For the common curriculum taught at Shiite religious seminaries see Mallat, The renewal of 
Islamic law, pp. 39-43 
!!! 142!
with those of religion, and, for al-Razi, philosophy was the highest 
expression of man's intellectual ambitions and the noblest achievement 
of the noble people, the Greeks, who were unsurpassed in their quest 
for wisdom (hikma)158. 
 
As noted in Chapter One, the influence of the Greek thought within the folds of 
Muslim legal theory was primarily encouraged by Ghazālī, who in his al-
Mustaṣfā wrote a lengthy introduction to the Aristotelian discourse on formal 
logic and presented the traditional jurisprudential arguments of legal theory in 
a logical manner. As a result of Ghazālī’s endeavour, it is found that the Shiites 
too began to incorporate the formal logic of Aristotle in their method of 
jurisprudential argumentation, and indeed this integration of logic and 
philosophy within the discourse of Uṣūlī legal theory has continued until the 
present day. Traditional Shiite seminaries require the completion of the 
intermediary discourses of logic and philosophy as necessary prerequisites 
before one can advance on to undertake the discourse of legal theory.  
 
Within the discourses of Muslim logic and philosophy, knowledge is described 
as “the grasping of immaterial forms, natures, essence or realities of things159”, 
and in Muslim philosophy, it is divided into ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī (acquired 
knowledge) and ʿilm al-ḥuḍurī (present knowledge). The former refers to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 See Fakhry, Majid. “Greek Philosophy” in Craig, Edward (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 10 vols. (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 3230 
159 See Inati, Shams C. “Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy” in Craig, Edward (ed.) 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 10 vols. (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 2502 
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knowledge of the external world or the objective reality that is cognised by the 
mind, where the mind acquires or captures the concept or the immaterial form 
(ṣūra) of an external thing without its external material properties. Meanwhile, 
the latter refers to knowledge that is not acquired, but rather is already present 
in the mind - for instance, the knowledge that “I am” is not acquired or 
captured by the mind through cognising the external world, rather it is always 
present, for “one cannot fail to be conscious of his own self in any 
circumstance, in solitude or in company, in sleep or in wakefulness, or in any 
other sense160.” In light of this, ʿilm al-ḥuḍurī is recognised as essential 
knowledge, and since it is essential it can never be inaccurate. On the other 
hand, as ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī is acquired, it is described as accidental in nature as 
opposed to essential. 
 
Furthermore, following the tradition of the Greek thought, Muslim 
philosophers and logicians have also divided the knowledge that is possessed 
in the human mind into conception (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq). The former 
refers to the concepts or immaterial forms that are apprehended by the mind, 
without the mind giving a judgment on their objective reality, whilst the latter 
refers to the conceptions and immaterial forms that are apprehended by the 
mind, where the mind – or the soul – gives a judgment, or assents, to their 
objective reality161. This is further explained in the following extract: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 See al-Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Bidāyat al-ḥikma, pp. 173-176 for the primary division of knowledge 
into ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī and ʿilm al-ḥuḍurī. 
161 For more information on the logical division of ʿilm into taṣawwur and taṣdīq see Muẓaffar, 
al-Manṭiq, pp. 13-19 
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Conceptualization [taṣawwur] is the act of the mind by which it grasps 
singular (though not necessarily simple) essences or quiddities, such as 
the concept of 'human being'. Assent [taṣdīq], by contrast, is the act of 
the intellect whereby it makes a determinate judgment to which a truth-
value can be assigned; in fact, conceptualization is defined in Islamic 
philosophy principally by contrast with assent. Thus, any act of 
knowledge that does not entail the assignment of a truth-value to the 
proposition that corresponds to it will be an act of conceptualization 
alone, not assent. More specifically, the Islamic philosophers link 
assent to the affirmation or denial of the existence of the thing 
conceived, or to the judgment that it exists in a certain state, with 
certain properties. Thus, assent presupposes some prior act of 
conceptualization, although conceptualization does not presuppose 
assent162. 
 
In light of the above distinctions, Ḥaydarī points out that knowledge of the 
objective reality (wāqiʿī), or that which is in the Mind of the Divine Lawgiver, 
is something that is accidental, inasmuch as it is not something that is present 
in the mind, rather it is knowledge that is acquired (ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī)163. As a 
result, Ḥaydarī suggests that this knowledge can only be apportioned with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
162 See Black, Deborah L. “Logic in Islamic Philosophy” in Craig, Edward (ed.) Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 10 vols. (London: Routledge, 1998) pp. 4874-4875 
163 Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, p. 114 
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accuracy or inaccuracy at the level of taṣdīq (assent) and not at the level of 
taṣawwur (conception)164.  
 
Ḥaydarī hypothetically exemplifies that if for instance your mind was to 
apprehend the proposition “a thief entered into the house,” then it does this due 
to sense perception, inasmuch as the sensory organs send a message to the 
mind and the mind cognises and apprehends the simple concept or the 
immaterial form of a thief – which is the subject (mawḍūʿ) of the proposition - 
and the simple concept or immaterial form of “entering into the house” – which 
is the predicate (maḥmūl) of the proposition - and conjoins both the subject and 
the predicate together. Ḥaydarī explains that in such an instance, it is not 
possible for the mind to apportion a truth-value at the level of cognition and 
apprehension to the objects of sense perception i.e. the subject and the 
predicate, because both the subject and the predicate are merely simple 
concepts, and as discussed, a concept is always free from judgment. Therefore, 
he suggests that the question of assigning a truth-value only arises when the 
mind assents or assigns a judgment to these concepts. However, Ḥaydarī also 
points out that since the individual forms of the subject and the predicate are 
present in the mind with their full existence, they are things that the mind has 
essential knowledge (ʿilm al-ḥuḍurī) of, and since it has essential knowledge of 
both the subject and the predicate, neither of them can ever be inaccurate. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
164 Ibid pp. 114-119 
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Ḥaydarī thus advocates that the task of assigning a truth-value can only occur 
in cases where knowledge is acquired from the external world or the objective 
reality i.e. in cases of ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī. Since both the subject and the predicate 
are individually present in the mind they cannot, in themselves, be inaccurate. 
Therefore, the only way to assign them with a truth-value is to examine the 
whole proposition “a thief entered into the house” with all its segments 
together, and to compare it to the objective reality. 
 
After doing so, if it is hypothetically supposed that in the objective reality the 
proposition “a thief entered into the house” is inaccurate, rather the accurate 
proposition is “your brother entered into the house,” then Ḥaydarī suggests that 
in such a case the mind would still believe in the former original proposition. 
Here, it is found that the mistake or inaccuracy that occurs in the mind 
specifically relates to the subject as opposed to the predicate, as the mind has 
mistaken the “brother” to be the “thief 165 .” Ḥaydarī explains that this 
inaccuracy may occur because the mind fails to differentiate between the 
attributes of the “brother” and the attributes of the “thief,” because they are 
exactly the same. In other words, both the “brother” and “thief” are for instance 
of the same height and built, are wearing the same clothes, have the same style 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
165 It must be noted that the inaccuracy cannot only come in the mind with regards to the 
subject (mawḍūʿ). It is possible for one to be mistaken about the predicate (maḥmūl) as well. 
For instance, in the example of “a thief entered the house”, in such a case a person can make a 
mistake with regards to the predicate, and thus conclude that “a thief entered the house,” 
whereas in the objective reality the true proposition is that “a thief passed by the house.” 
Therefore, it can be seen that the subject in this case is accurate, rather it is the predicate that is 
mistaken. 
!!! 147!
of entering the house etc. Thus, owing to the fact that they both share the same 
attributes, the mind is led to giving an inaccurate judgment166. 
 
Therefore, this establishes that at the level of conception, the mind has 
essential knowledge of the attributes of the subject, and this knowledge 
corresponds to the objective reality. In other words, the sensory organs 
perceive the objective reality accurately and the mind cognises and apprehends 
the perceived concepts and the immaterial forms of the objective reality 
accurately, until its knowledge is present in the mind. Once the knowledge is 
present in the mind, the mind accurately reflects this knowledge to the 
objective reality167. Therefore, the mind has accurate knowledge of the subject, 
inasmuch as the attributes of the “thief” and the attributes of the “brother,” are 
both the same. 
 
However, although the concept of the subject is accurate, this does not mean 
that truth-value can be assigned to it, because at the level of conception, a 
subject qua subject – or even a predicate qua predicate – cannot be assigned 
with a truth-value. For instance, in this example the subject in the original 
proposition is a “thief,” and a “thief” qua “thief” cannot be assigned with a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 See Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, pp. 119-123 for his full discussion. 
167 The accuracy of sense perception in reflecting and disclosing the objective reality is 
maintained by Ghazālī who expounds that “there is no meaning to knowledge except that of it 
being and image (mithāl) that arrives in the soul, which conforms to that which is an image in 
sense perception, namely, the object known” see Rosenthal, Franz. Knowledge Triumphant: 
The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p.65. Moreover, Rosenthal 
points out that the accuracy or the infallibility of sense perception in disclosing the objective 
reality was widely maintained in the medieval discourse of epistemology, see ibid, pp. 208-239 
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truth-value i.e. one cannot say a “thief” corresponds to the objective reality or 
not, for it simply is just a concept. Instead, truth-value can only be assigned to 
a concept at the level of assent, in cases where the mind wishes to assent 
whether the subject – or even the predicate - is corresponding to the reality or 
not. However, as mentioned above, this is only possible to do when the subject 
is examined together with the predicate within the whole proposition. 
 
Therefore, in light of the aforementioned hypothetical situation, Ḥaydarī 
explains that at the level of assent when the mind judges the whole proposition, 
it inaccurately judges the subject to be something other than what it actually is 
in the objective reality. In essence, at the level of conception, the mind 
accurately apprehends and cognises the subject qua subject. However, at the 
level of assent, when the mind judges the subject within the proposition, the 
subject is inaccurate, as it does not actually correspond to the subject in the 
external world or in the objective reality. 
 
On the basis of this understanding, Ḥaydarī responds to the criticism of the 
likes of Khumaynī towards the mainstream opinion, by defending that qaṭʿ 
does indeed essentially disclose and reflect that which is in the wāqiʿī. He 
argues that those who dispute that the properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are 
not essential properties of qaṭʿ because qaṭʿ is not always accurate are 
mistaken, because they fail to distinguish between qaṭʿ at the level of concept 
and qaṭʿ at the level of assent. In accordance with Ḥaydarī, when the 
mainstream conclude that qaṭʿ or ʿilm discloses and reflects the wāqiʿī, they do 
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so at the level of conception, inasmuch as the immaterial form of the subject 
and the immaterial form of the predicate are individually cognised and 
apprehended by the mind from a qaṭʿī (certainty-bearing) proposition, and 
since the immaterial form of the subject and the predicate is present in the 
mind, it is accurate; thus, at a conceptual level qaṭʿ or ʿilm always accurately 
reflects the objective reality. The mistake or inaccuracy can only potentially 
occur at the level of assent, when the mind’s faculty of imagination overpowers 
its faculty of sense perception, and as a result judges either the subject or the 
predicate of the qaṭʿī proposition to be something other than it actually is in the 
objective reality. Therefore, in essence, Ḥaydarī maintains the mainstream 
conviction that the properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya are essential properties 
of qaṭʿ, and supports the fact that qaṭʿ is always accurate in disclosing and 
reflecting the objective reality at the level of conception. 
 
 
3.2.3 The Epistemic Presumption of Uṣūlī Legal Theory 
 
It becomes apparent from Ḥaydarī’s argument that his underlying or 
fundamental epistemic presumption is based on the accuracy of sense 
perception, as the first step towards knowing something that is outside the 
mind, or in the external world, is through the sensory organs168. However, a 
major criticism towards this understanding relates to the assumed accuracy of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168 See Ḥaydarī, p. 117 
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the mind’s faculty of sense perception. For example, if one is to view a stick 
that is half-submerged in water, it visually appears to be bent. However, when 
the stick is outside the water, it visually appears to be straight. Therefore, how 
can one be sure that when the stick is inside the water it is not really bent? 
Suppose even if it is assumed that it is known that when the stick is outside the 
water it is not really bent, how can seeing a straight stick outside the water 
provide one with good reason for believing that when it is inside the water it is 
not really bent? One possible answer to these questions is that the sense 
perception of vision alone is not sufficient in reflecting the external world, and 
thus one has to also rely on the information obtained from other senses. 
Suppose then that a person asserts that his belief in declaring the stick to be 
straight is because he can feel it to be straight, one may question why the sense 
perception of touching is given priority over the sense perception of vision? 
Moreover, the sense perception of touching can also be inaccurate at times - for 
example, if a person is to chill one hand and warm the other hand, and then 
place both hands in a tub of lukewarm water, the water would feel warm to the 
cold hand and cold to the warm hand169.  
 
These examples demonstrate that the mind’s faculty of sense perception can at 
times be deceiving, and as such it cannot be assumed to be accurate at all 
times. This in turn suggests that one’s knowledge of the external world or the 
objective reality can be inaccurate, which necessarily implies that it is possible !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169 These example are clearly expounded by Austin, John L. “Sense and Sensibilia” in Huemer, 
M (ed.) Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (UK: Routledge, 2002), pp. 76-77 
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to be inaccurate not only at the level of assent, but also at the level of 
conception.  
 
However, it is important to note that if one concludes that sense perception 
cannot be relied on, and as a result it is not possible obtain knowledge – or qaṭʿ 
– of the objective reality, then in Muslim philosophy, such a person is 
described as a sophist. Indeed, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʿī 
(d.1981), who is recognised within Shiite Uṣūlī circles as a renowned 
philosopher for his extensive commentary on the magnum opus of the 
transcendental theosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā170, comments in his Bidāyat al-
ḥikma: 
 
Should the sophist who denies the possibility of knowledge and is 
sceptical of everything admit to be sceptic, it means that he admits the 
possibility of at least some kind of knowledge and thereby affirms the 
principle of contradiction. Then it becomes possible to make him admit 
the possibility of knowledge of many things similar to his knowledge of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
170 Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrazī, known as Mullā Ṣadrā (d.1640), was a Muslim philosopher whose 
major contribution was that he provided a synthesis of the nine centuries of the Muslim 
philosophical/theological heritage. He managed to merge the works of two important schools 
of Muslim philosophy, the Illuminationist (ishrāqī) School of Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī 
(d.1191), and the Peripatetic (mashāʿī) School that was significantly advanced by Ibn Sīnā 
(d.1037). Moreover, Mullā Ṣadrā, in his magnum opus entailed al-Asfār al-Arbaʿa fi’l-Ḥikmat 
al-Mutaʿāliyya, incorporated his philosophical synthesis and merged it with Ibn ʿArabī’s 
(d.1240) Sufi metaphysics and the theology of al-Ashʿarī (d.936) and the Twelvers Shiites. 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s work, also recognised as his transcendental theosophy, is argued to be the single 
most important and influential philosophical thought within the Muslim world in the last four 
hundred years. For more information on the works and the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, see 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. “Mullā Ṣadrā: his teachings” in Nasr, Seyyed H and Leaman, Oliver 
(ed.) History of Islamic Philosophy, 2 vols. (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 2001), pp. 643-662; 
Rizvi, Sajjad H. Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being (London: Routledge, 
2009) 
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being sceptic, such as his knowledge that he sees, hears, has sensations 
of touch, taste and smell, that when he feels hungry he looks for 
something that would satisfy his hunger, or quench his thirst when he 
feel thirsty. When he accepts these, he can be led to admit that he 
possesses the knowledge of other things as well, for all knowledge, as 
said earlier, terminates in sense experience (al-ḥiss). 
 
However, should he refuse to admit that he knows that he is a sceptic 
and declare that he is sceptical of everything, even of his own 
scepticism, and knows nothing, there can be no debate with him and no 
argument will work upon him. This kind of person either suffers from a 
disease affecting his mental faculty, in which case he should see a 
physician, or he is one [who is] hostile to the truth, seeking to refute 
it171. 
 
Thus, the major criticism given towards the sophists (or the sceptics) is that 
when they admit that knowledge of the external world cannot be obtained by 
the human mind, they are implicitly admitting that they “know” that it is 
impossible to obtain knowledge, which evidently tantamounts to a 
contradictory argument. On this basis, Muslim philosophers refute the claim 
that it is not possible to rely on sense perception, and maintain that it is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 See Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Bidāyat al-ḥikma, p. 184. For translations, see Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Muḥammad 
Ḥusayn. The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics: (Bidāyat Al-Ḥikma). Trans. ʻAlī Qūlī. Qarāʼī 
(London: ICAS, 2003) 
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possible to have knowledge – or qaṭʿ – of the external world or the objective 
reality. 
 
 
3.2.4 The Impelling Property of Qaṭʿ  
 
Apart from the essential properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya, Uṣūlī legal 
epistemology also describes qaṭʿ as possessing the necessary property of 
muḥarrikiyya (impulsion). In the realm of existence, the property of 
muḥarrikiyya is explained as the force that impels one who possesses qaṭʿ to 
act in accordance with their qaṭʿ. For instance, if it is supposed that a person is 
dying of thirst, and he possesses qaṭʿ that water is located in a particular 
direction, his qaṭʿ would necessarily impel him to move towards that particular 
direction172. 
 
In accordance with the Uṣūlī definition, qaṭʿ is synonymous with knowledge, 
and as such the external object that is outside the mind does not have an impact 
on a person until he or she has knowledge of it, which consequently explains 
why qaṭʿ has the ability to impel the one who possesses it into action. Thus for 
instance, the objective existence of water itself will not have an impact upon 
the mind of the person who is dying with thirst; rather, only when it is 
apprehended and cognised by the mind will it cause the person to act in a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 See Ṣadr, Durūs 2 vol. 2, pp. 172-173 
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particular way. At this point, the person has obtained knowledge – or qaṭʿ - of 
the water in the objective world, and he or she is impelled into action. 
 
It is suggested that a person is necessarily impelled towards acting in 
accordance with their qaṭʿ because he or she always believes that their 
disclosure of qaṭʿ is accurate, even though this may not the case, as highlighted 
by Ḥaydarī. Nonetheless, in order to explain why a human being is always 
impelled to act in accordance with their certainty, the Uṣūlīs have offered two 
differing opinions 173 . The first opinion proposes that it is rationally 
praiseworthy (ḥusn) to be impelled to act in accordance with certainty, and 
rationally blameworthy (qubḥ) to not be impelled to act in accordance with 
certainty. For example, if a person is dying with thirst, then it would be 
rationally praiseworthy for him to follow his certainty and be impelled towards 
the direction of water, as such an action would be beneficial for him. However, 
it would be rationally blameworthy for him to refrain from being impelled 
towards the direction of the water, as behaving against such an act would not 
be of benefit to him. 
 
Meanwhile, the second opinion given by scholars such as Ḥaydarī proposes 
that it is a part of human nature to be impelled towards acting in accordance 
with certainty. In this instance, a person dying of thirst would naturally be 
impelled towards moving in the direction of water, as this is an instinctive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173 See Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, pp. 123-125 
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reaction for him based on the inherent nature of a human being to survive and 
secure his life. As Ḥaydarī points out: 
 
The natural propensity within a human being will impel the human 
being for the attainment of everything that is compatible with his 
nature at any level of existence, whether it is at a rational level or at 
an imaginative level. This natural impelling force that we have has 
no connection with rational praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. It 
is for this reason that even if we were to deny the existence of 
rational praiseworthiness and rational blameworthiness, we find that 
such natural requirements manifests their effects174. 
 
Irrespective of whether acting in accordance with qaṭʿ is a dictate of rational 
praiseworthiness and rational blameworthiness, or a dictate of human nature, it 
is unanimously accepted by the Uṣūlīs that qaṭʿ has the property of 
muḥarrikiyya. However, it can be argued that in certain situations, ẓann 
(conjecture) may also have an impelling force upon a human being. For 
instance, if a person who is dying of thirst has ẓann that water exists in a 
particular direction, then his ẓann would also impel him to move towards that 
particular direction, which implies that any knowledge that a person has, 
whether it is qaṭʿī (certainty-bearing) or ẓannī (conjectural), would impel a 
person to act in accordance with it, depending on the circumstances. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 ibid, p. 125 
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However, the Uṣūlī argument in response to this analysis would evidently be 
that whilst qaṭʿ is always accurate at the level of conception, ẓann is not, and 
based on this distinction, a person would not always necessarily be impelled 
towards acting in accordance with the indication of ẓann, due to being aware 
that there is a possibility that it may be inaccurate. Contrastingly, if a person 
has qaṭʿ then he or she necessarily believes that their qaṭʿ fully corresponds to 
the reality, and consequently would always be impelled to act in accordance 
with it. 
 
 
3.3 The Epistemic Validity of Qaṭʿ in the Realm of Legislation 
 
From the discussion so far, it has become clear that the properties of disclosure 
(kashfiyya) and reflection (ṭarīqiyya) of the objective reality (wāqiʿī) are 
essential properties of qaṭʿ. In addition to these two defining properties, in the 
realm of existence qaṭʿ has also been described as possessing the property of 
muḥarrikiyya, which necessarily impels the person who possesses qaṭʿ to act in 
accordance with its indication. 
 
These properties of qaṭʿ are taken as a basic presumption (mabādī al-
taṣdīqiyya) in mainstream Shiite legal theory, as prominent Shiite mujtahids 
have generally displayed a tendency to mention these properties in passing, 
without discussing the aforementioned arguments in great detail. Instead, the 
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focal point of discussion within uṣūl al-fiqh relates to the ḥujjiyya (epistemic 
validity) of qaṭʿ.  
 
It is found that when Anṣārī claims, “there is no problem with regards to the 
obligatory nature of following qaṭʿ…for indeed it by itself is a path (ṭarīq) 
towards the objective reality,” his Uṣūlī contemporaries have unanimously 
understood his conclusion to confirm that qaṭʿ is ḥujja (epistemologically 
valid) in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. Based on this 
understanding, if a mukallaf is to follow and act in accordance with the 
indication of qaṭʿ, then he can be granted with excusability even if its 
indication does not – at the level of assent – correspond to the wāqiʿī. On the 
other hand, if a mukallaf does not follow or act in accordance with the 
indication of qaṭʿ and as a result acts contrary to the wāqiʿī, then he can be held 
accountable and be subjected to chastisement. However, on this note al-Sayyid 
Abū al-Qāsim al-Khūʾī (d.1412/1992) rightly points out that: 
 
It is apparent from what we have discussed that the reflectiveness 
(ṭarīqiyya) of qaṭʿ is other than its ḥujjiyya (epistemic validity), for as 
shown it [i.e. the reflectiveness of qaṭʿ] is among its essentialities. This 
is contrary to its ḥujjiyya, as it is unfamiliar to the essence of qaṭʿ in 
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every which way it is envisaged, this is why there is conflation between 
them [i.e. the Uṣūlīs] with regards to what al-Anṣārī has said.175 
 
Therefore, it is clear that there exists some confusion within the Uṣūlī School 
with regards to what exactly is meant by Anṣārī, for he has, in a convoluted 
manner, claimed that it is obligatory to follow the indication of qaṭʿ based on 
the fact that it reflects the objective reality. However, it is evident that the 
essential properties of qaṭʿ (i.e. kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya) do not in themselves 
suffice in proving the legislative property of ḥujjiyya. In other words, although 
it has been established that qaṭʿ has the property of disclosing and reflecting 
the objective reality, this does not necessarily imply that qaṭʿ is also 
epistemologically valid in the realm of legislation.  
 
The Uṣūlīs have provided three different explanations in order to support 
Anṣārī’s claim that qaṭʿ is ḥujja in the realm of legislation, and that it is 
obligatory (wājib) to follow its indication. 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 This view of Khūʾī is provided by Abī Qāsim al-Kawkabī in his commentary on the 
discussions of Khūʾī, see Kawkabī, Abī Qāsim, Mabānī al-istinbāṭ (Najaf: al-Adāb, n.d.) vol. 
1, p. 46 
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3.3.1 First Explanation: The Necessary Correlation of Ḥujjiyya to the Essence 
of Qaṭʿ 
 
According to the popular Uṣūlī understanding, when Anṣārī claims that 
ḥujjiyya is a property of qaṭʿ in the realm of legislation, he means that it is 
lawāzim al-dhat of qaṭʿ i.e. ḥujjiyya is necessarily correlated to the essence of 
qaṭʿ 176 . Thus, the property of epistemic validity i.e. accountability and 
excusability, necessarily exists whenever qaṭʿ exists, as this property is 
necessarily correlated to the essence of qaṭʿ. This mainstream view is clearly 
expounded by Khurāsānī, who states that: 
 
Rationally, there is no doubt in the obligatory nature (wujūb) of acting 
in accordance with qaṭʿ, and the undoubted necessity of being impelled 
to act with it. It verifies the immediate duty (taklīf), inasmuch as it 
actualises the blameworthiness and chastisement for acting in 
contradiction with it, and [grants] excusability if you are mistaken 
[when acting in accordance with it]. This efficacy of qaṭʿ is necessary 
(lāzim).177 
 
Khurāsānī’s view is supported by Khūʾī, who further elaborates by explaining 
that when Khurāsānī states that ḥujjiyya is necessarily correlated to the essence 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
176 See Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, pp. 129-130 
177 Khurāsānī, Kifāyat al-uṣūl vol. 2, p. 11 
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of qaṭʿ, he means that qaṭʿ has the property of ḥujjiyya in ‘actual fact’ (nafs al-
amr)178.  
 
In the Muslim discourse of philosophy, it is upheld that every essence subsists 
through existence, however it is not necessary that every existence must exist 
in the realm of the external world; rather, it is possible for an essence of a thing 
to be existent in the realm of the mind, thus making it possible for the mind to 
comprehend the existence of such an essence179. For instance, the mind is able 
to comprehend the proposition of the ‘impossibility of the unity of 
contradiction’, although it does not physically exist in the realm of the external 
world, as clearly it is impossible for two contradictory things to ever unite in 
the external world. However, this does mean that this proposition does not 
exist in actual fact, for if it did not exist then it would not be possible for the 
mind to comprehend its existence. Accordingly, the essence of this proposition 
has actual fact existence (wujūd fi-l nafs al-amr) in the realm of the mind and 
not in the realm of the external world.  
 
In light of this, the mainstream Uṣūlī view maintains that qaṭʿ by its very 
definition, (or by its very essence) has the property of disclosure (kashfiyya) 
and reflectiveness (ṭarīqiyya) of the objective reality. Moreover, in the realm of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 See Kawkabī, Mabānī al-istinbāṭ, vol. 1, p. 45; Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, p. 129; See Khūʾī, Miṣbāḥ 
al-uṣūl, vol. 2, pp. 15-17 
179 For a complete understanding of the Muslim philosophical/metaphysical understanding of 
the primacy of existence, see Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Bidāyat al-ḥikma, pp. 11-28; Nasr, “Mullā Ṣadrā: his 
teachings” pp. 646-648; Dabashi, Hamid. “Mīr Dāmād and the founding of the “School of 
Iṣfahān”” in Nasr, Seyyed H and Leaman, Oliver (ed.) History of Islamic Philosophy, 2 vols. 
(Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 2001), pp.612-615 
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the external world, it impels the person who possesses it into action. However, 
in actual fact, qaṭʿ also has the further property of ḥujjiyya, and this property 
exists in the mind. Thus, the property of ḥujjiyya is not something that is 
postulated, and accordingly it is not something that can either be affirmed or 
negated by the Divine Lawgiver, because ḥujjiyya necessarily exists whenever 
qaṭʿ exists.  
 
Nonetheless, although the mainstream conclude that the property of ḥujjiyya is 
a necessary correlative of qaṭʿ, this in itself is not sufficient in proving why it 
is obligatory (wājib) or necessary to follow and act in accordance with qaṭʿ, 
whereby failing to do so would imply that a mukallaf can be chastised. In 
response to this criticism, the mainstream have argued that since qaṭʿ by its 
very nature is epistemologically valid (ḥujja), following and acting in 
accordance with it ensures that it is given the proper right that it deserves. 
Indeed, the mainstream ʿAdliyya understanding supports this view, as it 
proposes that giving any particular thing its proper right is an act of justice 
(ʿadl), and justice is something that is praiseworthy (ḥusn). Meanwhile, not 
following or acting in accordance with qaṭʿ is considered to be an act of 
oppression, as this equates to not giving qaṭʿ the proper right that it deserves, 
and therefore it is blameworthy (qabīḥ) upon the mukallaf.  
 
Khūʾī supports this mainstream Uṣūlī stance and states that: 
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What is apparent from what we have discussed is that the ḥujjiyya of 
qaṭʿ is amongst its necessary correlatives; indeed reason perceives the 
praiseworthiness (ḥusn) of acting in accordance with it, and the 
blameworthiness (qubḥ) of not acting in accordance with it. 
[Furthermore] it also comprehends the properness of the chastisement 
of the Master (mawla) to his slave (ʿabd) who does not follow it, and 
comprehends the improperness of chastising an individual who acts in 
accordance with it, even if it [in actuality] is contrary to the wāqiʿī.180 
 
In essence, the mainstream Uṣūlī thought argues that ḥujjiyya, in actual fact 
(nafs al-amr), is amongst the essential properties of qaṭʿ, as it is necessarily 
correlated to the essence of qaṭʿ. This implies that qaṭʿ by its very nature is 
epistemologically valid, which results in the mukallaf being granted with 
excusability if he follows and acts in accordance with it, and being held 
accountable if he does not follow and act in accordance with it. Furthermore, 
the mainstream view maintains that the property of ḥujjiyya that is possessed 
by qaṭʿ cannot be affirmed nor negated by the Divine Lawgiver. Finally, by 
applying the ʿAdliyya theological understanding of the “praiseworthiness of 
justice and the blameworthiness of oppression” (ḥusn al-ʿadl wa’l-qubḥ al-
ẓulm) as a major premise, the mainstream prove the obligatory nature (wujūb) 
of following and acting in accordance with qaṭʿ, and justify that by not doing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
180Khūʾī, Miṣbāḥ al-uṣūl, vol. 2, p. 16 
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so, a mukallaf can be held accountable for committing a blameworthy act, for 
which he may be chastised. 
 
 
3.3.2 Second Explanation: Ḥujjiyya of Qaṭʿ by the Convention of Rational 
People 
 
The less popular understanding amongst the Uṣūlīs is that when Anṣārī claims 
that ḥujjiyya is a property of qaṭʿ in the realm of legislation and that it is 
obligatory to follow its indication, he means that this property is postulated 
based on the convention of rational people (banā’ al-ʿuqalā’). This implies that 
rational people choose to postulate the property of ḥujjiyya (epistemic validity) 
to qaṭʿ, because deeming qaṭʿ to be epistemologically valid (ḥujja) ensures that 
the functioning of the social system is regulated and preserved (ḥifẓ al-niẓām). 
Accordingly, if one was to act contrary to that which is fully disclosed or 
known to him with qaṭʿ, then this would necessarily disrupt the social construct 
of human life, and as a result the rational convention deems that such a person 
should be held accountable181. On the other hand, if one was to act in 
accordance with that which is fully disclosed and known to him with qaṭʿ, then 
this safeguards the social construct of human life, and as a result the rational 
convention deems that such a person should be granted with excusability even 
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181 See Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, pp. 129-132; and Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2 p. 21 
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if his qaṭʿ indicates towards something which in actuality is contrary to the 
objective reality. 
 
Therefore, qaṭʿ in actual fact (nafs al-amr) only has the essential properties of 
kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya, and in the realm of existence it also has the property of 
impelling one who possesses it into action. However, the property of ḥujjiyya 
is not something which it has in actual fact, rather it is something that is merely 
postulated by the convention of rational people. Thus, ḥujjiyya can either be 
affirmed or negated by the rational convention, and since the Divine Lawgiver 
is theologically accepted as the Chief of all rational agents (ra’is al-ʿuqalā’) 
and He has not refuted this convention of rational agents, then He too 
necessarily agrees with this convention and acts accordingly182. 
 
Adherents of this view prove the obligatory nature of following qaṭʿ by arguing 
that safeguarding the social system gives it the proper right it deserves, and as 
such is an act of justice (ʿadl). On the other hand, not safeguarding the social 
system equates to taking away the proper right it deserves, and thus is an act of 
oppression (ẓulm). Consequently, using the ʿAdliyya theological understanding 
of “the praiseworthiness of justice and the blameworthiness of oppression” 
(ḥusn al-ʿadl wa’l-qubḥ al-ẓulm) as a major premise, it is claimed that it is 
praiseworthy (ḥusn) to follow and act in accordance with qaṭʿ and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
182 The mainstream belief regarding the Divine Lawgiver being the Head of all rational beings 
(Sayyid al-ʿuqalā’) is discussed at length in Chapter Two; in the context of the jurisprudential 
discourse it is also discussed by Ḥaydarī in al-Qaṭʿ, pp. 146-151 
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blameworthy (qubḥ) not to do so. This view is clearly expounded by Iṣfahānī 
who states that: 
 
It should be known that the actualization of chastisement is not from 
the existential effects or the necessary correlation of acting in 
contradiction with something that is certainly known. Rather, it is 
among the postulates of the rational people (ʿuqalā). In a little while it 
will become clear, by the will of God, that the rational judgment (ḥukm 
al-ʿaql) that actualises chastisement is not something that is dictated by 
proof (burhān) or axiomatic propositions (al-qaḍāyā al-ḍarūriyya), 
rather it amongst the propositions that are popularly acknowledged (al-
qaḍāyā al-mashhūra) and followed by the convention of rational people 
in every issue. The conflicting of the command of the Master (mawla) 
is doing oppression to Him, and oppression is blameworthy (qabīḥ), 
and [this is something that the] rational people agree necessitates blame 
and chastisement. 
 
Therefore, to say that qaṭʿ actualises chastisement due to acting in 
contradiction [with it], and to exemplify that it is type of oppression, is 
based on the condition of rational people. [Inasmuch as] the rational 
people postulate this [property of qaṭʿ] and this is not [something which 
is] an essential/inevitable effect [of qaṭʿ]183. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 See Iṣfahānī, Nihāyat al-Dirāya fi Sharḥ al-Kifāya vol. 3, p. 22 
!!! 166!
 
It is important to note that one classification of propositions proposed in the 
discourse of Muslim logic is between axiomatic propositions (al-qaḍāyā al-
ḍarūriyya or yaqīniyyat) and popular propositions (mashhūrāt). Axiomatic 
propositions are propositions that exist in actual fact (nafs al-amr) and 
necessarily correspond to the objective reality. For instance, an example of an 
axiomatic proposition is “a whole is greater than a part”. Meanwhile, popular 
propositions are those propositions that do not exist in actual fact, but are 
nonetheless widely accepted by rational people184. The proposition of the 
“praiseworthiness of justice and the blameworthiness of oppression” is held as 
an axiomatic proposition by the mainstream, on the basis that it has actual fact 
existence that corresponds to the objective reality. On the other hand, scholars 
such as Iṣfahānī, and - his student - Muẓaffar185 view this as a popular 
proposition, which does not have actual fact existence; rather, it is merely a 
proposition that is widely accepted by the convention of rational people. 
 
For instance, “justice” is rationally deemed as “praiseworthy” by the 
mainstream because it has in actual fact the intrinsic moral value of 
praiseworthiness, and its intrinsic moral value corresponds to the objective !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
184 See Muẓaffar, “Ṣanāʿāt al-Khamsa” in al-Manṭiq, pp. 282-299 
185 It is vital to note that Muẓaffar elaborates on his view in his second chapter that is on “al-
ḥusn wa’l qubḥ al-ʿaqlī” see Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol.1, pp. 184-209 Moreover, in line with 
Iṣfahānī’s understanding Muẓaffar categorically states that the obligatory nature (wujūb) of 
following and acting in accordance with qaṭʿ is something that is unanimously concurred by 
the rational people, inasmuch as they have a fixed opinion (ārā’ al-maḥmūda) on it (see Uṣūl 
al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 21); Muẓaffar’s deliberations and contributions to the discourse of al-ḥusn 
wa’l qubḥ al-ʿaqlī are discussed at length in the unpublished Ph.D. of Ali-Reza Bhojani, see 
Bhojani, Moral Rationalism and Independent Rationality as a Source of Sharīʿa in Shīʿī Uṣūl 
al-Fiqh: In Search for an ʿAdliyya Reading of Sharīʿa. 
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reality. On the other hand, scholars such as Iṣfahānī and Muẓaffar advocate 
that an action is only judged to be praiseworthy or blameworthy because the 
convention of rational people postulates the value of praiseworthiness or 
blameworthiness to an action, and since the Divine Lawgiver is the Chief of all 
rational beings, He too endorses the postulation of the rational people. Thus, in 
line with this opinion, “justice” is only rationally deemed as “praiseworthy” 
because rational people have postulated the moral value of praiseworthiness to 
it, and since the Divine Lawgiver is the Chief of all rational beings, He too 
agrees with such postulation, and as a result, “justice” becomes praiseworthy in 
the objective reality. 
 
In essence, it is clear that both the aforementioned explanations provide a 
different understanding of what Anṣārī meant by the ḥujjiyya of qaṭʿ. The first 
explanation claims that the property of ḥujjiyya is amongst the essentialities of 
qaṭʿ, and as a result can never be affirmed nor negated. However, the second 
explanation argues that the property of ḥujjiyya is postulated by the convention 
of rational people, and therefore it can either be affirmed or negated depending 
on the convention. Although these explanations provide a different insight into 
the relationship between action and their moral properties, they collectively 
maintain that it is obligatory to follow and act in accordance with qaṭʿ because 
of the major premise of the ʿAdliyya theology of “the praiseworthiness of 
justice and the blameworthiness of oppression.”  
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3.3.3 Third Explanation: Ḥujjiyya of Qaṭʿ by the judgment of reason (ḥukm al 
aql) 
 
The third explanation is the most recently proposed justification amongst the 
contemporary Uṣūlī explanations behind Anṣārī’s claim. Its chief exponents 
are al-Ṣadr and his contemporaries, who in the present day are recognised as 
adherents of the School of ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa (also known as al-maslak al-ḥaqq al-
ṭāʿa)186. In accordance with this explanation, reason (ʿaql) is independently 
able to judge that qaṭʿ has the property of ḥujjiyya and that it is obligatory to 
follow and act in accordance with it. Accordingly, reason can independently 
judge that if a person follows and acts in accordance with qaṭʿ, then he or she 
can be granted with excusability. However, if a person fails to follow and act in 
accordance with qaṭʿ, then he or she can be held accountable and subject to 
chastisement.  
 
It can be suggested that this explanation is primarily built upon the criticisms 
raised towards the two aforementioned explanations. The following syllogism 
clearly illustrates the argument these two explanations collectively offer: 
 
Major premise: the act of justice is praiseworthy and the act of 
oppression is blameworthy 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
186See Ṣanqūr, al-Muʿjam al-uṣūl vol. 2, pp. 38-39 
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Minor premise: following qaṭʿ is an act of justice and not 
following qaṭʿ is an act of oppression 
 
Conclusion: following qaṭʿ is praiseworthy and not following 
qaṭʿ is blameworthy 
 
This syllogism illustrates that the minor premise is established through the 
major premise, and this as a result leads to the conclusion that it is obligatory 
(wājib) to follow and act in accordance with qaṭʿ. However, as proclaimed by 
Ḥaydarī: 
 
Indeed the mainstream [opinion] among the Uṣūlīs is that there is a 
relationship between the epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) of qaṭʿ on one 
hand, and on the other hand, the principle of the praiseworthiness of 
justice and the blameworthiness of oppression. The correct [opinion] in 
this is that there is no relationship between them187. 
 
Thus, Ḥaydarī argues that prior to proving the obligatory nature of following 
and acting in accordance with qaṭʿ through use of the major premise, one has to 
establish that qaṭʿ deserves the right to be followed and acted in accordance 
with in the first place. For instance, it may be proposed that one should 
“respect every scholar,” however before a person respects a scholar, he or she 
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187 Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, p. 133 
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must establish that the person is a “scholar”. As a result, Ḥaydarī, similarly to 
his teacher Ṣadr, proposes that the right of following qaṭʿ has been established 
because God – or the Divine Lawgiver – has the absolute right of obedience 
(ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa), and thus whenever He discloses a duty (taklīf), it must be 
followed and acted in accordance with188.  
 
In essence, Ḥaydarī argues that there is no need for the major premise to 
establish that following and acting in accordance with qaṭʿ is praiseworthy or 
blameworthy, as by accepting that the Divine Lawgiver has the absolute right 
of obedience, one by priority or necessity accepts that qaṭʿ – which is the full 
disclosure of the duty He ordains - is epistemologically valid (ḥujja). This in 
itself however does not confirm whether in the realm of legislation, the 
property of ḥujjiyya is amongst the essentialities of qaṭʿ, or whether it is 
postulated. Indeed, if the former is true then it is not possible for the Divine 
Lawgiver to either affirm or negate the property of ḥujjiyya to the essence of 
qaṭʿ, whilst if the latter is true then it is possible for the Divine Lawgiver to do 
so. 
 
In response to this, it is important to understand how Shiite Uṣūlīs have 
theologically and philosophically accepted that God possesses the absolute 
right of obedience. In order to substantiate this belief, Uṣūlīs have offered two 
key arguments, namely the argument of wujūb shukr al-munʿim (the obligatory 
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188 Ṣadr, Durūs 2 vol. 2, pp. 35-44; Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, pp. 171-186 
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nature of thanking the one who bestows) and the argument of God’s al-
khāliqiyya wa’l-mālikiyya (Creatorship and Proprietorship). 
 
The theologians commonly accept the former argument, which proposes that it 
is rationally obligatory (wujūb) upon every human being to thank (shukr) or 
show gratitude towards the one who bestows (al-munʿim), and since God – or 
the Divine Lawgiver – is recognised as the One who bestows life upon the 
human being, intuition acknowledges that it is rationally obligatory for a 
human being to show gratitude towards God. This gratitude is expressed by 
being completely obedient to God and by fulfilling every duty (taklīf) that He 
discloses189. 
 
Meanwhile, the philosophers commonly accept the latter argument of al-
khāliqiyya wa’l-mālikiyya, which proposes that since God is the Creator 
(khāliq) of everything, He is also the Proprietor (mālik) of everything, and the 
Proprietorship that is possessed by God is different to that which is possessed 
by the human proprietor, in that He has absolute control and dominance over 
His proprietorship. Ṭabāṭabāʿī in his exegesis of the Qurʾān states that: 
 
Indeed, God, to whom belongs glory, is the Proprietor whose 
proprietorship is unrestricted.  As for Him being the Proprietor of 
everything unrestrictedly, this is because He has unrestricted lordship 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189 See ibid, pp. 140-142; Shārwadī, Buḥuth fi ʿilm al-uṣūl vol. 4, p. 28 
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(rubūbiyya) and unrestricted establishing force (qaymūma) upon 
everything, for indeed He is the Creator of everything and to Him 
everything is towards190. 
 
The concept of God’s rubūbiyya and qaymūma indicates that He continuously 
nurtures and sustains existence, and as soon as He stops doing so, existence 
ceases to exist. This can be analogised to the concept of human thinking, for 
example when a human thinks of a thought, they are the creator of that thought, 
and since they are the creator of that thought, they have the ability to modify or 
even stop the thought at any point, as effectively they are the proprietor of the 
thought. 
 
The key distinction between the two proposed arguments is that in accordance 
with the first argument of wujūb shukr al-munʿim, the right of obedience that is 
possessed by the Divine Lawgiver is not essential, as it is postulated by reason, 
whereby reason judges that it is obligatory to thank the one who bestows. 
Meanwhile, the second argument of al-khāliqiyya wa’l-mālikiyya proposes that 
the right of obedience that is possessed by the Divine Lawgiver is essential, as 
reason naturally recognises that since the Divine Lawgiver is the Creator and 
the Proprietor of everything, He essentially possesses the right of obedience. 
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190 Ṭabāṭabāʿī, al-Mīzān fi tafsīr al-Qurʾān vol. 3, p. 129 
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Ḥaydarī, similarly to Ṣadr, chooses to advocate the second argument to the 
first, and as such claims that the right of obedience that is possessed by the 
Divine Lawgiver is established through Him being the Creator and the 
Proprietor. In support of his claim, Ḥaydarī points out that if the first argument 
were applied, it would evidently be blameworthy not to thank or to show 
gratitude to the one who bestows. However, this argument does not necessarily 
imply that such a person would be subjected to chastisement, because although 
reason judges that it is blameworthy not to thank the person – or God - who 
bestows, it does not necessarily judge that they become worthy of 
chastisement, as there is no correlation between not showing gratitude and 
being chastised. Moreover, Ḥaydarī also argues that the second argument of al-
khāliqiyya wa’l-mālikiyya is inclusive of the first argument of wujūb al-shukr 
al-munʿim, whereby it is, by priority, incumbent to show gratitude to the 
Creator and the Proprietor, as He continually bestows by nourishing and 
sustaining life. Therefore, by proclaiming the argument of God being the 
Creator and the Proprietor, it necessarily includes that He is owed gratitude191. 
 
It thus becomes clear that for the adherents of the School of ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa, the 
right of obedience that is possessed by the Divine Lawgiver is essential in 
nature. As a result, this necessarily implies that in the realm of legislation, 
ḥujjiyya is an essential property of qaṭʿ, in that it cannot be postulated by the 
convention of rational people. As soon as qaṭʿ is available, or as soon as God – 
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191 Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, p. 136 
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or the Divine Lawgiver - fully discloses a duty upon a mukallaf, such 
disclosure deserves full obedience, and therefore it is epistemologically valid 
(ḥujja), inasmuch as it brings about the effects of accountability and 
excusability. 
 
In accordance with this view, although the disclosure of a duty from the Divine 
Lawgiver is essentially epistemologically valid for the mukallaf, this does not 
mean that it is necessarily correlated to the essence of qaṭʿ. Rather, the Divine 
Lawgiver, due to his absolute khāliqiyya and mālikiyya, is able to issue an 
amnesty (tarkhīṣ), whereby it is logically possible for Him to command or 
instruct the mukallaf to not follow qaṭʿ. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the default position maintained by Ṣadr is that every disclosed duty of the 
Divine Lawgiver, whether it is qaṭʿī or even ẓannī is epistemologically valid, 
unless the Divine Lawgiver issues an amnesty that undermines the epistemic 
validity of that particular disclosure. Nonetheless, Ṣadr concludes that although 
in the realm of possibility (maqām al-thubūt), it is logically possible for the 
Divine Lawgiver to issue an amnesty for both qaṭʿī and ẓannī disclosure, in the 
realm of practice (maqām al-ithbāt) it is impossible for Him to issue an 
amnesty that permits a mukallaf to act contrary to that which has been fully 
disclosed to him with qaṭʿ192. Instead, it is only possible for an amnesty to take 
effect against the epistemic validity of a disclosure when a mukallaf possesses 
ẓann, or conjectural disclosure. 
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192 See Ṣadr, Durūs 3 vol. 2, p. 35 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
This findings from this chapter illuminate that the Uṣūlīs have unanimously 
defined qaṭʿ to be synonymous with the terms ʿilm and yaqīn, and accept that 
the nature of qaṭʿ consists of the essential properties of kashfiyya and ṭarīqiyya, 
whereby it naturally, or essentially, discloses and reflects that which is in the 
objective reality (wāqiʿī). Furthermore, in line with the Muslim discourse of 
philosophy and logic, the Uṣūlīs maintain that qaṭʿ is always accurate in its 
disclosure and reflection of the objective reality at the level of conception 
(taṣawwur), and admit that it can only potentially fail to do so at the level of 
assent (taṣdīq). It is also apparent from the analysis on the nature of qaṭʿ that 
both the Uṣūlī camp and mainstream Muslim philosophers and logicians 
collectively maintain the epistemological presumption of the infallibility of 
sense perception, and consequently advocate that the mind is able to accurately 
conceive the objective reality, insofar as it is able to have qaṭʿ or ʿilm of the 
objective reality which in actuality corresponds to it. Moreover, another key 
presumption within Uṣūlī legal theory is the acceptance of the concept that in 
the realm of existence (‘ālam al- takwīnī), qaṭʿ also has the property of 
muḥarrikiyya, inasmuch as it naturally impels the one who possesses it into 
action. 
 
In light of these existential epistemological presumptions, post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs 
have unanimously concurred with Anṣārī’s thought, by maintaining that in the 
realm of legislation (‘ālam al-tashrīʿī), qaṭʿ possesses the property of ḥujjiyya 
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(epistemic validity), and thus it is obligatory (wājib) to follow and act in 
accordance its indication. Therefore, they uphold that by following and acting 
in accordance with qaṭʿ, a mukallaf can be granted with excusability; however, 
failing to do so can lead to the mukallaf being held accountable and thus 
subject to chastisement. The Uṣūlīs have given three different explanations to 
justify their standpoint. Firstly, in accordance with the mainstream explanation, 
qaṭʿ is epistemologically valid (ḥujja) because the property of epistemic 
validity is necessarily correlated to the essence of qaṭʿ, thereby concluding that 
it is essentially praiseworthy to follow and act in accordance with it. Secondly, 
scholars such as Iṣfahānī and Muẓaffar explain that the property of ḥujjiyya is 
postulated by the convention of rational people (banā’ al-ʿuqalā’). Thus, they 
too propose that it is obligatory to follow and act in accordance with qaṭʿ, 
although they base this conclusion on the standpoint that since the Divine 
Lawgiver is the Chief of all rational people (ra’is al-ʿuqalā’) He too endorses 
the postulation of the rational people. Thirdly, proponents of the School of 
ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa advocate that the property of ḥujjiyya is postulated by the Divine 
Lawgiver due to Him being the Creator (khāliq) and the Proprietor (mālik) of 
all existence. As a result, they conclude that the Divine Lawgiver deserves the 
right of obedience, and likewise maintain that it is obligatory to follow and act 
in accordance with qaṭʿ.  
 
It is noted that the latter two explanations signify that in the realm of 
legislation, the nature of qaṭʿ is parallel to the nature of ẓann, as like ẓann, the 
epistemic validity of qaṭʿ can either be affirmed or negated by postulation. 
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Therefore, these explanations, and particularly the explanation provided by 
scholars such as Iṣfahānī and Muẓaffar, hold significant implications upon the 
range of evidence used in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts. 
Based on the proposed understanding, the utilisation of qaṭʿī evidence in the 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts is contingent upon the postulation of their 
epistemic validity, and indeed if the epistemic validity of qaṭʿī evidence were 
negated, then this would effectively result in restricting the range of evidence 
that can be used. This raises the question that if the epistemic validity of qaṭʿī 
evidence is negated, then is it ever possible to attain knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts? If it were concluded that it is not possible, then this would be 
reminiscent of the sceptical stance, which itself is highly criticised. However, if 
it is concluded that it is possible, then there still exists the predicament of 
distinguishing between which evidence can be used in the derivation of Sharīʿa 
precepts, as evidently if the epistemic validity of qaṭʿī evidence is denied, then 
by priority the epistemic validity of any evidence that is less then qaṭʿī must 
also be denied. 
 
Nevertheless, although post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs have offered various explanations in 
order to justify the relationship between ḥujjiyya and qaṭʿ, they all 
unanimously agree on the epistemological underpinning that qaṭʿ is 
epistemologically valid, and that it is obligatory to follow and act in 
accordance with its indication. As a result, it is maintained that only qaṭʿī 
evidence can be used in the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, and in light of this 
epistemological underpinning, the contemporary Uṣūlī discourse proposes that 
!!! 178!
qaṭʿī evidence has the ability to substantiate particular evidence that emanate 
ẓann. Accordingly, the next chapter will investigate how contemporary Uṣūlīs 
have argued for the epistemic validity of evidence that emanates especial 
conjecture (ẓann al-khāṣ). 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
The Epistemic Validity of Ẓann al-Khāṣ: a critical 
analysis of al-khabar al-wāḥid 
 
 
In light of the primary axiom maintained in Shiite legal epistemology of the 
non-validity of ẓann qua ẓann, it becomes clear that in accordance with the 
contemporary Uṣūlī understanding, it is prohibited for a mujtahid to utilise any 
evidence that gives rise to mere conjecture in the juristic process of deriving 
Sharīʿa precepts. This is because ẓann is unable to reveal accurate knowledge 
of the objective reality (wāqiʿī), and thus by following ẓannī (conjectural) 
evidence, there exists the likelihood of a mujtahid – or a mukallaf – to 
potentially err by overlooking the objective reality, for which he can be held 
accountable and subjected to chastisement. 
 
Instead, the Uṣūlīs unanimously agree that accurate knowledge of the objective 
reality can only be obtained from evidence that gives rise to qaṭʿ (certainty), 
and it is maintained that a mujtahid can only utilise qaṭʿī (certainty-bearing) 
evidence in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts. Consequently, if 
by using qaṭʿ and acting in accordance with its indication, a mujtahid in 
actuality overlooks that which is in the objective reality, then he can be granted 
with excusability and not be subjected to chastisement, as he is only following 
what he believes to correspond to the objective reality. 
 
Undoubtedly, by confining the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts to only evidence 
that gives rise to qaṭʿ, the access that a mujtahid has to knowledge of the 
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Sharīʿa precepts is limited, and as a result although there is a wide range of 
evidence that can potentially reveal knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, the 
mujtahid is unable to act in accordance with their indication, as they are not 
deemed as being able to disclose the objective reality accurately. However, in 
line with the contemporary Uṣūlī understanding, it is possible for the Divine 
Lawgiver to overrule the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann by granting 
the permission to use evidence that emanates al-ẓann al-khāṣ (especial 
conjecture) in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. Knowledge of such 
permission can only be obtained through qaṭʿī evidence, and thus the Uṣūlī 
discourse of legal theory is largely preoccupied in examining qaṭʿ that has the 
ability to substantiate or corroborate any conjectural evidence that has the 
potential of revealing Sharīʿa precepts.  
 
This chapter will critically analyse how Muẓaffar substantiates and justifies the 
epistemic validity and the juristic utility of one of the most contentious textual 
evidence that reveals the sunna of the maʿṣūm, namely al-khabar al-wāḥid (the 
isolated report). It will firstly examine how Muẓaffar advocates the mainstream 
Uṣūlī understanding of the epistemic validity of ẓann al-khāṣ. This chapter will 
then move on to discuss the sunna of the maʿṣūm, and particularly consider 
how Muẓaffar in his legal theory substantiates the epistemic validity of the 
sunna that is reported through conjectural isolated reports, by referring to other 
textual and non-textual evidence that he deems as qaṭʿī. 
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This critical analysis will not only clarify how the Uṣūlīs substantiate ẓannī 
evidence with qaṭʿ, but it will also determine the extent or the nature of qaṭʿ 
that the Uṣūlī School has access to. Undoubtedly, if it were to be found that 
they have broad access to such evidence, then this would necessarily imply that 
it is possible to substantiate a wide range of conjectural evidence, particularly 
the sources and hermeneutical methods that have been proposed by 
contemporary Muslim thinkers193. Alternatively, if it is found that the extent or 
the nature of access to qaṭʿ is limited, then this would unescapably infer that 
the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts is restricted to only specific evidence 
that emanates ẓann al-khāṣ, and it is not possible to substantiate the epistemic 
validity of a wider range of evidence under the pretext of Uṣūlī legal theory. 
 
 
4.1 Ẓann al-khāṣ in Uṣūlī legal theory 
 
A unique feature of Uṣūlī legal theory that separates it from Sunni legal theory 
and Akhbārī legal theory is its acceptance of ẓann al-khāṣ in the juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. On one end of the Muslim jurisprudential 
spectrum, the Sunni School’s discourse of legal theory is commonly described 
– at least in Shiite literature – to accept the indication of ẓann, or more 
specifically ghalabat al-ẓann (preponderant conjecture) in the juristic 
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193 See Introduction 
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derivation of Sharīʿa precepts194. On the other end of the spectrum, the Shiite 
Akhbārī School is historically recognised as playing a critical role in the denial 
of ẓann in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. In comparison to the 
mainstream Sunni School’s and the Shiite Akhbārīs, the Uṣūlī School 
distinctively places itself in the middle of this spectrum. Thus, whilst it accepts 
the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann maintained in Shiite legal theory, 
it also acknowledges the limits of only accepting qaṭʿī evidence, and 
accordingly appreciates the need to widen the range of evidence that can be 
utilised in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. By tactfully grounding 
itself between the two juxtaposing extremes portrayed by the Sunnis and the 
Akhbārīs, the Uṣūlī School expounds that the indication of any evidence that 
gives rise to ẓann can be accepted in the juristic derivation Sharīʿa precepts, 
provided that it has been substantiated by a qaṭʿī evidence, which establishes 
that the Divine Lawgiver has made an exception to the primary axiom of Shiite 
legal theory195. This Uṣūlī understanding is clearly upheld by Muẓaffar, who 
after establishing the non-validity of ẓann qua ẓann, states: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
194 It is vital to note that in Sunni legal theory, ghalabat al-ẓann refers to an opinion of a 
mujtahid that is recognised as being epistemologically valid because the preponderant 
conjecture of a mujtahid reaches a very high level of probability, inasmuch as there is a very 
high possibility that it in actuality corresponds to the wāqiʿī, and for this reason Sunni legal 
theory deems its epistemic validity to be just less than the epistemic validity of certainty. See 
Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, p. 39. It also must be noted that the concept of 
ghalabat al- ẓann is translated and explained in various different ways, for instance, “dominant 
opinion [of a jurist]” see Calder, Doubt and Prerogative, p. 59; “substantiated speculation” see 
Rebstock, U. “A Qāḍīs Errors” Islamic Law and Society 6.1, (1999), p. 14; “epistemic 
excellence” see Emon, Anver M. “To Most Likely Know the Law: Objective, Authority and 
Interpretation in Islamic law” Hebraic Political Studies 4.4, (2009), p. 434; “preponderance of 
belief” see El-Fadl “The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam”, p. 138 
195 The epistemic validity of ẓann al-khāṣ is maintained by all post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs, for instance 
see Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, p. 54; Khurāsānī, Kifāyat al-uṣūl vol. 2, pp. 38-44; Ḥaydarī, 
al-Ẓann, pp. 197-203; Faḍlī, Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh al-Imāmiyya vol. 1, pp. 270-274; Ṣadr, Durūs fi 
ʿilm al-uṣūl vol. 2, pp. 47-52 
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If it [i.e. ẓann] is established by qaṭʿī evidence, and it is [deemed as] 
epistemologically valid (ḥujja) by yaqīn that the Divine Lawgiver has 
postulated it as al-ẓann al-khāṣ as a particular ṭarīq for His precepts 
(aḥkām), and He has considered it to be an authority upon it, and He is 
content with it being an imāra that refers to it, and He has permitted us 
to utilise it even though it is ẓann, for indeed such ẓann is excluded 
from the primary axiom… Then in reality taking [recourse] to ẓann al-
muʾtabar (corroborated conjecture) that is established by qaṭʿ as [being] 
epistemologically valid is not like taking [recourse] to ẓann qua ẓann196. 
 
Thus, Muẓaffar upholds that the verses of the Qurʾān that he believes 
apparently indicate on the prohibition of following and acting in accordance 
with ẓann 197  are modified, or even abrogated, by qaṭʿī evidence that 
substantiates the epistemic validity of ẓann al-khāṣ. It can be deduced from his 
statement that Muẓaffar admits that it is possible to substantiate the epistemic 
validity of ẓann al-khāṣ by yaqīn, and thus he endorses that it is possible to 
have access to absolute knowledge of such substantiation, which in actuality 
corresponds to the objective reality. 
 
In the Uṣūlī discourse, a ẓannī evidence that is substantiated is at the same 
epistemic pedestal as a qaṭʿī evidence, in that, in practice, it too has the ability !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
196 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 16 
197 See Chapter Two for the verses used by the Shiites to establish the primary axiom of the 
non-validity of ẓann. 
!!! 184!
to reveal Sharīʿa precepts. However, the only difference between a qaṭʿī 
evidence and a substantiated ẓannī evidence is that the former is accepted as 
being essentially epistemologically valid, and thus by its very essence must be 
used in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, whereas the latter is 
accidental in nature, insofar as it has been postulated by the Divine Lawgiver, 
and thus is used in light of His permission. Nevertheless, despite placing ẓann 
al-khāṣ (or specific substantiated ẓannī evidence) at the same epistemic 
pedestal as qaṭʿī evidence, the Uṣūlī School maintains that its discourse of legal 
theory is in fact in line with the Shiite legal heritage of the non-acceptance of 
ẓann in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. For example, Muẓaffar 
points out: 
 
At this point, the answer to the slander from a group of Akhbārīs 
towards the Uṣūlīs is apparent, regarding [the point] that they [i.e. the 
Uṣūlīs] utilise some evidence that are specifically conjectural, such as 
khabar al-wāḥid and its like. They have slandered them for taking ẓann 
that does not reveal the truth of a thing. 
 
They [i.e. the Akhbārīs] have accused the Uṣūlīs of utilising particular 
conjectures (ẓūnūn). However, [in defence of the Uṣūlīs] they do not 
utilise them with the reason for them being merely conjectural, rather 
they utilise them for the reason that it is known that they are considered 
[by the Divine Lawgiver] as epistemologically valid (ḥujja) by the way 
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of certainty (qaṭʿ). Therefore, in reality they utilise it like they utilise 
qaṭʿ and yaqīn198. 
 
Thus, Muẓaffar clearly attempts to clarify that the Akhbārīs were mislead in 
indiscriminately claiming that the Uṣūlīs emphatically adopted and accepted 
Sunni innovated legal theory, which accepted the epistemic validity of ẓann, or 
more specifically, recognised that knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts can be 
derived from evidence that creates ghalabat al-ẓann (preponderant conjecture). 
Instead, Muẓaffar categorically ascertains that Uṣūlī legal theory differs to 
Sunni legal theory, by not accepting the epistemic validity of any type of ẓann, 
even if it reaches the level of preponderant conjecture. Rather, he, together 
with other prominent post-Anṣārī Shiite Uṣūlīs, emphasises that Uṣūlī legal 
theory only accepts ẓann whose epistemic validity is established by the Divine 
Lawgiver Himself. Thus, in essence, the Uṣūlī acceptance of ẓann in the 
juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts radically differs to the Sunni acceptance 
of ẓann, as whilst the Shiites only accept the validity of ẓann al-khāṣ, which is 
deemed as being ẓann that the Divine Lawgiver Himself considers as 
epistemologically valid, the Sunnis accept the epistemic validity of every ẓann 
that has the ability to create preponderant conjecture, irrespective of whether it 
has been substantiated by the Divine Lawgiver or not. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
198 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 16-17 
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Due to the mainstream Sunni Schools and the Shiite Akhbārī and Uṣūlī 
Schools positioning themselves at different extremes of the Muslim 
jurisprudential spectrum, it is found that their understanding of evidence that is 
deemed as epistemologically valid in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa 
precepts correlates to their respective understanding of legal epistemology. For 
example, the mainstream Sunni Schools consent to the juristic utility of a wider 
range of evidence, and thus alongside the famous four-fold categorisation of 
evidence – i.e. the Qurʾān, sunna, ijmāʿ and qiyās (analogy) – certain schools 
also accept the epistemic validity of renowned ẓannī evidence such as istiḥsān 
and maṣlaḥa. Although they admit that these evidence give rise to ẓann, in 
accordance with their legal epistemology such ẓann is deemed to be 
epistemologically valid199. Meanwhile, the Shiite Akhbārī School restricts the 
juristic utility of evidence to only those that it believes give rise to qaṭʿī 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. Accordingly, the Akhbārīs deny the epistemic 
validity of the four-fold categorisation of evidence, and rather only consent to 
the epistemic validity of the textual evidence of the Qurʾān and sunna, and 
indeed at times, only sunna. 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, in contrast to the popular Uṣūlī standpoint, 
scholars such as Muẓaffar argue that any evidence that has the potential to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
199 It must be noted that there is discrepancy within the Sunni Schools regarding the epistemic 
validity of each of these sources, and thus it would be inaccurate to say that all Sunnis, in 
practice, accept ẓann in the same manner. For instance, it is commonly accepted that the Sunni 
Ḥanafī School accepts more ẓann than the Ḥanbalī School. Nonetheless, the Sunni tradition – 
as a collective body – theoretically accepts the epistemic validity of ẓann, or as mentioned 
ghalabat al-ẓann. For a detailed study of Sunni legal epistemology see Hallaq, A History of 
Islamic Legal Theories; also see Zysow, The Economy of Certainty 
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reveal knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts qualifies to receive an epistemic 
evaluation in the discourse of Uṣūlī legal theory. Thus, in his legal 
epistemology, Muẓaffar not only evaluates the epistemic validity of the Uṣūlī 
four-fold categorisation of evidence – i.e. Qurʾān, sunna, ijmāʿ and ʿaql – but 
he also evaluates the epistemic validity of infamous evidence such as qiyās and 
shuhra, which are unanimously held to give mere ẓann in the mainstream 
Shiite discourse. Undoubtedly, the epistemic evaluation of a wider range of 
evidence is consistent with, and of paramount importance to, Uṣūlī legal 
theory, because it is only possible to confirm whether or not a particular 
evidence that gives rise to ẓann is substantiated by the Divine Lawgiver after it 
is subjected to epistemological evaluation. 
 
A thorough analysis of all the evidence evaluated in the Uṣūlī discourse is 
indeed a critical study, however this is beyond the scope of this research. This 
chapter will specifically present a critical analysis of Muẓaffar’s epistemic 
evaluation of the isolated report, due to two key reasons. Firstly, as illustrated 
in Chapter One, during the initial phase of the historical development of Shiite 
legal theory, the utilisation of the isolated report was relentlessly denounced, 
based on the premise that its epistemic validity or evidentiary nature was the 
result of a Sunni innovation as it gave rise to mere ẓann qua ẓann. However, 
within a matter of decades, it became almost unanimously recognised as an 
independent source within Uṣūlī legal discourse, and this position has been 
sustained until the present day. Secondly, it is commonly suggested in the 
writings of prominent commentators of Muslim Law that the Uṣūlī 
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understanding of Sharīʿa precepts is predominantly developed through 
inference from textual evidence 200 . This suggestion is certainly not 
exaggerated, as Muẓaffar in his final analysis of the epistemic evaluation of 
ʿaql (reason) as an independent evidence, or source of knowledge, of Sharīʿa 
precepts concludes that: 
 
There is no way in which reason can know that, without referring [to 
textual evidence], that its judgment regarding an action is in correlation 
with [the judgment] of the Divine Lawgiver. The reason for this is 
clear, for indeed the precepts (aḥkām) of Allah are dictated 
(tawqīfiyya), and it is not possible to know them [by any other means] 
except by the way of hearing them from the informer of the precepts 
who is approved by the All Mighty for informing them201. 
 
It can be inferred that in accordance with the Uṣūlī understanding, or at least 
Muẓaffar’s understanding, the only evidence that gives knowledge – whether 
qaṭʿī or ẓann al-khāṣ - of Sharīʿa precepts is the textual evidence of the Qurʾān 
and sunna. In light of this, if the majority of the corpus of Uṣūlī derivations of 
Sharīʿa precepts are in fact derived from textual evidence, then this is certainly 
a good enough reason for specifically focusing on Muẓaffar’s epistemic 
evaluation of the isolated report, for indeed it constitutes as being the largest 
body of textual evidence. Thus, it is clearly the most sought after ẓannī !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
200 This is pointed out in the introduction, see Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law, p. 39 
201 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 111 
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evidence that requires substantiating within the Uṣūlī tradition, and it is not 
implausible to suggest that the whole discourse of legal epistemology within 
the folds of Shiite jurisprudence has evolved in order to establish the epistemic 
validity of the ẓann created by the isolated report. 
 
 
4.2 Sunna and its Modes of Transmission !
Owing to the fact that the majority of Sharīʿa precepts are inferred or derived 
from textual evidence, there exists no doubt that the reported sunna of the 
maʿṣūm is singlehandedly one of the most important sources of legal 
knowledge within the Uṣūlī, if not the Muslim, jurisprudential discourse. There 
is a general consensus that the number of legal verses in the Qurʾān amount to 
approximately 500 verses, signifying that despite the Qurʾān being the primary 
textual source of legal knowledge, it alone is not sufficient in indicating 
comprehensive knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. Accordingly, alongside the 
Qurʾān, the sunna is independently utilised in the juristic process of deriving 
Sharīʿa precepts, as it provides access to a broad range of Sharīʿa precepts that 
are not holistically detailed in the Qurʾān. 
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In the Muslim jurisprudential tradition, the sunna is defined as “the word of the 
Prophet, his action, and his tacit endorsement202.” This understanding of sunna 
is universal for both the Shiites and the Sunnis, as it is theologically accepted 
by all Muslims that the Prophet Mohammad is the source of Sharīʿa, inasmuch 
as he has been divinely appointed by God as His representative and as a 
lawgiver. Therefore, the epistemic validity of the sunna as an independent 
source of Sharīʿa precepts is undisputedly accepted within the Muslim 
jurisprudential discourse. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the main 
argument used to establish this is that God – or the Divine Lawgiver – Himself 
establishes this in numerous verses of the Qurʾān. For instance, the Qurʾān 
categorically states that: “Nor does he [the Prophet] speak from [his own] 
desires203”, or: “Indeed the messenger of Allah is an excellent example to 
follow for anyone whose hope is Allah, and the last day, and [remembers] 
Allah often204.” Since God Himself claims that the Prophet is the best example 
of all, and that he only says that which God wishes, this signifies that He wants 
Muslims to follow and act in accordance with the sunna or the words, actions 
and tacit endorsements of the Prophet. 
 
However, the Shiite thought differs to the Sunnis in that it does not only accept 
the epistemic validity of the sunna of the Prophet, but it also consents to the 
epistemic validity of the sunna of the impeccable Shiite Imams. In Shiite !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
202 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 55; Faḍlī, Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh al-Imāmiyya vol. 1, p. 167; 
Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, p. 10 
203 Qurʾān, 53:3 
204 Qurʾān, 33:21 
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theology, the impeccable (maʿṣūm) Imams are not merely recognised as 
narrators or interpreters of the sunna of the Prophet, rather they are accepted as 
the divinely appointed successors of the Prophet, and thus succeed him in 
every aspect, which includes being the source of knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts. Therefore, in the Shiite tradition, the sunna of the impeccable Imams 
possesses the same value as the sunna of the Prophet205. 
 
The sunna of the maʿṣūm – whether the Prophet or the Imams – is transmitted 
in the form of a statement or report that is commonly termed as either ‘ḥadīth’ 
(plural ‘aḥādīth’) or ‘khabar’ (plural akhbār)206, and the science that is 
specifically dedicated to discussing the authenticity of the transmitted reports is 
known as ʿilm al-ḥadīth. In one of the earliest Shiite works entitled Dirāyat al-
Ḥadīth, Ibn Shahīd al-Thānī defines ʿilm al-ḥadīth as: 
 
A science in which the text of the ḥadīth is investigated, with its chain 
of transmission, from the authentic to the faulty to the weak, along with 
all that is needed to distinguish the acceptable from the unacceptable207. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
205 See Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, pp. 179-188 
206 It must be noted that the term ḥadīth is often referred to as “tradition”, whereas the term 
khabar is often referred to as “report”. However, it is found that in the context of hadith 
studies, both these terms are usually used interchangeably and technically refer to “a statement 
carrying the speech, action or tacit approval of an impeccable [maʿṣūm]” see Faḍlī, ʿAbd al-
Hādī. Introduction to Ḥadīth including Dirāyat al-Ḥadīth by al-Shahīd al-Thānī . Trans. 
Nazmina A. Virjee (London: ICAS, 2002), p. 19. 
207 See ibid, p. 47 
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It becomes apparent from this that the study or the purpose of ʿilm al-ḥadīth is 
to classify the authenticity of a transmitted report, by determining whether it is 
authentic (ṣaḥīḥ), good (ḥasan), dependable (muwaththaq), or weak (ḍaʿīf)208, 
and based on its classification, it is determined whether the report can be 
accepted or not as a source of knowledge. One of the chief requirements of a 
mujtahid is that he not only has knowledge of other disciplines such as logic, 
theology and linguistics, but also has a thorough understanding of ʿilm al-
ḥadīth. Indeed, since knowledge of a significant proportion of Sharīʿa precepts 
is inferred or derived from the reported tradition of the maʿṣūm, a mujtahid 
must possess an acute awareness of being able to determine the authenticity of 
a transmitted report. 
 
However, the authenticity of the transmitted reports of the sunna has been 
severely criticised in Western Orientalist literature, with the most profound 
criticism being provided by Ignaz Goldziher (d.1921), who inducted a critical 
study on the authenticity of the transmitted reports in his analysis of the 
evolution of Muslim theology and dogmatic beliefs. His analysis led him to 
conclude that a great majority of reports that claim to be from the time of the 
Prophet were in fact inaugurated in a much later period, and thus he claimed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
208 It must be noted that a ṣaḥīḥ report is one in which all the narrators in its chain of 
transmission are Shiite and are trustworthy. All scholars consider a ṣaḥīḥ report to be valid. A 
ḥasan report is where at least one of the narrators in the chain is not known to be trustworthy, 
however has been praised by the biographers of narrators –or experts in al-rijāl). Many 
scholars consider this type of report to be valid. A muwaththaq report is one in which all 
reporters in a chain of transmission are trustworthy, but are not necessarily Shiite. Most of the 
scholars consider this type of report to be valid. Lastly, a ḍaʿīf report is one in which it is 
known that at least one of the narrators in the chain of transmission is not trustworthy or is 
unknown. According to many scholars, a weak tradition can only be relied upon if mujtahids of 
the past have acted in accordance with it. See Faḍlī, Mabādī al-uṣūl, pp. 29-30. 
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that they were spurious209. Goldziher’s study was further developed by Joseph 
Schacht (d.1969), who insisted that as far as the transmitted reports that reveal 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts are concerned, they must be considered 
fictitious until they are proven to be authentic210. In essence, the main criticism 
from the Orientalists towards the mainstream Muslim scholarship was that it 
was wrong to consider transmitted reports as being a true representation of the 
actual words of the Prophet regarding dogmatic and legal precepts. Therefore, 
the Orientalists uphold that the epistemological yardstick instilled by Western 
scholarship for assessing the authenticity of the transmitted reports is far more 
critical than the measure that is offered within the mainstream Muslim 
scholarship. 
 
However, the Orientalist argument is completely disregarded by Hallaq, who 
views the Orientalist discourse concerning the non-authenticity of transmitted 
reports as “pointless” 211 . Hallaq argues that a critical epistemological 
appreciation considering the authenticity of transmitted reports was actually 
first discovered in the Muslim jurisprudential discourse of legal theory, which 
he claims has escaped the attention of modern hadith scholarship. Muslim legal 
theory principally classifies transmitted reports into two epistemological 
categories, namely mutawātir (widely narrated report) and khabar al-wāḥid !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
209 See Goldziher, Ignac et al. Muslim Studies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971) For a 
summary of Goldziher’s position see Robson, James. “Muslim Tradition: The Question of 
Authenticity,” Memoirs and Proceedings, Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, 
(1951) pp. 84-102 
210 See Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) 
211 See Hallaq, Wael B. “The Authenticity of Prophetic Ḥadīth: a Pseudo-problem” Studia 
Islamica 89 (1999) p.77 
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(the isolated report). The former is accepted as a transmitted report that has the 
capacity of providing certain knowledge (qaṭʿ), whereas the latter is accepted 
as a transmitted report that is merely capable of providing conjectural 
knowledge (ẓann). Hallaq thus concludes his critique of the Orientalist position 
by stating that: 
 
To sum up, Western scholarship has concentrated its attention upon an 
area of traditional Muslim discourse that is not particularly instructive. 
The traditionalist discourse is stated in terms that are largely 
incongruent with the epistemic evaluation of ḥadīth, and evaluation that 
is directly relevant and indeed central to the Islamicist paradigm of 
historical research. If minimal traces of this epistemic interest are to be 
found in the traditionalist discourse, it is because legal theory 
commended a measure of attention from the traditionalists. The 
epistemic evaluation of ḥadīth was finally articulated and elaborated by 
the legal theoreticians and jurists, and it is in this area of traditional 
discourse that Western scholars should have begun their enquiry – if 
such an enquired need at all be embarked upon212.  
 
In light of the epistemological categorisation of transmitted reports into 
mutawātir and khabar al-wāḥid, Hallaq accurately argues that the mainstream 
Muslim scholarship within legal circles already accepted that a large number of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
212 ibid, p. 88 
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the transmitted reports gave rise to mere ẓann, and hence it was a futile effort 
by the Orientalists to suggest something that was already clearly explicated 
within the Muslim jurisprudential discourse.  
 
Although Hallaq’s study primarily focuses on the mainstream Sunni 
jurisprudential discourse, it can convincingly be argued that his understanding 
can be extended to the Shiite jurisprudential discourse, as the origin and 
development of Shiite legal theory was largely inspired by the Sunni 
discourse213, and the Shiite jurisprudential discourse too maintains a two-fold 
distinction of the different modes from which the reports of the maʿṣūm are 
transmitted. In essence, the Shiites, like the Sunnis, accept the epistemological 
categorisation of transmitted reports into mutawātir and khabar al-wāḥid. 
 
 
4.2.1 Mutawātir: The Qaṭʿī Mode of Transmission 
 
In the discourse of ʿilm al-ḥadīth, every transmitted report has two 
components, namely sanad and matan. The former refers to the ‘chain’ of 
narrators or reporters who have transmitted a particular report over generations 
from the time of the maʿṣūm, whilst the latter refers to the actual “content” of 
the report, which indicates the sunna, i.e. the actual word, action or tacit 
approval of the maʿṣūm. In legal theory, a transmitted report is deemed as a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
213 See Chapter One 
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qaṭʿī evidence if its sanad (chain of transmission) reaches the level of 
mutawātir. Ibn Shahīd al-Thānī expresses: 
 
A mutawātir is a report that has so many narrators that it is 
conventionally impossible for them to all have agreed upon its 
fabrication. This multitude must be fulfilled on all the levels or 
generations of reporters, in such a way that the beginning of the chain is 
the same as its end, and the middle of the chain is congruous with the 
two ends. The number of reporters has not been stipulated or restricted 
to an exact figure, as some people believe, but rather it serves to 
generate certitude214. 
 
Thus, a mutawātir is a report that is so widely narrated that it produces 
qaṭʿ/ʿilm that it has not been fabricated or misunderstood by any of the 
reporters in its chain of transmission over the generations. Ghazālī classifies 
knowledge provided by a mutawātir report as necessary knowledge (al-ʿilm al-
ḍarūrī) as opposed to acquired conjectural knowledge (al-ʿilm al-naẓarī). The 
former type of knowledge is akin to ʿilm al-ḥuḍurī, inasmuch as it is defined as 
knowledge that “naturally imposes itself upon the intellect.” Meanwhile, the 
latter type refers to knowledge that is attained through the process of deductive 
reasoning, and since it involves the process of deduction, it is described as 
knowledge that is prone to error. In contrast, the knowledge that is attained 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
214 See Faḍlī, Introduction to ḥadīth, p. 20 
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through mutawātir reports is knowledge that is necessary, in that it cannot be 
prone to error. Moreover, since it “necessarily” gives knowledge, Ghazālī 
expounds that it can be used as a source from which other knowledge can be 
derived215. 
 
Muẓaffar, who in his al-Manṭiq categorises mutawātir reports under the title of 
al-yaqīniyāt, also maintains a similar distinction to Ghazālī. By classifying a 
mutawātir report as having the capability of providing yaqīn, Muẓaffar 
expounds that it can never be erroneous, as its indication – as with the 
indication of anything that has the ability of providing yaqīn – in actuality 
always accurately corresponds to the objective reality (wāqiʿī). In his discourse 
of both logic and legal theory, Muẓaffar defines mutawātir reports as: 
 
Propositions that the soul [or the self] (nafs) is at peace (sukūn) with, 
and doubt (shakk) is alleviated with them, and a psychological state of 
jazm is acquired for the one who possesses them with qaṭʿ. This is 
because [regarding a] widely narrated report, it is impossible for a 
group to concur on a fabrication, and it is [also] impossible for it to 
coincide on making a mistake in reporting. Like we know of the remote 
countries that exist although we have not seen them, and that the Noble 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
215 See Weiss, Bernard G. “Knowledge of the Past: The Theory of “Tawātur” According to 
Ghazālī” Studia Islamica 61 (1985) p. 100 
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Qurʾān was revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad may peace be upon 
him and his family216. 
 
It can be argued that Muẓaffar extends the ambiguity discussed in the previous 
chapter regarding the definition of qaṭʿ, as on one hand, he categorises a 
mutawātir report as having the ability of giving qaṭʿ in the context of yaqīn, 
whilst on the other, he states that it has the ability of giving qaṭʿ in the context 
of sukūn al-nafs. Indeed, the former signifies that the indication of a mutawātir 
report always accurately corresponds to the objective reality (wāqiʿī), whereas 
the latter signifies that the indication does not necessarily always correspond to 
the objective reality, rather the individual who possesses the mutawātir report 
may have peace with oneself (sukūn al-nafs) that all doubt has been alleviated. 
However, such sukūn al-nafs or “peace with oneself” does not necessarily 
imply that the mutawātir report, in actuality, corresponds to the objective 
reality, rather it is possible for one to possess compound ignorance (jahl al-
murakab), inasmuch as whilst he or she believes that the indication of the 
mutawātir report corresponds to the objective reality, in actuality this is not the 
case. Thus, there is ambiguity regarding whether Muẓaffar advocates that a 
mutawātir report in actuality corresponds to the reality, or whether it merely 
gives sukūn al-nafs. This uncertainty can be illustrated using the following 
example: if the proposition “America exists” was revealed to Zayd by a large 
number of people, then does this mean that America actually exists in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
216 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 60; Muẓaffar, al-Manṭiq, pp. 286-287 
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objective reality? Or does it mean that Zayd is satisfied in believing that 
America exists, although it may not exist in reality? 
 
Although Muẓaffar defines qaṭʿ as jazm, in that it has the ability to give rise to 
both yaqīn and jahl al-murakab, in his final analysis he, in line with other 
Uṣūlīs, maintains that qaṭʿ is synonymous with yaqīn. Thus, with regards to the 
earlier proposition, if a large number of people were to claim the proposition 
“America exists”, then in accordance with the Uṣūlī thought, America does in 
actuality exist in the objective reality. In spite of this, the number of available 
mutawātir reports that amount to explicating the sunna of the maʿṣūm are 
significantly few, and difficult to locate within the corpus of ḥadīth 
literature217. In other words, although it is theoretically accepted in the Muslim 
legal discourse that a mutawātir report is qaṭʿī, in practice such a report is very 
rare to find. As a result, most of the Sharīʿa precepts that are derived from 
textual sources are in fact obtained from the ẓannī textual evidence of khabar 
al-wāḥid. 
 
 
4.2.2 Khabar al-wāḥid: the Ẓannī Mode of Transmission 
 
In Muslim legal theory, a transmitted report is deemed as a khabar al-wāḥid 
(the isolated report) if its sanad (chain of transmission) fails to reach the level 
of mutawātir. It is commonly mistaken that an isolated report refers to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
217 See Hallaq, “The Authenticity of Prophetic Ḥadīth: a Pseudo-problem,” pp. 79-80 
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sunna of the maʿṣūm that is transmitted by a single – or one – chain of 
transmission. However, this is not necessarily the case, for in the Uṣūlī 
discourse an isolated report can refer to sunna that is transmitted by more than 
a single chain of transmission, and hence an isolated report can have two, 
three, four etc. chains of transmission, as long as it does not reach the level of 
qaṭʿ218. Indeed, if a transmitted report reaches the level of qaṭʿ, then it can no 
longer be classified as an isolated report or khabar al-wāḥid, as it is then a 
mutawātir report. In essence, any transmitted report that gives qaṭʿ, or removes 
doubt that it is fabricated, is classified as a mutawātir report, whereas any 
transmitted reported – irrespective of how many chains of transmission it has – 
that fails to give qaṭʿ, inasmuch as there always exists the possibility of it being 
fabricated, is classified as an isolated report. 
 
The Uṣūlīs primarily divide an isolated report into two types, namely khabar 
al-wāḥid that is associated with evidence (al-maḥfūẓ bi-l qarāʾin) and khabar 
al-wāḥid that is not associated with evidence (ghayr al-maḥfūẓ bi-l qarāʾin). 
The former is deemed as a qaṭʿī source that produces knowledge (ʿilm) of 
Sharīʿa precepts, whereas the latter is not. For instance, regarding a khabar al-
wāḥid that is associated with evidence, Shomali points out that: 
 
This is a narration, which produces certainty due to some other 
evidence. For example, the content of the narration is of such high 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
218 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 21-22 
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standard that there can be no doubt that it is from the Prophet (S) or his 
household (A), like the salutation of al-Jāmiʿah. Or the narration is such 
that it speaks against those in power – it would be very unlikely that a 
narration of this type would have been fabricated, as there would be no 
benefit in this for the fabricator219. 
 
Here, Shomali assumes that such isolated reports are epistemologically valid 
due to two reasons. Firstly, he elucidates that there are certain aspects of 
knowledge – such as the content of the salutation of al-Jāmiʿah – that only the 
maʿṣūm have access to. This is a theological assumption that is argued for and 
proven in the discourse of theology, and Shomali simply accepts it without 
providing any further analysis. However, it can be suggested that this is a naïve 
assumption, because in the discourse of Shiite theology, theologians have in 
fact differed in their views of how much access the maʿṣūm have to knowledge 
in comparison to a fallible human being220. Secondly, Shomali assumes that the 
individuals who have played a major role in fabricating ḥadīth literature only 
did so to establish the regime that was in power. However, it can quite easily 
be counter-assumed that it was also possible for those who were against the 
regime to fabricate reports and falsely attribute them to the maʿṣūm.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
219 See Shomali, Mohammad A. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: An Introduction to 
Methodology of Fiqh (Qum: The Organization of Abroad Howza and Islamic Schools, 2006), 
p. 30 
220 See Ḥillī, Kasfh al-murād, pp. 157-159; Modarressi, Crises on Consolidation in the 
Formative Period of Shia Islam, p. 9, and pp. 46-47 
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Nevertheless, the isolated report that is associated with evidence is not the 
subject matter of epistemic evaluation, as by its very definition it is a source 
that gives rise to certainty (qaṭʿ) and knowledge (ʿilm), due to it being actually 
associated with evidence. As a result, Muẓaffar upholds that it is futile to 
evaluate its epistemic validity, as anything that is a source of certainty or 
knowledge is deemed as epistemologically valid in itself. Rather, he maintains 
that the subject matter of epistemic evaluation is the isolated report that is not 
associated with evidence. Indeed, this type of isolated report does not produce 
qaṭʿ/ʿilm, rather it has the default position of just producing ẓann, and thus in 
order to deem it as epistemologically valid, it is necessary that it is 
substantiated by general evidence that proves that it is a valid source 
knowledge221. 
 
Muẓaffar further subdivides the isolated report that is not associated with 
evidence into two types. The first type is one which gives rise to mere ẓann, 
whereas the second type gives rise to iṭmiʾnān (contentment). An exclusive 
feature of the latter type of isolated report is that it produces a high level of 
conjecture (ẓann) that gives contentment to the mukallaf that it is not fabricated 
and that it is from the maʿṣūm. However, despite this distinction, Muẓaffar 
states that the Uṣūlīs claim that even if an isolated report produces a high level 
of conjecture that gives contentment, it is not deemed as epistemologically 
valid until it has been subjected to epistemic evaluation and is substantiated by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
221 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 22-23 
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qaṭʿī evidence222. This indeed ascertains the fact that the Uṣūlīs are strict in 
maintaining that anything other than qaṭʿ cannot be accepted in the juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. Shaykh Ṭūsī (d.460/1067), who has been 
described as one of the earliest Shiite Uṣūlīs to accept the isolated report as an 
epistemologically valid source of knowledge, points out: 
 
“Whoever acts with khabar al-wāḥid, only acts with it when there is 
evidence that indicates upon the obligation of acting with it, whether it 
is from the book [i.e. the Qurʾān], or sunna, or ijmāʿ. If there is no 
[evidence] then he is acting with something other than knowledge.”223 
 
Therefore, khabar al-wāḥid qua khabar al-wāḥid, or khabar al-wāḥid that is 
not associated with any evidence, is deemed as ẓannī, and in accordance with 
the Uṣūlī thought it cannot be accepted in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa 
precepts until its epistemic validity is established. Accordingly, the next 
section will critically analyse the “qaṭʿī” evidence that Muẓaffar presents to 
establish the epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid qua khabar al-wāḥid. 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
222 Ibid. 
223 Ṭūsī’s view is quoted by Muẓaffar, see Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 62 
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4.3 Evidence from the Qurʾān for the Ḥujjiyya of Khabar al-wāḥid  
 
In the Muslim jurisprudential tradition, the Qurʾān is considered as the primary 
source of knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. The authenticity of the Qurʾān is not 
categorically proven or established in the discourse of legal theory; rather it is 
taken as a basic assumption. Accordingly, it is unanimously upheld as a qaṭʿī 
source of knowledge, because its chain of transmission is considered as 
mutawātir i.e. many narrators over generations have reported the verses of the 
Qurʾān, to the extent that it is impossible for them all to have agreed upon its 
fabrication, and thus the verses produce qaṭʿ/ʿilm in the mind of the mukallaf 
that they have not been fabricated or misunderstood. 
 
However, although the sanad of the Qurʾān is deemed as qaṭʿī, the textual 
indication of the Qurʾān – or for that fact any mutawātir report – is either 
deemed as explicit (naṣṣ) or apparent (ẓāhir). The former exists when there is 
no doubt – or there is absolute certainty (qaṭʿ) – regarding the intention of the 
Divine Lawgiver and the meaning of the textual indication of a verse or report, 
inasmuch as it only carries one meaning and there is no possibility of it 
meaning anything otherwise. For instance, Faḍlī gives the example of naṣṣ 
from the textual indication of the following verse: 
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“And those who accuse chaste women and then do not produce four 
witnesses - lash them with eighty lashes and do not accept from them 
testimony ever after. And those are the defiantly disobedient.224” 
 
Faḍlī points out that this verse unambiguously reveals the intention of the 
Divine Lawgiver, as the word “ever” explicitly indicates that one is prohibited 
to ever accept the testimony of a person who wrongly accuses, as opposed to 
only during the specific instance of when a person wrongly accuses225. 
Therefore, in essence, when a mutawātir – whether it is a verse of the Qurʾān 
or a report of the sunna – explicitly indicates the intention of the Divine 
Lawgiver, the Uṣūlī School maintains that its indication is deemed as being 
qaṭʿī and can be used in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts without any 
further epistemic evaluation. 
 
On the other hand, a textual indication is deemed as apparent (ẓāhir) when 
there is doubt – or there is no certainty – as to what the intention of the Divine 
Lawgiver is and what is actually meant by the textual indication of a verse or 
report. The Uṣūlīs recognise it as “apparent” because whilst the textual 
indication of such a verse or report carries the possibility of more than one 
meaning, amongst the various meanings it carries, a particular meaning stands 
out or is more “apparent” than the other meaning(s). For instance, if it were 
hypothetically stated that the aforementioned verse did not contain the word !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
224 Qurʾān 24:4 
225 Faḍlī, Mabādī al-uṣūl, pp. 37-38 
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“ever”, then it is possible to affirm that its indication could have more than one 
meaning; it could either mean that the testimony of a person who wrongly 
accuses cannot be accepted in the specific instance of when he wrongly 
accuses, or it could mean that his testimony can never be accepted after he has 
already wrongly accused someone once. Thus, in such a case a mujtahid 
initially has doubt in his juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts with regards to 
which of the two situations is prohibited, and he is required to further evaluate 
which meaning is more apparent in indicating the true intention of the Divine 
Lawgiver, and derive the Sharīʿa precept accordingly.  
 
Therefore, when the textual indication of a mutawātir is not explicit (naṣṣ) but 
rather is apparent (ẓāhir), then the Uṣūlī School maintains that its indication is 
ẓannī, despite its chain of transmission being qaṭʿī226. Nevertheless, the Uṣūlīs 
recognise that access to naṣṣ is significantly restricted and at times even 
impossible. This is because a great number of verses of the Qurʾān cannot be 
interpreted to have a single meaning, but appear to offer more than one 
meaning. As a consequence, the Uṣūlīs have exerted a remarkable effort in 
establishing hermeneutical methods that can be used to interpret the linguistic 
significations of textual sources, in order to arrive at an apparent textual 
indication. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
226 The Uṣūlīs unanimously agree that the indication of naṣṣ is qaṭʿī, whereas the indication of 
ẓāhir is ẓannī, see Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, pp. 312-331; Khurāsānī, Kifāyat al-uṣūl vol. 
2, pp. 47-57; Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 23-24; Ṣadr, Durūs 1 vol. 1, pp. 303-308; Faḍlī, 
Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh vol. 2, pp. 323-335; Ḥaydarī, al-Ẓann, pp. 233-273 
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However, at this juncture it is vital to highlight that by substantiating the 
epistemic validity of ẓannī sources of law by relying on the ẓannī apparent 
indication the Qurʾān, it is possible for one to err. For example, this could lead 
one to substantiating the ẓannī evidence of khabar al-wāḥid as being 
epistemologically valid, whereas in reality it may not be. As claimed by 
Muẓaffar: 
 
It cannot be hidden that the noble verses that are claimed to prove the 
epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid are not explicit (naṣṣ) and [do 
not] have a qaṭʿī indication. Rather, the maximum that can be claimed 
is that they are apparent (ẓāhir) in indicating this. 
 
If this is the case, then one can challenge that it is necessary, as 
established, that the evidence that proves the epistemic validity [of 
something] has to be qaṭʿī. Therefore, it is not correct to prove [the 
epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid] by verses that are ẓannī in their 
indication, as that is [like] proving the epistemic validity of ẓann with 
ẓann, even though its chain of transmission is qaṭʿī227. 
 
In response to this, the Uṣūlī School evaluates and establishes the epistemic 
validity of the hermeneutical primacy of apparent meaning (ḥujjiyya aṣālat al-
ẓuhūr). According to this hermeneutical primacy, when there is no associated 
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227 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 23 
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evidence to suggest otherwise, the apparent meaning of a textual source is 
taken to be epistemologically valid. Thus in line with this, if a mujtahid finds 
that a textual source is open to various meanings or interpretations, he is 
required to act in accordance with the interpretation that is most apparent. As a 
result, if he derives a Sharīʿa precept on the basis of the hermeneutical primacy 
of apparent meaning, then he cannot be held accountable, but rather is granted 
with excusability even if his derivation is in actuality contrary to that which is 
in the wāqiʿī. On the other hand, if he fails to derive a Sharīʿa precept based on 
the hermeneutical primacy of apparent meaning, and consequently derives a 
Sharīʿa precept that in actuality is contrary to that which is the wāqiʿī, then he 
is not granted with excusability, but instead is accountable and can be 
subjected to chastisement228. 
 
Therefore, it becomes evident that when substantiating the epistemic validity of 
the isolated report through the textual sources of either the Qurʾān or ḥadīth, 
the Uṣūlīs rely on, and assume, the epistemic validity of the hermeneutical 
primacy of apparent meaning. It can indeed be suggested that a critical analysis 
of how the Uṣūlīs evaluate the epistemic validity of the hermeneutical primacy 
of apparent meaning, and the effect it has on the textual derivation of Sharīʿa 
precepts, is of paramount importance. However, this is beyond the scope of this 
research. Accordingly, when evaluating Muẓaffar’s substantiation of the 
epistemic validity of the isolated report, this chapter will uphold the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
228 The epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) of the hermeneutical primacy of apparent meaning is 
unanimously accepted in the Uṣūlī discourse, see ibid pp. 121-122 and pp. 128-136; Ḥaydarī, 
al-Ẓann, pp. 233-273; Faḍlī, Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh vol. 1, pp. 330-335 
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assumptions made by Muẓaffar, and assume the epistemic validity of the 
hermeneutical primacy of the apparent indication. 
 
 
4.3.1 The Verse of Nabaʾ 
 
“If a miscreant (fāsiq) brings you a piece of news (nabaʾ) then 
scrutinise (fatabayyanū) [it] so that you do not harm others through 
ignorance and then have to repent for what you have done.”229 
 
In Uṣūlī legal theory, a textual statement is described to have two types of 
significations; it can either have an articulated signification (dalālat al-
manṭūq), whose apparent indication explicitly reveals the intent of the Divine 
Lawgiver, or it can have an implied signification (dalālat al-mafhūm), whereby 
the intent of the Divine Lawgiver can be understood through the implicit 
indication of that which is articulated. The Uṣūlīs commonly use the dalālat al-
mafhūm of this verse as a significant evidence that proves and substantiates the 
epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) of the isolated report. However, prior to detailing 
how Muẓaffar does this, it is noteworthy that the Uṣūlīs largely agree that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
229 Qurʾān 49:6 
!!! 210!
term nabaʾ (news) is synonymous with the technical term khabar (report)230. 
As it can be read, the dalālat al-manṭūq of this verse sets forth a condition, 
whereby it apparently indicates on the protasis “if a fāsiq comes with news” 
and the apodosis “then scrutinise it”. Based on this, the Uṣūlīs conclude that 
the Divine Lawgiver intends that there is only a need to scrutinise a piece of 
news or report (khabar) when it is brought by a fāsiq. On the other hand, the 
dalālat al-mafhūm of this verse leads to a conditional implication (al-mafhūm 
al-sharṭ), in accordance with which the negation or the non-actualisation of the 
protasis necessarily implies the negation or the non-actualisation of the 
apodosis. Accordingly, Muẓaffar interprets the signification of the conditional 
implication of this verse to indicate that “if a non-fāsiq – also referred to as an 
ʿādil (just person) – comes with news, then do not scrutinise it”231.  
 
This illustrates that by interpreting the conditional implication of this verse to 
mean that a person whose moral probity is established then there is no need to 
scrutinise the news he reveals, Muẓaffar is able to satisfactorily conclude that 
when an ʿādil person is to report the sunna of the maʿṣūm, then his report must 
be accepted without any scrutiny232. Therefore, Muẓaffar signifies that the only 
reports that are accepted to be epistemologically valid in the juristic derivation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
230 See Gleave, Robert. “Modern Shīʿī Discussion of Khabar al-wāḥid: Ṣadr, Khumaynī and 
Khūʾī” in Tottoli, Roberto (ed.) Oriente Moderno: Hadith in Modern Islam, (Roma: Istituto per 
L'Oriente C.A. Nallino, 2002), p.182; Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 64; 
231 Ibid, pp. 65-67 
232 Ibid. 
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of Sharīʿa precepts are those that are transmitted by people who are recognised 
for their moral probity. 
 
Indeed, there is always a possibility of a ʿādil person to misunderstand or err 
when reporting the sunna of the maʿṣūm. However, such a prospect is ignored 
in the Uṣūlī discourse, for the Uṣūlīs predominantly conclude that in 
accordance with the apparent indication of the conditional implication of the 
aforementioned verse, the Divine Lawgiver Himself gives permission to follow 
and act in accordance with the ẓannī report of a ʿādil233. In other words, 
although it is impermissible to follow and act in accordance with ẓann, the 
ẓann that is produced from the report – or the khabar al-wāḥid – of a ʿādil is 
substantiated. Thus, in line with this understanding, the primary task of a 
mujtahid is to recognise the biography of any given reporter, as if a reporter is 
deemed as a ʿādil, then his report is accepted as an epistemologically valid 
source of Sharīʿa knowledge. 
 
However, Khumaynī criticises the predominant Uṣūlī position regarding the 
ability of the aforementioned verse to substantiate the epistemic validity of the 
isolated report, by proposing that its conditional implication can actually 
apparently indicate upon two different significations. He asserts that it can 
either signify that “if a non-fāsiq brings a report, then do not scrutinise it” or it 
can signify that “if a non-fāsiq does not bring a report, then there is no need to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
233 Ibid; also see Gleave, “Modern Shīʿī Discussion of Khabar al-wāḥid,” pp.179-194 who 
analyses how Ṣadr and Khūʾī also maintain the epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid through 
evaluating this verse; also see Faḍlī, Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh vol. 1, pp. 305-318 
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scrutinise anything, because there is nothing to scrutinise”234. Whilst the 
apparent indication of the former conditional implication is predominantly 
proposed by the Uṣūlīs, Khumaynī points out that the apparent indication of the 
latter conditional implication is more plausible under common linguistic 
custom (ʿurf). Accordingly, Khumaynī maintains that this verse only signifies 
that scrutiny should occur when a fāsiq comes with a report. However, it is 
silent, or fails to give any reference, with regards to the case of when a ʿādil – 
or a non-fāsiq – comes with news or a report. Therefore, he concludes that this 
verse alone is insufficient in substantiating the epistemic validity of the isolated 
report, as its apparent indication neither explicitly nor implicitly indicates on a 
ruling about a report that is brought by a ʿādil. Moreover, Khumaynī points out 
that even if there is a remote chance of the mainstream Uṣūlīs being right in 
their interpretation of this verse, this still does not provide sufficient proof for 
substantiating the epistemic validity of the isolated report, because they fail to 
offer a valid reason for why one interpretation is preferred over the other. 
 
Nonetheless, at the very least it becomes evident from Khumaynī’s criticism 
towards the Uṣūlīs camp that since the conditional implication of the 
aforementioned verse can have two different significations, in accordance with 
the Uṣūlī discourse it essentially does not have an apparent indication. This is 
because, as discussed, textual evidence only has an apparent indication (ẓāhir) 
when one of its meanings or significations is more apparent than the other, in 
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234 See Khumaynī, Tahdhīb vol. 2, pp. 152-154 
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that it is more superior to the other. However, in the case of this verse, one can 
either choose the mainstream Uṣūlī interpretation or Khumaynī’s 
interpretation, and since both camps deem their interpretations to be more 
apparent, this in itself is sufficient in demonstrating that this verse does not 
elucidate upon one apparent indication that can be preferred over another. 
 
It can consequently be claimed that the apparent indication of this particular 
verse cannot be held as a qaṭʿī evidence that substantiates the epistemic 
validity of the isolated report. In essence, the verse of nabaʾ is not sufficient in 
revealing that the Divine Lawgiver has given His permission to act contrary to 
the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann qua ẓann, and as a result it is 
arguable that the mainstream Uṣūlīs are failing to adhere to the standards they 
have set within their discourse by referring to this verse as a primary evidence 
that substantiates the epistemic validity of the ẓannī source of khabar al-wāḥid. 
 
 
4.3.2 The Verse of Nafara 
 
“And it is not for the believers to go forth all together. Of every group 
(firqa) from them, a sect (ṭāʾifa) should go forth (nafara), that they may 
obtain understanding (tafaqqhu) in religion, and that they may warn 
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(indhār) their people (qawm) when they return to them, so that they 
may beware.”235 
 
Muẓaffar provides this verse as the second evidence from the Qurʾān that 
proves and substantiates the epistemic validity of the isolated report. 
Nonetheless, he admits that when interpreting the apparent indication of this 
verse, there is discrepancy amongst the Uṣūlīs and they are divided into two 
contrasting camps; the first consists of those who believe that this verse fails to 
indicate the obligation (wujūb) of following and acting in accordance with the 
isolated report, whereas the second camp maintain that this verse does indicate 
this obligation. 
 
In accordance with the former camp, the aforementioned verse was revealed in 
the context of lesser jihād (battle), as the verses before and after this verse 
specifically discuss the concept of jihād. As a result, some Uṣūlīs – Muẓaffar 
does not specifically discuss who – interpret this verse to signify that it is not 
essential for all Muslims to go to battle at once, rather it is obligatory for a 
group (firqa) of Muslims to stay back with the Prophet and seek knowledge 
and understanding from him, so that when the sect (ṭāʾifa) of those who travel 
to battle return, they can “warn” or convey the knowledge they have sought 
from the Prophet to them. For example, a sect of 50 people may go to battle, 
whilst a group of 100 people remain with the Prophet, so that when the 50 
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people return, the group of 100 are able to reveal to them what they learnt from 
the Prophet whilst the sect were away. 
 
Meanwhile, according to the latter camp of Uṣūlīs – which also includes 
Muẓaffar – the verse of nafara was revealed in the context of those who lived 
away from the Prophet in different towns and villages, indicating that it is 
obligatory for a sect (ṭāʾifa) of people living at a distance from the Prophet to 
come to Medina and seek knowledge and understanding of religion from him, 
and then go back to their respective towns or villages and “warn”, or convey 
this knowledge, to their people (qawm)236. For example, a sect of people may 
travel from Yemen and seek knowledge from the Prophet. After seeking such 
knowledge, they are then able to return to their community in Yemen and 
reveal to them the knowledge that they have sought from the Prophet. In 
support of this latter interpretation, Muẓaffar states: 
 
“Although the verses before [this verse] mention jihād, indeed this 
alone is not sufficient in establishing that [this verse has been revealed 
in the context of jihād], for the rest of the verse apparently indicates on 
a context, which is that nafara (“to go forth”) is for learning (taʿilm) 
and understanding (tafaqqhu)”237. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
236 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 67-68 
237 Ibid, p. 67 
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It is thus apparent that in accordance with the former camp, the verses before 
and after the verse of nafara provide a particular context, which signifies that 
this verse cannot be interpreted to substantiate the epistemic validity of the 
isolated report. However, the latter camp overlooks the verses that come before 
and after, rather it analyses and interprets this verse in light of itself. By 
interpreting the first part of the verse of nafara in light of its second part, 
Muzaffar claims that the former part of this verse  (i.e. “it is not for all 
believers to go forth (nafara)”) is associated with the latter part of this verse 
(i.e. “to obtain understanding”) and as a result, he concludes that its apparent 
indication signifies the epistemic validity of the isolated report, and maintains 
that those who have sought understanding or knowledge from the Prophet can 
go and report it to their people. 
 
In order to provide further justification for his interpretation, Muẓaffar 
elucidates that grammarians have distinguished between two types of 
statements, namely jumla inshāʾiyya and jumla khabariyya. The former type of 
statement is used to declare something, whereas the latter type of statement can 
either be used to declare something or describe something. In accordance with 
Muẓaffar, when the Divine Lawgiver states: “it is not for the believers to go 
forth all together”, He uses the particle of negation (ḥarf al-nafī) as opposed to 
the particle of prohibition (ḥarf al-nahī), and thus He starts the verse as “it is 
not” (“mā kāna”) as opposed to “it is prohibited.” Muẓaffar concludes that the 
choice of words here indicate that the Divine Lawgiver is not declaring, but 
rather is describing or informing us of something that is already rationally 
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accepted. He explains that this is because reason necessarily recognises that it 
is impossible for every person of a particular town or village to go to the 
Prophet to seek knowledge – or, as he describes, qaṭʿ - and thus a sect amongst 
them may go to the Prophet, obtain qaṭʿ and return to their town or village to 
relay the qaṭʿ that they have obtained in a ẓannī manner238. Thus, Muẓaffar 
suggests that in reality the verse of nafara establishes that not every mukallaf 
has access to ʿilm or qaṭʿ, rather only some do. Fittingly, this verse permits 
those that have this access to propagate it further, and although their 
propagation only gives rise to conjecture (ẓann), it is required to be accepted 
nonetheless. Therefore, in support of the context provided by the verse itself, 
Muẓaffar provides a further grammatical analysis that establishes a rational 
necessity, which in turn enables him to prove that the Divine Lawgiver Himself 
revokes the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann qua ẓann, by permitting 
and substantiating, through the verse of nafara, the epistemic validity of the 
ẓannī source of khabar al-wāḥid.  
 
Muẓaffar also infers that this verse apparently indicates upon two obligations; 
the first obligation requires a sect to travel to the Prophet to seek knowledge or 
understanding of religion, whereas the second obligation requires the sect to 
return home and “warn” (indhār) its people. In light of the latter obligation, 
Muẓaffar expounds that there is a necessary correlation between the obligation 
of warning and the obligation of accepting the warning. He explains this by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
238 Ibid, p. 69 
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highlighting it is not necessary for the Divine Lawgiver to deem that “warning” 
as obligatory if the people who are being warned have the choice to either 
accept or reject it. Muẓaffar’s deliberation can be illustrated using the 
following example: when Zayd returns back from the Prophet, it is obligatory 
for him to warn the people of his town, and since it is obligatory for Zayd to 
warn, it is obligatory for the people of his town to accept his warning, 
otherwise it would be pointless for Zayd to have the obligation in the first 
place. With this in mind, Muẓaffar concludes that since there is a correlation 
between the obligation of warning and the obligation of accepting, the verse of 
nafara not only substantiates the epistemic validity of the isolated report, but 
also demonstrates that it is obligatory to accept its indication239. This implies 
that if a mukallaf chooses to reject following or acting in accordance with the 
isolated report, he may not only be held accountable, but can also be subjected 
to chastisement. 
As highlighted, in accordance with the Uṣūlī School, the hermeneutical 
primacy of apparent indication is only used when there is an absence of any 
associated evidence (qarīna). However, the differences between the two camps 
regarding the context in which the verse of nafara was revealed clearly 
illustrates that this principle has not been upheld here. The first Uṣūlī camp 
maintains that this verse is unable to substantiate the epistemic validity of the 
isolated report because it believes that this verse is associated with evidence 
that indicates that it was revealed in the context of jihād. Meanwhile, the latter !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
239 Ibid, p. 70 
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Uṣūlī camp maintains that this verse is able to substantiate the epistemic 
validity of the isolated report because it believes that the second part of the 
same verse acts as an associated evidence for the first part of the verse.  
 
Therefore, once again in line with the standards provided within the 
contemporary Uṣūlī discourse itself, this verse cannot be understood by 
applying the hermeneutical primacy of apparent indication, as it is 
unanimously accepted as being associated with evidence, albeit there is 
disagreement on what this associated evidence actually is. Thus, it can either 
be argued that this verse has no apparent indication at all, or at minimal it can 
be concluded that although it does have an apparent indication, it cannot be 
used as qaṭʿī evidence to prove or substantiate the epistemic validity of the 
isolated report. 
 
In addition, even if one was to accept Muẓaffar’s understanding of the context 
in which the verse of nafara was revealed, there still exists the drawback that 
its apparent indication is dissimilar to the apparent indication of the verse of 
nabaʾ. In line with Muẓaffar’s interpretation, the subject matter of the verse of 
nafara concerns a person who goes to the Prophet in order to seek knowledge 
or “understanding” (tafaqqhu) of religion, inasmuch as he is able to 
comprehend what he learns from the Prophet. However, Muẓaffar interprets 
that the subject matter of the verse of nabaʾ concerns a narrator who possesses 
moral probity and transmits a report of the maʿṣūm, irrespective of whether he 
understands and comprehends the content of the report or not. Accordingly, it 
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is not improbable to assert that the subject matter of the former verse relates 
exclusively to an individual who has understanding of religion in his role as a 
scholar (or faqīh), and whose function is to spread the knowledge that he 
acquires, whereas the subject matter of the latter verse concerns a narrator, 
whose function is merely to transmit reports of the maʿṣūm. In light of this, it is 
possible to suggest that the verse of nafara does not apparently indicate on the 
epistemic validity of the isolated report that is conventionally accepted as being 
transmitted by a chain of narrators; at most it can only substantiate the 
epistemic validity of the knowledge that is transmitted by scholars. 
 
Another criticism given is that by definition the Uṣūlīs accept that the isolated 
report is a report that does not reach the level of mutawātir. However, they do 
not assign an exact figure to the number of chains of transmissions it can have, 
as they claim that it can either have a single chain of transmission or multiple 
chains of transmission. However, in contrast to this, based on Muẓaffar’s 
interpretation, the verse of nafara categorically states that it is obligatory for a 
sect (ṭāʾifa) to go forth to seek knowledge. The term “ṭāʾifa” in Arabic – as the 
term “sect” in English – denotes an assembly or a group of at least three or 
more people240. Based on the apparent indication of this verse, an isolated 
report is only accepted to be epistemologically valid if it is reported by at least 
three or more people, or has at least three or more chains of transmission. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
240 See Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 574; this is also explicated by 
Muẓaffar, see ibid, p. 67 
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However, Muẓaffar disputes this criticism by claiming that when the Divine 
Lawgiver says that from every group a sect should go forth, He does not mean 
that it is obligatory for the sect to warn the people in an assembly together, 
rather they can individually go and warn people. Muẓaffar endeavours to 
validate his stance by taking reference to the primacy of absolute meaning 
(aṣālat al-muṭlaq)241. In accordance with this principle, when there is no 
apparent restriction (muqayyad) presented in the textual evidence, reason is 
able to determine that the Divine Lawgiver intends to signify absoluteness 
(iṭlāq) from it, and thus the maximum is taken. This principle is commonly 
illustrated using the verse from the Qurʾān that states: “Allah has allowed 
trading242”. Since this verse does not apparently indicate upon any restriction, it 
signifies absoluteness insofar as the maximum is taken, and thus this verse is 
interpreted to signify that all sorts of trade and business are permissible243. 
Accordingly, by using the primacy of absolute meaning, Muẓaffar deduces that 
since the Divine Lawgiver does not restrict or specify how many people from a 
sect are required to “warn,” reason is able to determine the absoluteness of this 
verse, and thus the maximum is taken, whereby the obligation of warning can 
either be carried out by the whole sect combined, or individually by one person 
from the sect. 
 
After taking into consideration that there are two opposing Uṣūlī opinions on 
the context in which the verse of nafara was revealed, alongside the existence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
241 Ibid, p. 70 
242 Qurʾān 2:275 
243 See Faḍlī, Mabādī al-uṣūl, pp. 65-67 
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of significant discrepancy relating to the apparent indication of the terms 
“tafaqqhu” and “ṭāʾifa”, it can quite easily be contented that this verse does not 
provide qaṭʿī evidence that suffices in proving the epistemic validity of the 
isolated report. By adhering to the criteria set by the Uṣūlīs themselves, it 
cannot be concluded that the verse of nafara provides one apparent indication 
that is superior to its other indications, and thus it is not possible to accurately 
suggest that this verse produces qaṭʿī knowledge that the Divine Lawgiver has 
given His permission to act contrary to the primary axiom by following and 
acting in accordance with the ẓannī source of khabar al-wāḥid244.  
 
 
4.4 Evidence from the Sunna for the Ḥujjiyya of Khabar al-wāḥid 
 
Following his evaluation of the epistemic validity of the isolated report using 
the aforementioned verses of the Qurʾān, Muẓaffar moves on to consider the 
textual evidence of sunna. As has been established, the transmitted reports that 
convey the sunna are of two types, namely mutawātir or khabar al-wāḥid. It 
would be irrelevant to substantiate the epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid by 
using khabar al-wāḥid, as this would lead to to a circular argument, whereby 
ẓann cannot be used to substantiate the epistemic validity of ẓann. In other 
words, one cannot conclude that: “khabar al-wāḥid indicates that khabar al-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
244 In addition, Muẓaffar also discusses the verse of ḥurmat al-kitmān (“the prohibition of 
concealment” – Qurʾān 2:159). However, he admits that this verse is not sufficient in 
substantiating the epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid. See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 
71-72 
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wāḥid is epistemologically valid (ḥujja)”, because in such a case, how does one 
ascertain that the former khabar al-wāḥid is epistemologically valid in the first 
place? This can be known through either another khabar al-wāḥid, or through 
evidence that is qaṭʿī. Undoubtedly, if it is known through the former then this 
effectively tantamounts to an infinite regress, thus the only way to ascertain 
whether a khabar al-wāḥid is epistemologically valid is through qaṭʿī evidence 
i.e. the mutawātir reports, or reports that are associated with qaṭʿī evidence. 
 
Muẓaffar distinguishes between two types of mutawātir reports, namely 
mutawātir lafẓī and mutawātir maʿnawī. The former refers to widely narrated 
reports that have been preserved verbatim (lafẓī), inasmuch as their matan 
(content) has been reported exactly word for word by a wide number of 
narrators. Meanwhile, the latter refers to widely narrated reports that are not 
preserved verbatim, inasmuch as their matan (content) has not been reported 
exactly word for word, but they nonetheless effectively convey the same 
meaning (maʿna)245. Muẓaffar claims that there are no mutawātir lafẓī that 
substantiate the epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid, and thus together with 
other prominent post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs 246 , he establishes that there are no 
mutawātir reports that reveal knowledge that the maʿṣūm permit the use of the 
isolated report in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
245 For a detailed distinction between mutawātir lafẓī and mutawātir maʿnawī see Faḍlī, 
Introduction to Ḥadīth, pp. 101-103 
246 Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, pp. 140-144; Khurāsānī, Kifāyat al-uṣūl vol. 2, pp. 78-79; 
Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 82; Faḍlī, Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh vol. 1, pp. 285-286  
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However, Muẓaffar claims that al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī’s (d.1104/1693) canonical 
collection of reports entitled al-Wasāʾil al-Shīʿa contain a record of mutawātir 
maʿnawī that substantiate the epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid. Using 
Shaykh Anṣārī’s grouping of these reports, Muẓaffar explicates the following 
five groups of mutawātir maʿnawī that he believes are “not farfetched247” in 
substantiating the epistemic validity of the isolated report. 
 
 
4.4.1 First Group 
 
The first group of reports that have the potential to substantiate the epistemic 
validity of the isolated report are those that are discussed in the chapter of uṣūl 
al-fiqh, which considers the situation when there is a conflict or contradiction 
(taʿāruḍ) between two reports. It must be noted that true contradiction between 
two conflicting reports only occurs when the chain of narration of both the 
reports are equal e.g. both the chains contain reporters whose moral probity is 
established, and thus both reports are authentic (ṣaḥīḥ). As a result of this, the 
contradiction relates to the matan (content) of the two reports. For instance, 
one report indicates that action x is obligatory (wājib), whereas the other report 
indicates that the same action x is prohibited (ḥarām).  
 
In such instances, there exist widely narrated non-verbatim reports (mutawātir !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
247 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 72 
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maʿnawī), which apparently indicate that the maʿṣūm have stipulated certain 
guidelines upon which it is possible to give preference (tarjīḥ) to one 
conflicting report over another. Moreover, there are also widely narrated non-
verbatim reports, which reveal that when it is not possible to give preference to 
one of the two conflicting reports, a mukallaf has the right to choose between 
following and acting in accordance with either one of the two conflicting 
reports. 
Muẓaffar concludes that since the maʿṣūm have stipulated what a mukallaf is 
required to do in cases when there are two conflicting reports, this necessarily 
suggests that the maʿṣūm accept the epistemic validity of the isolated report, 
for indeed if they had not deemed it as epistemologically valid in itself, then 
they would not have conveyed a criteria of giving preference in cases where 
there are two conflicting reports. 
However, in response to Muẓaffar’s view, Ṣadr suggests that the likes of 
Muẓaffar are assuming that the subject matter of this group of mutawātir 
maʿnawī are those conflicting reports that fall under the category of isolated 
reports (akhbār al-āḥād) over which there is doubt regarding their authenticity. 
However, Ṣadr persuasively asserts that this is false by arguing that the subject 
matter actually relates to those reports that are recognised as authentic248. For 
instance, if one was to consult with the maʿṣūm about what to do in cases 
where there are two conflicting reports, he knows that both reports are from the 
maʿṣūm himself, and thus he has no doubt regarding their authenticity.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
248 For Ṣadr’s discussion, see Durūs 2 vol. 2, pp. 159-166 
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This implies that the subject matter of this group of mutawātir maʿnawī is 
regarding those reports whose authenticity is qaṭʿī, and Ṣadr criticises that it is 
incorrect to assume that its subject matter is regarding the ẓannī indication of 
the isolated report. Thus, in accordance with Ṣadr, this group of mutawātir 
maʿnawī is unable to substantiate the epistemic validity of the isolated report.  
 
 
4.4.2 Second Group 
 
The second group of reports that have the potential to substantiate the 
epistemic validity of the isolated report are those in which the maʿṣūm permit a 
mukallaf to directly refer to their companions in order to seek knowledge of 
Sharīʿa precepts. For instance, there are numerous reports from the sixth Shiite 
impeccable Imam – Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d.148/765) – that clearly indicate that it is 
acceptable to obtain knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts from his companion named 
Zurāra, as he categorically states that Zurāra is trustworthy. Another example is 
the following report: 
“ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Mahdī said: Perhaps due to need I cannot meet you 
[Imam] every time. Is Yūnus b. ʿAbd al-Raḥman trustworthy (thiqa), 
from whom I can take knowledge of my religion? He [the Imam] said: 
Yes249.” 
Based on such reports, Muẓaffar quotes that Shaykh Anṣārī argues that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
249 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 73 
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second group of mutawātir maʿnawī highlights that the maʿṣūm necessarily 
assumed the epistemic validity of the isolated report. Accordingly, Anṣārī 
asserts that this is precisely why they explicated that the isolated report is 
accepted, if and when moral probity, or trustworthiness, of a particular narrator 
is established. 
It can again be argued that the subject matter of the second group of mutawātir 
maʿnawī does not relate to the epistemic validity of following and acting in 
accordance with the isolated report per se, but rather with certain individuals. 
Evidently, the aforementioned report of the maʿṣūm clearly indicates that the 
knowledge sought from Yūnus b. ʿAbd al-Raḥman is epistemologically valid. 
However, this does not necessarily indicate that all isolated reports of 
individuals whose moral probity is established are epistemologically valid. 
!
4.4.3 Third Group !
The third group of mutawātir maʿnawī reports that have the potential to 
substantiate the epistemic validity of the isolated report are those reports that 
indicate on the necessity of relying on the reported sunna of the maʿṣūm and 
their narrators. An example of such a report is the following: 
 
“The one upon who is peace [i.e. the Imam] has said: When new 
situations arise then refer to the narrators (ruwā) of our ḥadīth, for 
verily they are my ḥujja upon you, and I am the ḥujja of Allah upon 
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them250.” 
However, it can be argued that the aforementioned report uses the term ruwā 
(narrators) as opposed to the term rāwī (narrator). Based on the usage of the 
plural form of the word, it is possible to alternatively suggest that the maʿṣūm 
is indicating that in cases of new situations arising, it is not appropriate to 
merely consult a single narration or an isolated report, but rather a mukallaf or 
a mujtahid should consult multiple narrations.  
Therefore, instead of deducing that the third group of mutawātir maʿnawī   
substantiate the epistemic validity of the isolated report, it can be asserted that 
they actually substantiate the epistemic validity of a multiplicity of narrations 
that indicate the sunna of the maʿṣūm on a particular issue that can be extended 
and applied to new situations that arise. 
 
 
4.4.4 Fourth Group !
The forth group of mutawātir maʿnawī that have the ability to substantiate the 
epistemic validity of the isolated report consist of those reports that urge the 
importance of memorising, writing and conveying the reports of the maʿṣūm. 
An example of this is the following report from the Prophet: 
“Whoever from my community memorises (ḥafaẓa) forty hadith, Allah !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
250 Ibid. 
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will raise him on the day of judgment as a faqīh and a knowledgeable 
person (ʿālim)251.” 
Whilst Muẓaffar does not reveal his own opinion, it may be suggested that 
Shaykh Anṣārī included this group of reports in proving the epistemic validity 
of the isolated report because they emphasise the importance of preserving the 
sunna of the maʿṣūm. Accordingly, Shaykh Anṣārī draws a correlation between 
preservation and epistemic validity, inasmuch as he assumes that the reason 
why the maʿṣūm have emphasised the preservation of their reported sunna is 
because their reported sunna is epistemologically valid. 
However, it is arguable that whilst encouraging people to preserve the reports 
that convey the sunna of the maʿṣūm implies that the sunna of the maʿṣūm is 
epistemologically valid, it does not necessarily imply that the ẓannī source of 
khabar al-wāḥid is also epistemologically valid.  
 
4.4.5 Fifth Group !
The final group of mutawātir maʿnawī that can potentially substantiate the 
epistemic validity of the isolated report are those reports from the maʿṣūm that 
warn people against falling prey to reports that are fabricated. Muẓaffar points 
out that these reports signify that the epistemic validity of the isolated report 
was already pre-assumed by the maʿṣūm, as otherwise it would be irrelevant 
for the maʿṣūm to find it incumbent upon himself to warn people against !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
251 Ibid. 
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following fabricated reports.  
This group of reports provides stronger evidence in indicating the epistemic 
validity of the isolated report than the previous groups. This is because the 
isolated report by definition is a source that gives rise to mere ẓann, as there 
always exists some doubt regarding its authenticity and the possibility of it 
being fabricated. Accordingly, the maʿṣūm is warning people to not fall prey to 
fabricated reports, with the obvious implication being to act in accordance with 
the isolated reports that are not fabricated, but instead are epistemologically 
valid. In essence, this group of mutawātir maʿnawī highlights that during the 
time of the maʿṣūm, the Muslims accepted the epistemic validity of the isolated 
report, and it was common practice to follow and act in accordance with its 
indication. Furthermore, the maʿṣūm endorsed this practice and just warned the 
Muslims to be careful of fabrication.  
 After discussing the aforementioned five groups, Muẓaffar concludes by 
quoting Anṣārī, who states that: 
Other than this [i.e. the five groups of mutawātir maʿnawī], among the 
reports that can be gathered and made use of are those that show that 
the Imams were satisfied by [people] acting in accordance with khabar 
[al-wāḥid]. And although they [i.e. the isolated reports) do not give 
qaṭʿ, in Wasāʾil [al-Shīʿa] it is claimed that there are reports that 
amount to mutawātir [that indicate] on acting in accordance with 
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khabar that is trustworthy (thiqa)252. 
Muẓaffar does not directly give his own opinion on whether or not he believes 
that the five groups of mutawātir maʿnawī can be used as evidence to 
substantiate the epistemic validity of the isolated report, however he does not 
propose any criticisms towards Anṣārī’s claims. Therefore, it appears that 
Muẓaffar accepts Anṣārī’s standpoint, despite the fact that his legal 
epistemology maintains that ẓannī evidence does not have the potential to 
prove the epistemic validity of another ẓannī evidence. Although the mutawātir 
maʿnawī are widely reported, they do not fall under the definition of the 
mutawātir that give rise to qaṭʿ, as they are non-verbatim.  
 
Even if one is to argue that mutawātir maʿnawī do give rise to certainty, it is 
clear that the subject matter of the aforementioned five groups concerns those 
isolated reports in which there is only one person in the chain of transmission 
between the maʿṣūm and the narrator (N). In other words, the chain of 
transmission would read as follows: 
 
Maʿṣūm told A, who told N 
However, the isolated report that is available to a mujtahid in the present day 
differs significantly to this, as the chain of transmission of the isolated report 
that currently exists contains many persons between the narrator and the 
maʿṣūm e.g. it would read as follows: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
252 Ibid, p. 74 
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Maʿṣūm told A, who told B, who told C, who told D, who told E, who 
told F, who told N 
 
It can be seen that the subject matter of the five groups of the mutawātir 
maʿnawī does not correspond to the type of isolated reports that exist in the 
present day, as the chain of transmission is now significantly extended. 
Therefore, it is apparent that there is need for further argumentation to 
generalise the aforementioned five groups of mutawātir maʿnawī if they are to 
be used to substantiate the epistemic validity of the isolated reports that we 
have at present. 
 
 
4.5 Evidence from ijmāʿ for the Ḥujjiyya of Khabar al-wāḥid 
 
The third evidence evaluated by Muẓaffar to substantiate the epistemic validity 
of the isolated report is from ijmāʿ (consensus). It is vital to know that ijmāʿ 
was first introduced in the Sunni jurisprudential discourse as an independent 
source of Sharīʿa precepts. There has always been some level of disagreement 
amongst Sunni scholars about what type of ijmāʿ is considered to be 
epistemologically valid, as some Sunni scholars maintain that ijmāʿ is only 
epistemologically valid when it involves the consensus of all Muslims, whereas 
other Sunnis scholars argue that ijmāʿ is epistemologically valid when it 
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involves the consensus of prominent Muslim scholars253. Following the four-
fold categorisation of Sunni evidence, the Shiite Uṣūlī jurisprudential discourse 
also recognises ijmāʿ as one of its main sources of knowledge. However, 
contrastingly to the Sunnis, the Uṣūlīs maintain that ijmāʿ is only 
epistemologically valid when there is a consensus or agreement between a 
group of scholars, and among them is the maʿṣūm254.  
 
The Uṣūlīs uphold the necessity of having the maʿṣūm as one of the 
participants of the ijmāʿ on the basis that it is possible for scholars, who are 
fallible human beings, to concur upon something that in actuality is contrary to 
the objective reality (wāqiʿī). Owing to their fallibility, even if a large number 
of scholars were to unanimously agree upon a particular issue, their consensus 
would not bring about qaṭʿ, rather at most it may provide ẓann – or more 
precisely, ghalabat al-ẓann - and therefore, due to the Shiite insistence 
regarding the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann, they maintain that 
ijmāʿ that is constructed solely from the opinion of fallible scholars is invalid. 
The Shiites propose that ijmāʿ arising from fallible human scholars is only 
epistemologically valid when the impeccable Prophet or Imam is also included 
within the large group of scholars. Owing to the impeccability of the Prophet 
or the Imams, it is not theologically possible for them to agree upon something 
that is erroneous and contrary to that which is in the objective reality. 
Accordingly, ijmāʿ that involves the opinion of the maʿṣūm brings about qaṭʿī !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
253 See Vogel, Frank E. Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden: Brill, 
2000), p. 46; Faḍlī, Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh vol. 1, pp. 216-217 
254 See ibid, pp. 217-218; Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 91-99  
!!! 234!
knowledge, and hence is recognised as being epistemologically valid within the 
Shiite jurisprudential discourse. Shomali, in the Principles of Jurisprudence 
elucidates: 
 
Therefore, according to Shiʿi Islam, consensus is reduced to the 
Sunnah. Also, as supplementary evidence, some Shi’a scholars have 
argued that whenever there is a consensus amongst the Shi’a scholars in 
the time of occultation we can conclude that Imam Mahdi [who is the 
twelfth impeccable Imam] must have endorsed their view; otherwise he 
should have saved the community from holding a mistaken position by 
all. The Imam can intervene, perhaps by placing an idea into the mind 
of one or more of the scholars so that there will not be total agreement 
on an erroneous position… Therefore, for both Sunni and Shia, it is 
very difficult to have real consensus in practice, where there is no 
reference in the Qurʿan and Sunnah255. 
 
Nevertheless, when substantiating the epistemic validity of the isolated report 
by seeking proof from ijmāʿ, it is found that there is discrepancy within the 
Uṣūlī School. On one hand, Ṭūsī (d.460/1067) has been reported as the first 
Uṣūlī jurist to claim that there is an ijmāʿ on the epistemic validity of the 
isolated report, and he states that all scholars belonging to the Shiite School, 
including the maʿṣūm, have unanimously agreed that although the isolated 
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report is a ẓannī evidence, it is epistemologically valid. Thus, following and 
acting in accordance with its indication is obligatory upon every mukallaf, 
insofar as if they fail to do so and as a result overlook that which is in the 
wāqiʿī, they may be held accountable and subject to chastisement. 
 
Ṭūsī does not accept that the isolated report is unrestrictedly epistemologically 
valid, rather he maintains that the ijmāʿ qualifies that an isolated report can 
only be deemed as epistemologically valid when it has been transmitted by a 
chain of narrators who are all recognised as being adherents of the Shiite 
School, with the report being from one of the maʿṣūm as opposed to a 
companion of the maʿṣūm. Therefore, Ṭūsī does not advocate that the subject 
matter of ijmāʿ is khabar al-wāḥid qua khabar al-wāḥid; rather it is khabar al-
wāḥid with the aforementioned qualifications. Muẓaffar points out that the 
following prominent Uṣūlī scholars also claimed that there was an ijmāʿ within 
the Shiite School regarding the epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid, namely: 
Sayyid Raḍī al-Dīn b. Ṭāwuṣ (d.664/1266), ʿAllāma Ḥillī (d.726/1325) in his 
al-Nihāya, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī (d. 1109/1698), and Shaykh al-Anṣārī 
(d.1281/1864) in his al-Rasāʾil (Farāiʾd al-uṣūl)256. 
 
In contrast, other Shiite scholars have claimed that there is an ijmāʿ between 
the Shiite scholars, including the maʿṣūm, which categorically denounces the 
epistemic validity of the isolated report. The most prominent scholar who 
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advocated this view was the teacher of Ṭūsī, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d.436/1044), 
who maintains that in the Shiite tradition, the epistemic status of the isolated 
report is akin to the epistemic status of qiyās, thus concluding that it gives rise 
to mere ẓann, which is not epistemologically valid257. Muẓaffar notes that 
lending support to Murtaḍā, other notable scholars who have claimed this ijmāʿ 
were Ibn Idrīs (d.598/1202) in al-Sarāʾir, and Faḍal ibn Ḥasan al-Ṭabarasī 
(d.548/1153), the author of one of the most renowned Shiite works exegesis 
(tafsīr) of the Qurʾān entitled Majmaʿ al-bayān li-ʿulūm al-Qurʿān, who 
explicitly proclaimed that there was a consensus amongst Shiite scholars on the 
non-validity of the isolated report258.   
 
It becomes apparent that there are two camps within the Uṣūlī School. The first 
camp claims that there is an ijmāʿ that substantiates the epistemic validity of 
the isolated report, whereas the second camp claims that there is an ijmāʿ that 
denounces the epistemic validity of the isolated report. Being the pioneers of 
the early Shiite jurisprudential discourse, both Ṭūsī and Murtaḍā are recognised 
as highly respected scholars within the Shiite tradition by not only the Uṣūlīs, 
but also the Akhbārīs, and as a result, their conflicting claims have led to 
creating severe confusion about the epistemic status of the isolated report. 
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257 See ibid, pp. 74-75; also for a detailed analysis of the historical development of Shiite uṣūl 
al-fiqh in the formative period (from the time of Mufīd to Ṭūsī), see Calder, “Doubt and 
Prerogative,” pp. 61-62; Ḥaydarī, al-Qaṭʿ, pp. 12-18; Faḍlī, Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh vol. 1, pp. 69-76 
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Owing to this, Muẓaffar moves on to examine how Anṣārī has offered various 
reconciliations between these two contrasting opinions259.  
 
Firstly, Anṣārī elucidates that Ṭūsī’s definition of khabar al-wāḥid differs to 
Murtaḍā’s definition, as when Murtaḍā claims that there is an ijmāʿ on the non-
validity of the isolated report, he is referring to those isolated reports that were 
narrated by people who adhered to the Sunni Schools, as opposed to 
originating from the Shiite tradition. Anṣārī argues that in light of this, both 
Murtaḍā and Ṭūsī are indicating upon the same thing; whilst Murtaḍā claims 
that there is an ijmāʿ that the isolated report ‘that is reported by the Sunnis’ is 
not epistemologically valid, Ṭūsī claims that there is an ijmāʿ that the isolated 
report ‘that is reported by the Shiites’ is epistemologically valid. 
 
Similarly, the second possible reconciliation proposed by Anṣārī is that when 
Murtaḍā discusses khabar al-wāḥid, he is referring to those isolated reports 
that were not contained within the reliable Shiite canonical collections of 
ḥadīth, whereas when Ṭūsī discusses khabar al-wāḥid, he is referring to those 
isolated reports that were. This suggests that the Shiite scholars unanimously 
agreed on the epistemic validity of the isolated reports contained within the 
reliable Shiite canonical collections of ḥadīth, and denounced the epistemic 
validity of the isolated reports that were not. 
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The third possible reconciliation that Anṣārī offers is that when Ṭūsī claimed 
that there is an ijmāʿ on the epistemic validity of the isolated report, he does 
not refer to khabar al-wāḥid qua khabar al-wāḥid, which is ẓannī, but rather 
refers to khabar al-wāḥid that is associated with evidence (maḥfūẓ bi-l 
qarāʾin), which is qaṭʿī. This would reconcile the apparent differences between 
Murtaḍā and Ṭūsī, as Murtaḍā too agrees that it is possible for one to rely on 
and act in accordance with the isolated report that is associated with evidence, 
as it is substantiated. 
 
Anṣārī suggests that in accordance with Ṭūsī’s and Murtaḍā’s actual works on 
legal theory, the most plausible or preferred reconciliation between their 
conflicting claims on ijmāʿ is the first possibility and then the second 
possibility. It is important to note that Anṣārī further suggests another more 
complicated reconciliation, but although he believes that it is the most 
comprehensive reconciliation between the claims of Ṭūsī and Murtaḍā, 
Muẓaffar rejects it as being inaccurate. It is also questionable whether Anṣārī 
actually formulated all of the aforementioned reconciliations, due to their 
varying differences in terms of complexity and detail. Instead, it is suggested 
that his Uṣūlī predecessors proposed these reconciliations in their respective 
works of legal theory, as they were also concerned with resolving the conflict 
between the two founding fathers of Shiite legal theory, and Anṣārī simply 
compiled these propositions together. This stance is supported by Muẓaffar, 
who provides a footnote in which he highlights that even the most preferred 
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reconciliation of Anṣārī was initially proposed by Muḥaqiq al-Narāqī 
(d.1209/1795), who is famously known as the author of al-Mināhaj.  
 
Nevertheless, apart from this, Muẓaffar does not directly comment on, or give 
preference to, any of the aforementioned possible reconciliations. Rather, he 
claims that: 
 
Indeed, Murtaḍā has acted contrary to what he has originated here, and 
also has Ibn Idrīs who has followed him in his opinion, for verily most 
of the time they have taken [or have derived Sharīʿa precepts] from the 
trustworthy akhbār al-āḥād that are in the books of our people. In line 
with this, it is difficult to claim that all [the isolated reports they use] 
are widely reported, or are associated with evidence that prove their 
authenticity as certain (qaṭʿ)260. 
 
This clearly highlights that although scholars such as Murtaḍā and Ibn Idrīs 
claim that there is an ijmāʿ on the non-validity of the isolated report, their 
practice in the discourse of jurisprudence (fiqh) suggests the opposite, as both 
of these scholars use a vast number of isolated reports in their juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. Muẓaffar concludes that as both Murtaḍā and 
Ibn Idrīs belong to the Shiite tradition, they would not accept and rely on ẓann 
qua ẓann, and thus their reliance on the ẓann produced from the isolated report 
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demonstrates that they deem such ẓann to be substantiated or associated with 
other evidence. Thus, in accordance with Muẓaffar, the subject matter of the 
ijmāʿ claimed by Murtaḍā and Ṭūsī is not the isolated report that is 
substantiated by qaṭʿī evidence, rather it is the isolated report that is not 
substantiated by qaṭʿī evidence.  
 
Muẓaffar also asserts that most of the scholars belonging to the Shiite tradition 
who followed Ṭūsī accepted the epistemic validity of the isolated report, which 
in turn highlighted their acceptance of the validity of the ijmāʿ claimed by 
Ṭūsī. In support of this, Muẓaffar once again refers to Anṣārī, who in Farāiʾd 
al-uṣūl also mentions other claims of ijmāʿ that do not directly, but rather 
implicitly denote and substantiate the epistemic validity of the isolated 
report261. The two consensuses that Anṣārī presents are both offered by 
renowned scholars of biographical studies of narrators (ʿilm al-rijāl), 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAmr al-Kishī  (d. unknown) and Aḥmad ibn al-Kūfī al-
Najāshī (d.450/1058).  Kishī claims that there is an ijmāʿ amongst Shiite 
scholars whereby when particular scholars narrate a chain of transmission, 
there is no requirement to evaluate the moral probity of each narrator, as it is 
assumed that they are all trustworthy. Similarly, Najāshī also claims that there 
is an ijmāʿ amongst the Shiites whereby if a hurried report (mursal ḥadīth) – a 
report that has missing links of narrators in its chain of transmission – is 
reported by ibn Abī ʿUmayr, it is deemed as authentic. This is because the 
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moral probity of the narrators from a chain of transmission he reports does not 
need to be evaluated, as it is known that every report narrated by ibn Abī 
ʿUmayr has an authentic chain of transmission in which all narrators are 
considered as trustworthy, even if they are not explicitly mentioned in it. 
 
It can be inferred from both these aforementioned claims of ijmāʿ that since 
Shiite scholars have agreed upon the epistemic validity of the isolated reports 
that have been reported by particular narrators, it necessarily implies that they 
must have, by priority, had a consensus on the fact that the indication of the 
isolated report is epistemologically valid in the first place. Consequently, in 
accordance with Anṣārī – and most likely Muẓaffar – the aforementioned 
claims of ijmāʿ imply that there was always an ijmāʿ within the Shiite tradition 
regarding the epistemic validity of the isolated report. 
 
In his final analysis, Muẓaffar concludes by elucidating upon the closing 
remarks of Anṣārī, who pragmatically argues that if one is to maintain doubt 
that an ijmāʿ that substantiates the epistemic validity of the isolated report does 
not exist, then it would be very difficult for them to find an ijmāʿ in any other 
area of the jurisprudential discourse, apart from those that deal with the 
fundamental elements (ḍarūriyyāt) of religion262. As such, Anṣārī argues that 
the epistemic validity of the isolated report is one of the very few 
jurisprudential issues that all Shiite scholars have unanimously agreed upon. 
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Nonetheless, he moves on to importantly qualify his final conclusion by 
emphasising that this ijmāʿ does not epistemologically validate all isolated 
reports, rather it only validates those reports that are transmitted by narrators 
whose moral probity is established, and as a result produce iṭmiʾnān 
(contentment) as opposed to mere conjecture263. 
 
It is arguable that Muẓaffar too agrees with Anṣārī’s conclusion, as he simply 
does not indicate otherwise. Thus, there has always been an ijmāʿ between the 
Shiite scholars that the conjecture (ẓann) produced from the isolated report is 
epistemologically valid in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. However, 
it can be analyzed that Muẓaffar’s uncertainty regarding whether or not all 
jurists have agreed on such a consensus is sufficiently apparent from this 
discourse, as he has abstained from establishing his own position throughout, 
instead choosing to be dependent on Anṣārī’s standpoint. 
 
A major issue that appears to be overlooked by Anṣārī and Muẓaffar is the fact 
that both Murtaḍā and Ṭūsī were not only recognised as jurists, but were also 
renowned as accomplished Shiite theologians. Accordingly, it can be disputed 
that their position is not just a legal epistemological one, but it is also a 
theological polemical standpoint. As pointed out in Chapter One, the legal 
theory proposed by Murtaḍā was developed alongside a polemic encounter !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
263 Muẓaffar explains that the term iṭmiʾnān is used in the context of sukūn al-nafs, whereby it 
brings peace (sukūn) to the self (nafs). However, something that brings contentment does not 
necessarily mean that it in actuality corresponds to the objective reality (wāqiʿī), rather it is 
something that can in fact lead to compound ignorance (jahl al-murakab), and thus it is 
different to qaṭʿ/ʿilm, which as shown in Chapter Three leads to yaqīn. 
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with the mainstream Sunni Schools, which resulted in him denouncing the 
epistemic validity of a wide range of evidence used by Sunnis jurists, including 
the isolated report, on the basis that they did not give knowledge (ʿilm) of 
Sharīʿa precepts and produced mere ẓann. In contrast, in order to reduce the 
varying opinions (ikhtilāf) that were prevalent within circles of the Shiite 
jurisprudential discourse, Ṭūsī acted against what Calder describes as the 
established slogan of Shiite legal theory of the “non-validity of khabar al-
wāḥid,” and upheld that the ẓann produced from the isolated report is valid as 
long as it has been reported by a chain of trustworthy reporters264.  
 
This gives way to two suggestions. Firstly, it can be argued that the true 
position amongst the Shiites was that the isolated report is epistemologically 
valid, however due to severe confrontation between the Shiites and the Sunnis, 
the likes of Murtaḍā – or his teacher Mufīd – rejected the epistemic validity of 
the isolated report. Alternatively, it can be debated that the true position of the 
Shiites was that the isolated report is not epistemologically valid, however in 
order to establish juristic authority and achieve a dominant opinion amongst 
the varying opinions, scholars such as Ṭūsī had no choice but to accept the 
epistemic validity of the isolated report and maintain uniformity of Sharīʿa 
precepts across the Shiite tradition. 
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In essence, whether it is argued that the definition of the isolated report differs 
in the ijmāʿ that is claimed by Ṭūsī to the ijmāʿ that is claimed by Murtaḍā, or 
whether it is proposed that an ijmāʿ against the epistemic validity of the 
isolated report was constructed by the Shiites to achieve supremacy over the 
Sunni Schools, or indeed to maintain dominance over the Shiite tradition, the 
fact remains that there are two conflicting claims of ijmāʿ. Due to this 
ambiguity regarding what the real indication of the ijmāʿ is, in line with the 
standards set by the Uṣūlī School itself, it can suitably be argued that the ijmāʿ 
claimed by Ṭūsī and some of his contemporaries does not sufficiently act as a 
qaṭʿī evidence that can potentially substantiate the epistemic validity of the 
isolated report. 
 
4.6 Evidence from Banā al-ʿuqalā for the Ḥujjiyya of Khabar al-wāḥid 
 
The final evidence that Muẓaffar evaluates to substantiate the epistemic 
validity of the isolated report is banā al-ʿuqalā (literally: the convention of 
rational people). As discussed, the knowledge that is derived from the 
convention of rational people is deemed as being epistemologically valid 
within the mainstream Uṣūlī tradition because the Divine Lawgiver is regarded 
as the Chief of all rational people (ra’is al-ʿuqalā). It is important to note that 
this understanding is based on the Shiite affiliation with the ʿAdliyya thought, 
which acknowledges that reason has the potential to know or intellectualise the 
intrinsic moral properties of Sharīʿa precepts, because every Sharīʿa precept 
ordained by the Just Divine Lawgiver is postulated with an intrinsic moral 
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property of either “praiseworthiness” or “blameworthiness”. Since it is 
believed that the Divine Lawgiver only orders acts whose intrinsic moral 
properties can be intellectualised, He is theologically held as the Head of all 
rational beings, and therefore, when all rational people follow a particular 
convention, the Divine Lawgiver by priority also follows that particular 
convention. 
 
However, the mainstream Uṣūlīs point out that prior to taking banā al-ʿuqalā 
as an epistemologically valid source or evidence of knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts, it is a necessary prerequisite for a mujtahid to actively search for any 
possible counter evidence that suggests otherwise. If counter evidence is found, 
which highlights that the Divine Lawgiver has rejected or prevented a 
particular convention of rational people, then it cannot be deemed as 
epistemologically valid, for the Chief of all rational beings Himself does not 
conform with it. In light of this, Muẓaffar claims that: 
 
In itself the non-existence of prevention (ʿadam thubūt al-radʿ) is 
sufficient in revealing that He is consenting (mūwāfiqa) with them [i.e. 
the rational people], for indeed that is what He means and intends. If He 
was not happy with it [i.e. the convention] – which He sees and hears – 
then He would prevent them [i.e. the rational people] from it, and He 
would express to them this prevention by any manner of expression 
(tablīgh). Therefore, by the mere non-existence of prevention from 
Him, we know of His consent. Necessarily, if the real prevention (al-
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radʿ al-wāqiʿī) does not arrive, then the prevention cannot be 
intellectualised, and thus it is epistemologically valid (ḥujja)265. 
 
Thus, Muẓaffar advocates that it is natural for rational people to always follow 
and act in accordance with their particular conventions, as they cannot, or do 
not, have the ability to intellectualise or pick any faults with these conventions. 
Muẓaffar clarifies that the only way in which rational people would not act in 
line with their particular conventions is if the Divine Lawgiver – being the 
Chief of all rational beings – explicitly expresses the faults and inaccuracies of 
such particular conventions. Therefore, it follows that if a particular rational 
convention is to reveal something that in actuality is contrary to that which is 
in the objective reality (wāqiʿī), it would still be considered as 
epistemologically valid. 
 
One such convention amongst rational people is their habitual acceptance of 
following isolated reports. Through the process of induction (istiqrāʿ), it is 
known that rational people in their daily lives rely on news that is conveyed to 
them by sources that they deem as reliable. Undoubtedly, although such news 
cannot provide them with certainty (qaṭʿ), as there is always the possibility of it 
being erroneous, rational people still accept it and ignore this possibility. For 
example, if best friend A informs best friend B that he has seen their best 
friend C die on the street, then B would accept and rely on the news brought by 
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A. Indeed, it is possible that C is not really dead and the news brought by A is 
inaccurate e.g. although A thought that C was dead, in reality C may have just 
fainted, or it is possible that C may have just been playing a practical joke on 
A. However, irrespective of such possibilities, B would still accept and rely on 
the news conveyed by A. 
 
Owing to the fact that all rational people act in accordance with this 
convention, and considering that the Divine Lawgiver has not explicitly 
prevented rational people from doing so, for most post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs, 
including Muẓaffar, this particular rational convention is a qaṭʿī evidence that 
proves and substantiates the epistemic validity of the isolated report 266 . 
Muẓaffar illustrates this view in a syllogistic manner, whereby he proclaims 
that both the minor premise and the major premise of the syllogism are qaṭʿī, 
and thus necessarily lead to a qaṭʿī conclusion267: 
 
Minor Premise:  All rational people conventionally follow and act 
in accordance with isolated reports. 
 
Major Premise:  The Divine Lawgiver, being the Head of all 
rational people, always consents to the 
conventions of rational people, unless He 
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267 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 80 
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explicitly prevents them from acting in 
accordance with particular conventions. 
 
Conclusion:  Therefore, the Divine Lawgiver consents to the 
convention of acting in accordance with isolated 
reports, for he has not prevented rational people 
in doing so. 
 
Here, the minor premise is based on inductive reasoning (istiqrāʿ), whereby its 
general proposition is derived and constructed from the examination and 
evaluation of specific instances. Therefore, the proposition that “all rational 
people conventionally follow and act in accordance with isolated reports” is 
only derived and constructed on the basis of examining and evaluating 
numerous instances of the practice of rational people.  
 
At this juncture, it is important to consider that in his al-Manṭiq, Muẓaffar 
distinguishes between two types of inductions, namely istiqrāʿ tām (complete 
induction) and istiqrāʿ nāqiṣ (incomplete induction)268. The former refers to the 
process of induction where a general proposition is derived after examining 
and evaluating every possible instance. For example: 
 
1. 100% of humans are mortal 
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2. Zayd is a human 
3. Therefore, it is 100% certain that Zayd is mortal 
 
Meanwhile, the latter refers to the process of induction where a general 
proposition is derived after examining and evaluating numerous possible 
instances, as opposed to every possible instance. For example: 
 
1. 90% of humans are right-handed 
2. Zayd is a human 
3. Therefore, there is a 90% probability of Zayd being right-handed 
 
Muẓaffar advocates that the proposition that is derived from a complete 
induction gives rise to qaṭʿī knowledge as it covers every instance. Meanwhile, 
the proposition that is derived from an incomplete induction merely provides 
ẓannī knowledge, as it only covers some of the instances. In light of this, 
although Muẓaffar claims that the proposition: “All rational people 
conventionally follow and act in accordance with isolated reports” is based on 
istiqrāʿ, he does not clarify whether it is istiqrāʿ tām or istiqrāʿ nāqiṣ. Indeed, 
Muẓaffar could not claim that this proposition is derived from istiqrāʿ nāqiṣ, 
for if this was the case then it could not be deemed as qaṭʿī, and as a result, the 
conclusion derived from it could also not be considered as qaṭʿī, which would 
necessarily imply that banā al-ʿuqalā is not qaṭʿī evidence that can be used to 
substantiate the epistemic validity of isolated reports. Thus, in order to support 
his claim that this proposition is qaṭʿī that leads to a qaṭʿī conclusion, Muẓaffar 
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is required to verify that it is derived from istiqrāʿ tām. However, as mentioned 
above, Muẓaffar does not provide any proofs or argumentation to prove this. 
 
Nevertheless, Muẓaffar points out that in accordance with his teacher Naʾīnī, in 
comparison to the evidence provided from the Qurʾān, sunna, and ijmāʿ, banā 
al-ʿuqalā is the most strongest evidence that substantiates the epistemic 
validity of the isolated report269. This is because even if one is to deny that 
there is no evidence from the Qurʾān, sunna, or ijmāʿ that signifies or 
substantiates the epistemic validity of the isolated report, one cannot deny that 
there still exists a convention amongst rational people whereby they accept 
reliable isolated reports.  
 
However, although rational people rely on the ẓann produced from isolated 
reports in their day-to-day life, it is arguable that in the realm of Sharīʿa, it is 
prohibited to rely and infer Sharīʿa precepts from the isolated report due to the 
general verses of the Qurʾān that prohibit following and acting in accordance 
with ẓann. In response to this point, Muẓaffar elucidates upon two arguments 
put forward by post-Anṣārī Uṣūlī predecessors: 
 
1. Firstly, Muẓaffar’s teacher Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Gharawī al-Iṣfahānī 
(d.1365/1945) claims that the content of the verses that establish the 
primary axiom is irshādī (instructive), as opposed to mawlawī 
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(religious/devotional). Iṣfahānī argues that the primary axiom of the 
non-validity of ẓann is primarily inferred from the judgment of reason 
(ḥukm al-ʿaql), and in light of this, he points out that it is impossible 
that the content of the verses of the Qurʾān are incompatible with 
another judgment of reason that dictates that the isolated report is an 
epistemologically valid source of knowledge.  
 
In other words, it is impossible to suggest that reason has two 
conflicting rational judgments, where on one hand, it judges the non-
validity of ẓann, resulting in rational people following the convention 
that prohibits acting in accordance with ẓann, and on the other hand, it 
judges the validity of ẓann produced from the isolated report, resulting 
in rational people following the convention that permits the acceptance 
of the ẓann produced from isolated reports. Consequently, Iṣfahānī 
suggests that the rational primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann 
does not include the ẓann produced from the isolated report 270 . 
Nevertheless, although neither Muẓaffar nor Iṣfahānī explain why and 
how the ẓann produced from the isolated report differs to the ẓann 
mentioned in the primary axiom, it can seemingly be argued that they 
imply that rational people choose to rely on ẓann produced from the 
isolated report because they deem it to be more reliable than any other 
forms of ẓann.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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2. The second argument is provided by Naʾīnī (d.1355/1936), who claims 
that the verses of the Qurʾān that establish the primary axiom of the 
non-validity of ẓann indicate upon those instances where there is a lack 
of access to ʿilm/qaṭʿ. However, when rational people rely on the 
isolated report, they do so in the context of it producing ʿilm/qaṭʿ as 
opposed to ẓann, because they do not take into consideration the “very 
slim” possibility of it being erroneous. Therefore, in accordance with 
Naʾīnī, the verses that establish the primary axiom have no relevance to 
the epistemic validity of the isolated report, as in accordance with 
rational people, the isolated report produces ʿilm/qaṭʿ as opposed to 
ẓann271. 
 
Muẓaffar abstains from giving his own opinion on either of the two 
aforementioned opinions, and it can be suggested that this is because they are 
somewhat contrary to his legal epistemology, and lead to a circular argument. 
Whilst both Iṣfahānī and Naʾīnī conclude that the banā al-ʿuqalā of following 
ẓann produced from the isolated report is excluded from the general verses of 
the Qurʾān, they arrive at this conclusion by effectively admitting that there is a 
banā al-ʿuqalā that distinguishes the ẓann produced from the isolated report 
from other ẓann. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Alternatively, Muẓaffar upholds that the apparent indication of the general 
verses of the Qurʾān clearly state that it is prohibited to act in accordance with 
ẓann. However, despite this general prohibition, he proposes that the 
convention of rational people, together with the practice of Muslim adherents 
(sīrat al-mutasharʿia) of following and acting in accordance with ẓann that is 
produced from the isolated report, is a specific instance (khāṣ) that is excluded 
from the general prohibition (ʿām)272.  
 
In order to fully understand Muẓaffar’s deliberation, it must be clarified that in 
the Uṣūlī discourse, a distinction is made between the general and the specific 
(al-ʿām wa-l khāṣ) indication. The Uṣūlīs maintain that the apparent indication 
of a general (ʿām) statement can always be specified or modified (takhṣīṣ) by 
the apparent indication of a specific (khāṣ) statement. For example, if it is 
supposed that the Divine Lawgiver hypothetically states: “respect all scholars” 
and elsewhere He says, “do not respect scholars who are transgressors” the 
latter indication, being specific, modifies the general indication, and as a result 
the Uṣūlīs arrive at the conclusion that in accordance with the Divine 
Lawgiver, “respect all scholars except the transgressors”. The Uṣūlīs maintain 
that the apparent indication of the khāṣ has the ability to modify the ʿām, 
because the former indication is deemed as being clearer and more accurate 
than the latter273. Accordingly, the general indication of the verses that indicate 
the non-validity of all ẓann is modified by the specific convention of rational !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
272 Ibid, p. 82 
273 For a detailed discussion on al-ʿām wa-l khāṣ see Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 1, pp. 130-
145; Faḍlī, Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh vol. 2, pp. 306-399 
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people, and based on this, Muẓaffar proposes the convention of rational people 
as being a more stronger and accurate evidence that can modify the general 
indication of the Qurʾān. 
 
Nonetheless, even if it is supposedly accepted that the Divine Lawgiver does 
not prevent the banā al-ʿuqalā of accepting and following information from 
reliable and trusted people, or khabar al-wāḥid qua khabar al-wāḥid, it can be 
argued that this convention cannot be analogised with accepting and following 
the isolated report from the maʿṣūm. This is because even the most authentic 
(ṣaḥīḥ) isolated report is effectively information from the maʿṣūm that has been 
verbally passed down over generations. Accordingly, although there only exists 
a slim possibility of error (which is tolerated) when someone who is known 
personally brings information, it is somewhat naïve to think that this possibility 
of error does not significantly increase when considering information that has 
been verbally passed down over generations. In light of this, it can be argued 
that the banā al-ʿuqalā that Muẓaffar describes does not equate to the isolated 
report that is from the maʿṣūm, and thus it cannot be used to substantiate the 
epistemic validity of the isolated report.  
 
!
4.7 Conclusion 
 
After highlighting the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann, and 
emphasising the epistemic validity of qaṭʿ, the Uṣūlī School is insistent that 
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evidence that produces ẓann can only be used in the juristic derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts when it has been substantiated by another qaṭʿī evidence. This 
is because the substantiation of evidence that gives rise to especial conjecture 
(ẓann al-khāṣ) reveals that the Divine Lawgiver has permitted its utility in the 
juristic derivation. Accordingly, if a mujtahid was to use a particular 
substantiated ẓannī evidence and consequently derive a Sharīʿa precept that is 
contrary to the objective reality, then he would be granted with excusability 
and not be held accountable and subjected to chastisement. Conversely, if he 
was to not use a particular substantiated ẓannī evidence, and consequently act 
contrary to the objective reality, then he would not be granted with 
excusability, but rather be held accountable and subjected to chastisement. 
 
One of the most – if not the most – widely used evidence from which Sharīʿa 
precepts are derived is the ẓannī source of khabar al-wāḥid that reveals 
the sunna of the maʿṣūm. Accordingly, substantiating its epistemic validity has 
always been of paramount importance to the Uṣūlīs, and hence scholars such as 
Muẓaffar have exerted a great effort to do so. As discussed, by using evidence 
provided by the Qurʾān, sunna, ijmāʿ and banā al-ʿuqalā, Muẓaffar concludes 
that each one of these sources independently produce qaṭʿ and fully disclose 
that the Divine Lawgiver permits the utility of khabar al-wāḥid as an 
independent source of knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
However, following the critical analysis carried out in this chapter, it has been 
established that each of the sources Muẓaffar analyzes to substantiate the 
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epistemic validity of the isolated report does not sufficiently produce qaṭʿ, 
whereby there is absolute and complete certainty that the Divine Lawgiver 
permits the utility of the ẓannī knowledge that is produced from the isolated 
report in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. Therefore, in line with the 
standards set forth within the post-Anṣārī discourse of legal epistemology – i.e. 
of the non-validity of anything that is less than qaṭʿ, or anything that is not 
substantiated by qaṭʿ - it can be concluded that since the conjecture produced 
from the textual source of the isolated report fails to be substantiated by qaṭʿ, 
this necessarily implies that the majority of the Sharīʿa precepts that have been 
derived from it must also be re-evaluated or discarded.  
 
Alternatively, it can be concluded that the standards proposed by contemporary 
legal epistemology are simply too demanding, inasmuch as although in theory 
it may be possible to have access to absolute certainty (or qaṭʿ), in practice it is 
impossible to have absolute qaṭʿ that has the ability to substantiate the 
epistemic validity of ẓann. Indeed, whilst this would imply that there is no need 
to re-evaluate or discard any of the Sharīʿa precepts that have been derived 
from the conjecture produced from the isolated report, it highlights that there is 
a significant need to re-evaluate the rigid underpinnings maintained in 
contemporary Uṣūlī legal epistemology. 
 
The next chapter will move on to consider whether the post-Anṣārī insistence 
on the epistemic validity of ẓann al-khāṣ has been unanimously maintained in 
the Uṣūlī School, and highlight how certain pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlī scholars have in 
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fact argued for the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq (conjecture qua 
conjecture). This stance supports the notion that the epistemological 
underpinnings or standards prescribed by post-Anṣārī legal epistemology are 
far too demanding, as there is a lack of access to qaṭʿī evidence that can be 
used to substantiate ẓannī evidence. The theories and proofs that pre-Anṣārī 
Uṣūlīs have offered in order to substantiate the epistemic validity of ẓann al-
muṭlaq also potentially hold significant implications on the epistemic validity 
of evidence that can be used in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, for if 
ẓann is proven to be epistemologically valid, then it naturally follows that 
every evidence that gives conjecture of Sharīʿa precepts should also be deemed 
as epistemologically valid.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Epistemic Validity of Ẓann al-Muṭlaq 
 
 
It appears that prior to Anṣārī, the Uṣūlīs did not unanimously accept the 
epistemic validity of ẓann al-khāṣ alone, rather they also accepted the 
utilisation of al-ẓann al-muṭlaq (conjecture qua conjecture) in the juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. This stance is supported in the following 
passage from Ibn Shahīd al-Thānī’s (d. 996/1558) Maʿālim al-dīn, where he 
categorically expounds: 
 
The sphere of definitive knowledge of those legal values that are not 
ḍarūrī [(essential)] in religion and in the Shīʿī sect is in our time cut off. 
For, that which is found in the indicators of juristic values (adillat al-
aḥkām) produces on ẓann because of the lack of mutawātir proof, and 
the absence of any mention of ascertaining ijmāʿ other than the 
transmission of khabar al-wāḥid; and because it is evident that aṣālat 
al-barā’a [also] produces only ẓann and the book is ẓannī al-dalāla. If 
the cutting of knowledge (ʿilm) be granted with regard to the legal 
values (ḥukm al-sharʾī) then God’s commission (taklīf) must be based 
on opinion (ẓann)274. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
274 See Calder, “Doubt Prerogative,” pp. 72-73 
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Ibn Shahīd al-Thānī believed that access to knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts was 
restricted to those precepts that were already established and accepted in the 
Shiite tradition. As a result, a large number of Sharīʿa precepts were derived 
from ẓannī sources, and he explicitly conceded to the acceptance of ẓann in the 
juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. As clarified in Chapter One, the growing 
influence of scholars such as ʿAllāma and Ibn Shahīd al-Thānī contributed to 
the epistemological shift regarding the acknowledgement of ẓann that occurred 
within the Shiite tradition. This shift led to a severe onslaught by the Akhbārīs, 
who labelled the discourse of legal epistemology proposed by ʿAllāma, Ibn 
Shahīd al-Thānī and their contemporaries as a Sunni innovation that acted 
against the Shiite jurisprudential heritage of the non-acceptance of ẓann. In 
essence, it is arguable that it was primarily due to the dominance displayed by 
the Akhbārī School that led these Uṣūlī scholars to concur on the primary 
axiom of the non-validity of ẓann, and accordingly interpret the famous works 
of legal theory of pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs based on this understanding of legal 
epistemology.  
 
As elaborated in previous chapters, post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs maintain that the only 
exception to the primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann is ẓann al-khāṣ i.e. 
especial conjecture that is substantiated by qaṭʿī evidence. Based on this 
understanding, contemporary Uṣūlīs have been able to sufficiently 
counterattack the Akhbārī criticism of why they, and their Uṣūlī predecessors, 
accept ẓann – or more accurately ẓann al-khāṣ - in the juristic derivation of 
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Sharīʿa precepts, by arguing that they are acting in accordance with their early 
Shiite jurisprudential heritage. 
 
It is also debatable that the interpretation of the pre-Anṣārī acceptance of ẓann 
offered by post-Anṣārī scholars was influenced by an overriding agenda to 
legitimise their insistence of the epistemic validity of ẓann al-khāṣ. As such, it 
is equally possible that prior to Anṣārī’s discourse of legal epistemology, his 
predecessors actually accepted the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq or ẓann 
qua ẓann. This is supported by the fact that after detailing all the evidences that 
do not suffice in proving the epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid, Abū Qāsim 
al-Qummī (d. 1232/1817), whose Qawānīn al-uṣūl was prominently studied in 
the Shiite seminaries of Qum and Najaf275, categorically maintains that in the 
era of occultation, a mujtahid does not have any access to knowledge of 
Sharīʿa precepts due to a lack yaqīn or amnesty (tarkhīṣ) being granted from 
the Divine Lawgiver that permits him to act in accordance with ẓann. This 
leads Qummī to highlight that access to knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts is 
“closed” (munsadd) in the era of occultation, and as a result the mujtahid has 
no choice but to take recourse to ẓann al-muṭlaq. Through proclaiming the 
theory of “insidād” (closure), Qummī concludes that it is the main – if not the 
only276 - proof that sufficiently establishes the epistemic validity of khabar al-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
275 See Litvak, “Madrasa and Learning in Nineteenth-Century Najaf and Karbalāʾ,” p. 76  
276 See Qummī, Qawānīn vol.2, p. 458 
!!! 261!
wāḥid and other ẓannī evidence, such as the apparent indication of the Qurʾān 
and ijmāʿ277. 
 
The theory of insidād is without a doubt one of the most influential theories 
that has been proposed by the Uṣūlīs who have supposedly argued for the 
epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq. As a result of this, it is found that 
numerous post-Anṣārī mujtahids have criticised its validity, for indeed if its 
epistemic validity was to be established then this would necessarily lead to 
undermining the post-Anṣārī construction of legal epistemology.  
 
Other than the theory of insidād, there are also three other theories that may 
potentially establish the epistemic validly of ẓann al-muṭlaq, which Anṣārī 
himself has presented in his Farāiʾd al-uṣūl278. This chapter will thus critically 
analyse Anṣārī’s evaluation of these theories, and then move on to appraise the 
four premises (muqadimāt) upon which the theory of insidād is based. A 
detailed examination of these theories will not only determine how Anṣārī and 
his contemporaries have argued against any theory that potentially establishes 
the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq, but it will also assess the strength of 
these arguments. Undoubtedly, if it is found that such theories carry weight, 
then it is possible to claim that at least during some point in its historical 
development, the Shiite tradition accepted the epistemic validity of ẓann al-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
277 Ibid, pp. 420-421 
278 It is vital to note that Ṣanqūr, in Muʿjam al-uṣūl vol. 2, p. 368 points out that in total there 
are four theories that potentially substantiate the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq and that 
there is no fifth.  
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muṭlaq, and as a result possibly permitted the utilisation of a wider range of 
evidence in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
 
5.1 The First Theory: the necessity of repelling ẓannī harm  
 
The first theory that Anṣārī evaluates is that of the necessity of repelling harm 
that is emanated by ẓann (dafʿ al-ḍarar al-maẓnūn). It must be noted that 
Anṣārī does not attribute this theory to any specific Uṣūlī predecessor of his 
and as a result, it is unknown who authored it and during which era it 
originated. Nonetheless, since Anṣārī discusses this theory first, it is feasible to 
suggest that it was one of the first theories proposed in the Uṣūlī jurisprudential 
discourse in an attempt to substantiate the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq. 
 
In accordance with this theory, a mujtahid is required to follow and act in 
accordance with obligatory Sharīʿa precepts (wujūb) and prohibited Sharīʿa 
precepts (ḥurma) that he derives from evidence that gives rise to mere ẓann. 
This is because by abstaining from following or acting in accordance with 
ẓannī (conjectural) obligations and prohibitions, a mukallaf – or more precisely 
a mujtahid – may potentially be exposed to harm, and since the repulsion of 
harm is necessary, the mujtahid is required to follow his ẓannī knowledge of 
obligations and prohibitions. 
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In order to explain the uncover the nuances of this explanation and analyse 
whether it in fact substantiates the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq, Anṣārī 
explains that the components of this theory can be divided into a minor premise 
and a major premise279 . The former is concerned with the harm that is 
emanated by not following and acting in accordance with ẓannī Sharīʿa 
precepts, whereas the latter is concerned with the principle of the necessity of 
repelling ẓannī harm. 
 
Concerning the minor premise, Anṣārī claims that in line with the Shiite 
affiliation with ʿAdliyya theology, every Sharīʿa precept that is ordained by the 
Divine Lawgiver carries either the intrinsic property of praiseworthiness (ḥusn) 
or the intrinsic property of blameworthiness (qubḥ). Therefore, when the 
Divine Lawgiver ordains an obligatory act to a mukallaf, He only does so 
because the obligatory act itself carries the intrinsic property of being 
praiseworthy, which in accordance with Anṣārī results in benefiting (maṣlaḥa) 
the mukallaf. On the other hand, when the Divine Lawgiver ordains a 
prohibition to a mukallaf, He only does so because the prohibited act itself 
carries the intrinsic property of being blameworthy, and thus results in 
deterring (mafsada) the mukallaf. In light of this, when a mujtahid has ẓann 
that a particular Sharīʿa precept is obligatory, he effectively has ẓann that it can 
lead to a benefit, and thus if he was to not follow and act in accordance with it, 
then this may lead him to harm, as there is a possibility of him overlooking a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
279 See Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, pp. 175-180 
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benefit. On the other hand, when a mujtahid has ẓann that a particular Sharīʿa 
precept is prohibited, he effectively has ẓann that it can lead to his detriment, 
and thus if he is to not follow and act in accordance with the prohibition then 
this can lead him to harm. 
 
Furthermore, apart from the potential harm that arises from not following and 
acting in accordance with ẓann in the realm of this world, there also exists the 
possibility of being exposed to harm in the hereafter. Therefore, if a mujtahid 
was to discard a ẓannī obligation or a ẓannī prohibition, there is a possibility of 
him being held accountable by the Divine Lawgiver, and thus subject to 
chastisement (ʿiqāb) in the hereafter. In essence, by not following and acting in 
accordance with ẓann, a mujtahid may potentially incur harm both in this world 
(ḍarar al-dunyawī) and in the hereafter (ḍarar al-ukhrawī). 
 
The major premise of this theory is concerned with the principle of the 
necessity of repelling ẓannī harm. However, Anṣārī notes that this theory has 
been criticised by al-Ḥājibī in Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-uṣūl280 and his followers, 
on the basis that since its major premise is false, the theory is unable to 
substantiate the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq at all.  
 
In accordance with Ḥājibī, since all obligatory and prohibited Sharīʿa precepts 
have the intrinsic properties of being either praiseworthy or blameworthy, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
280 The reference that Ḥājibī is the author of Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-uṣūl is given by Mīrzā Mūsa 
Tabrīzī in Awthaq al-wasāʾil, which is a commentary on Farāiʾd al-uṣūl. See Tabrīzī, Mīrzā 
Mūsa b. Jaʿfar.  Awthaq al-wasāʾil fi sharḥ al-Rasāʾil 2 vols. (Qum: Samāʾ Qalam, 1969) 
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when a mujtahid or mukallaf only has ẓannī knowledge of obligations and 
prohibitions, then there is only a possibility that his ẓannī knowledge can lead 
him to harm. As a result, Ḥājibī concludes that since there is only a possibility 
of harm, reason is unable to unescapably dictate the principle of the necessity 
of repelling ẓannī harm; rather, he suggests that at most it can dictate that it is 
‘good’ or ‘recommended’ to remain cautious281. Thus, according to Ḥājibī, 
when a mujtahid has ẓann of a particular Sharīʿa precept, reason dictates that it 
is recommended for him to repel the ẓannī harm that is emanated from it, and 
in extreme circumstances it would dictate that he is required to be cautious and 
consequently act in accordance with his ẓann. However, it does not dictate that 
it is necessary for the mujtahid to repel the ẓannī harm, and hence it is not 
necessary for him to follow and act in accordance with his ẓann. 
 
However, Khurāsānī (d. 1329/1911) in his Kifāyat al-uṣūl revokes Ḥājibī’s 
understanding, and points out that:   
 
As for the major premise (kubrā), reason (ʿaql) independently judges 
[the [necessity of] repelling conjectural harm (dafʿ al-ḍarar al-
maẓnūn), and it [i.e. the judgment of reason] is not informed by the 
rational intelligibility of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness (al-
taḥsīn wa-l taqbīḥ ʿaqlī)282.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
281 See Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, p. 175 
282 See Khurāsānī, Kifāyat al-uṣūl vol. 2, pp. 88-89 
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By expounding that the principle of the repulsion of harm is unrelated to the 
rational intelligibility of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, Khurāsānī 
suggests that irrespective of whether a mukallaf has qaṭʿī knowledge or ẓannī 
knowledge of the intrinsic properties of Sharīʿa precepts, it is necessary for him 
to repel any possibility of harm. He explains that this is because the outcome of 
the principle of the necessity of repelling ẓannī harm cannot be rationally 
intellectualised, rather it is a natural or intuitive (fiṭrī) act283. Accordingly, 
when the possibility of harm is emanated by ẓann – or even qaṭʿ - reason will 
always naturally and intuitively respond to it by repelling it. For example, if it 
is supposed that a mukallaf, or for that matter any rational person, has ẓann that 
a thief will enter his house, then in accordance with Khurāsānī, the mukallaf’s 
reason will naturally and intuitively dictate to him that it is necessary that he 
repels the harm that can be caused by the thief, and thus he would necessarily 
act in a cautious manner and ensure he locks his house carefully. 
 
However, it is possible to critique Khurāsānī’s opinion by arguing that reason 
does not always naturally and intuitively necessitate that a person has to repel 
harm in a cautious manner, rather the repulsion of harm is contingent upon the 
level of knowledge that one has of the occurrence of harm and the severity of 
its outcome. For example, if a mukallaf has certainty or even just conjecture 
that there is a poisonous snake in his house, then it can be suggested that his 
reason would naturally judge that he is required to exert maximum effort to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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repel any harm caused by the snake, as it could possibly lead to the severe 
outcome of endangering ones life. On the other hand, if a mukallaf has 
conjecture or even certainty that there is a mouse in his house, then although 
there is a possibility of it causing an inconvenience, since the outcome is not as 
severe, it can be suggested that his reason would not naturally judge that he is 
required to exert maximum effort to repel any harm caused by it. 
 
It can thus be argued that it is somewhat farfetched for Khurāsānī to claim that 
the rational mind naturally and intuitively always judges that it is necessary to 
repel any harm that is emanated by ẓann. Nonetheless, Khurāsānī remains in 
support of Anṣārī’s claim, who also similarly criticises the view promoted by 
Ḥājibī284 . Apart from this rational criticism, Anṣārī also offers a textual 
argument, whereby he presents proofs from the textual sources that too signify 
that the repulsion of ẓannī harm is necessary/obligatory (wājib). For example, 
Anṣārī points out that the verse of nabaʾ clearly clarifies that God – or the 
Divine Lawgiver – does not want anyone to expose themselves to harm or 
detriment of any kind, and thus He warns by saying: 
 
“If a miscreant (fāsiq) brings you a piece of news (nabaʾ) then 
scrutinise (fatabayyanū) [it] so that you do not harm others through 
ignorance and then have to repent for what you have done285.” 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
284 See Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, pp. 176-178 
285 Qurʾān 49:6 
!!! 268!
According to Anṣārī, this verse clearly establishes that even though news that 
is brought by a fāsiq creates mere ẓann, the Divine Lawgiver is ordaining a 
mukallaf to take caution by following and acting in accordance with it. In 
addition to this verse, Anṣārī points out other verses that indicate upon the 
Divine Lawgiver’s emphasis on the repulsion of any harm, whether qaṭʿī or 
ẓannī in nature286. Therefore, Anṣārī extends his criticism against Ḥājibī and 
his followers by elucidating that the major premise of this theory is not only 
established through a rational (ʿaqlī) argument, but also through a 
textual/religious (naqlī) argument, and as a result Ḥājibī’s critique of the major 
premise is inaccurate. 
 
Nevertheless, the rebuttal presented by Anṣārī and Khurāsānī against Ḥājibī 
suggests that if the major and the minor premises are accepted, then this 
combined thought implies that ẓann al-muṭlaq is epistemologically valid. This 
conclusion in turn indicates that a mujtahid is required to follow and act in 
accordance with any potential evidence that give ẓannī knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts in his juristic derivation. However, such an inference is undoubtedly 
problematic, as it goes against perhaps the core principle in post-Anṣārī legal 
epistemology of upholding the epistemic validity of ẓann al-khāṣ as opposed to 
ẓann al-muṭlaq.  
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Accordingly, in order to affirm that this theory does not substantiate the 
epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq, Anṣārī criticises its minor premise on the 
basis that it is incomplete and inaccurate. In order to integrate his argument 
within the bounds of traditional Shiite heritage, Anṣārī points out that it is clear 
from ʿUddat al-uṣūl of Shaykh Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067) and al-Ghunya of Ibn Zuhra 
al-Ḥalabī (d. 585/1189-90) that when a mukallaf acts contrary to his ẓann, there 
is a possibility of him incurring harm upon himself. However, the harm that the 
mukallaf incurs is restricted to the realm of this world (dunyawī), and cannot be 
extended or analogised to the harm he may possibly incur in the hereafter 
(ukhrawī)287. Thus for instance, if a mukallaf has ẓann about a particular 
Sharīʿa precept being obligatory, then not acting in accordance with it can 
possibly lead him to harm, as he would essentially overlook the benefit it 
carries. However, although the mukallaf may possibly incur dunyawī harm, it is 
inaccurate to infer that he may also incur ukhrawī harm by being subjected to 
chastisement. 
 
Anṣārī elaborates upon his reading of ʿUddat al-uṣūl and al-Ghunya by 
explaining that these texts suggest that a mukallaf does not incur ukhrawī harm 
because of the ʿAdliyya principle of qubḥ al-ʿiqāb bi-lā bayān (the 
blameworthiness of chastisement without disclosure). As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the position held by Anṣārī and his mainstream contemporaries is that it 
is not befitting for a Just Divine Lawgiver to hold a mukallaf accountable for 
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not acting in accordance with His ordinance, if He Himself does not disclose 
His ordinances through either qaṭʿī (or full) explication or ẓannī (or 
conjectural) explication that is substantiated i.e. ẓann al-khāṣ. This is because 
the Divine Lawgiver is considered as the Chief of all rational beings (ra’is al-
ʿuqalā), and therefore He too acts in accordance with how rational people act. 
Accordingly, since it is deemed as a blameworthy for a rational master to 
chastise another person without proper or full explication, it follows that it is 
also blameworthy for the Divine Master to chastise a mukallaf without proper 
or full explication. Anṣārī concludes that since a blameworthy act cannot be 
attributed to the Divine Lawgiver, it is inaccurate to claim that a mukallaf may 
attract ukhrawī harm by being subjected to chastisement if he was to discard 
following or acting in accordance with ẓannī Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
However, at this juncture it is important to note that as discussed in Chapter 
Two, Ṣadr rejects the mainstream Uṣūlī understanding of qubḥ al-ʿiqāb bi-lā 
bayān, by expounding the theory of ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa. In accordance with this 
theory, the Divine Lawgiver has absolute Mastership and Proprietorship over 
everything, and thus He does not necessarily follow the convention of rational 
masters, rather theoretically it is logically possible for Him to hold a mukallaf 
accountable and subject him to chastisement without proper or full explication. 
Therefore, Ṣadr’s proposal suggests that the minor premise is indeed accurate, 
as by not following a ẓannī Sharīʿa precept, a mukallaf may be exposed to 
harm both in this world and in the hereafter. Therefore, although Ṣadr does not 
directly give an opinion on this theory, it can be argued that based on his 
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understanding, it is theoretically possible to conclude that if he agrees with the 
major premise, then logically he would also have to accept the epistemic 
validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq. 
 
Nevertheless, Anṣārī and the mainstream post-Anṣārī mujtahids uphold that the 
minor premise is incomplete, as it is inaccurate to conceive that a mukallaf can 
incur ukhrawī harm. Thus, for instance, if it is hypothetically supposed that a 
mukallaf has ẓann that smoking cigarettes is prohibited, however he chooses to 
discard his ẓann and smoke a cigarette, then in such a case the mukallaf would 
incur harm in this world, insofar as smoking is detrimental to his health. 
However, it does not necessarily mean that he would also incur harm in the 
hereafter, as he cannot be chastised for something that the Divine Lawgiver has 
not properly disclosed. In light of this, Anṣārī concludes that although the 
major premise is accurate in indicating that it is necessary to repel ẓannī harm, 
the inaccuracy of the minor premise leads to the nullification of this theory as a 
valid proof that substantiates the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq288. 
 
However, it can be debated that Anṣārī’s argument against this theory is 
somewhat polemical, for although it may be accepted that the minor premise is 
incomplete, it does not mean that a mukallaf does not incur harm at all. In other 
words, even if a mukallaf does not incur harm in the hereafter, he still does 
incur harm in this world by either overlooking a benefit (maṣlaḥa) by not 
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following a ẓannī obligation, or incurring detriment (mafsada) by following a 
ẓannī prohibition. This emphasises the argument made in Chapter One, which 
suggests that the purpose of post-Anṣārī legal epistemology has been twofold, 
as not only does it provide instructions on how to attain knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts, but it is also profoundly concerned with explicating how to gain 
immunity against accountability. Nevertheless, it becomes apparent that if 
Anṣārī was to modify the minor premise to only indicate on the harm that can 
be incurred in this world by not following ẓann, then this theory would support 
the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq. However, as discussed, such an 
outcome would evidently go against the claim that only ẓann al-khāṣ is 
epistemologically valid, and thus it can be argued that in order to keep his legal 
epistemology intact, Anṣārī was compelled to dismiss the minor premise on the 
basis that it is incomplete.  
 
 
5.2 The Second Theory: the necessity of giving preference to ẓann 
 
The second theory that is evaluated by Anṣārī, which aims to substantiate the 
epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq, is based on the rational principle of tarjīḥ 
al-marjūḥ ʿalā ’l-rājiḥ qabīḥ. In accordance with this theory, it is blameworthy 
(qabīḥ) to give preference (tarjīḥ) to something that is least preferred (marjūḥ) 
over something that is more preferred (rājiḥ). Thus, in the context of legal 
epistemology, proponents of this theory – who Anṣārī again does not specify – 
proclaim that it is preferred to give preference to conjecture (ẓann) of Sharīʿa 
!!! 273!
precepts over giving preference to doubt (shakk) of Sharīʿa precepts. In other 
words, it is preferred to follow and act in accordance with ẓann over shakk. 
 
Anṣārī explains that proponents of this theory deem ẓann to rationally be more 
preferred over shakk on the basis that shakk is the opposite of ẓann289. In other 
words, if a person has ẓann of something, then he has shakk of its opposite. For 
example, if Zayd has to walk to the city of Baghdad and he has ẓann – or even 
ghalabat (preponderant) al-ẓann – that it is in the north direction, then at the 
same time he has shakk – or some level of doubt – that it may be in a non-north 
direction i.e. it could be in the south, east, west, south-west etc. In this instance, 
it would be blameworthy for Zayd to follow and act in accordance with his 
shakk and ignore his ẓann, as the likelihood or the probability of his ẓann being 
accurate and leading him to Baghdad is greater than the probability of his 
shakk leading him to Baghdad. 
 
Proponents of this theory thus claim that since ẓann is the opposite of shakk, 
whenever a mujtahid is faced with ẓannī knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, he is 
required to follow and act in accordance with it, as it is blameworthy to ignore 
it and follow shakk instead. Thus, if it is hypothetically supposed that a 
mujtahid has ẓann that it is obligatory to establish the Friday congregational 
prayers (ṣalāt al-jumuʿā) instead of establishing the afternoon prayers (ṣalāt al-
ẓuhr), then he is required to follow and act in accordance with his ẓann and 
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choose the former option. Indeed, if he ignores his ẓann, and instead follows 
and acts in accordance with his shakk by establishing the afternoon prayers, 
then he may be held as blameworthy. As highlighted, according to the Shiite 
ʿAdliyya thought, if someone is deemed to be blameworthy, he can be held 
accountable and subject to chastisement. By using the following syllogistic 
framework, an understanding of how this theory substantiates the epistemic 
validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq can be achieved: 
 
Minor premise:  It is blameworthy for a mujtahid to give 
preference (tarjīḥ) to ẓann – which is rājiḥ - over 
shakk – which is marjūḥ. 
 
Major premise:  Anyone who commits a blameworthy act can be 
held accountable and be subjected to 
chastisement. 
 
Therefore:  A mujtahid is held accountable and can be 
subjected to chastisement for giving preference 
to shakk, and thus he must always follow and act 
in accordance with ẓann.  
 
This theory evidently goes against Anṣārī’s legal epistemology, which 
promotes the epistemic validity of ẓann al-khāṣ. Anṣārī responds by arguing 
that the principle of ‘the blameworthiness of giving preference to the least 
!!! 275!
preferred over the most preferred’ (tarjīḥ al-marjūḥ ʿalā ’l-rājiḥ qabīḥ) is not 
always necessarily true290. He explains that this is because there are certain 
instances when giving preference to the marjūḥ i.e. to shakk, is rationally 
praiseworthy as opposed to blameworthy, particularly in cases where shakk 
leads to iḥtiyāṭ (caution). As elucidated in Chapter One, the principle of 
caution (aṣālat al-iḥtiyāṭ) is applied when a mukallaf has doubt (shakk) of a 
Sharīʿa precept because he only has ambiguous knowledge (ʿilm al-ijmālī) of 
it, thus requiring the mukallaf to carry out and fulfil the maximum duties 
required. In light of this, if the mukallaf was to give preference to shakk – or 
marjūḥ - this would be more preferred than giving preference to ẓann – rājiḥ - 
because the marjūḥ would dictate him to carry out the maximum duties 
required, ensuring that he performs all possible duties insofar as he would 
perform the duty he has shakk of and the duty he has ẓann of. 
 
For example, if a mukallaf has ẓann that it is obligatory to establish the Friday 
congregational prayers, then he conversely has shakk that it may be obligatory 
to establish the afternoon prayers instead of the Friday prayers. In such a case, 
whilst the mukallaf knows without doubt – or with yaqīn/qaṭʿ- that he has to 
establish prayers, his knowledge is ambiguous (ijmālī) regarding which prayer 
out of the two he is required to establish. In this instance, if the mukallaf was to 
follow and act in accordance with his ẓann, then he would choose to only pray 
the Friday prayers; on the other hand, if he was to follow and act in accordance 
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with shakk, then he would have to take recourse to the principle of iḥtiyāṭ, and 
hence it would be necessary for him to establish both the prayers. Therefore, in 
this instance, the act of remaining cautious, which is emanated by following 
and acting in accordance with the marjūḥ - or shakk - is praiseworthy, in 
comparison to following and acting in accordance with the rājiḥ - or ẓann - for 
indeed by following the marjūḥ, a mukallaf is certain that he has performed the 
dictates of both the rājiḥ and the marjūḥ. 
 
In addition to this, Anṣārī also argues that in the context of the jurisprudential 
discourse, the principle of ‘the blameworthiness of giving preference to the 
least preferred (shakk) over the most preferred (ẓann)’ is not always 
conclusive, as there is no evidence that indicates that ẓann is most preferred 
(rājiḥ) or even least preferred (marjūḥ). Rather on the contrary, there is 
counterevidence – both rational and textual - that in fact indicates that when a 
mukallaf does not have any knowledge – or yaqīn/qaṭʿ - of a Sharīʿa precept, 
then rather than acting in accordance with ẓann, he is required to apply the 
principle of exemption (aṣālat al-barā’a)291. As discussed in Chapter Two, in 
accordance with the mainstream opinion, it is rational that a mukallaf is exempt 
from the performance of any duty - or Sharīʿa precept - that the Divine 
Lawgiver has not explicated with full disclosure. Moreover, there are 
numerous traditions that also reflect this; for instance, the Prophet has stated 
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that: “my umma (community) is alleviated from [responsibility] that it does not 
know”. 
 
Anṣārī thus concludes that preference cannot be given to ẓann at any level; 
rather, a mukallaf is categorically excused from performing any responsibility 
that he does not have absolute knowledge of. Based on this understanding, this 
principle is unable to substantiate the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq; on 
the contrary, it is in fact blameworthy for a mukallaf to give any preference to 
ẓann, as by doing so, he would be acting against the rational and textual 
evidence that enforce the principle of barā’a (exemption). 
 
Nevertheless, although Khurāsānī shares Anṣārī sentiment above, it is found 
that in al-kifāya he claims that the only drawback posed by the second theory 
arises in cases where it is possible to prefer the marjūḥ or shakk over the rājiḥ 
and apply the principle of iḥtiyāṭ. He clarifies that if the principle of iḥtiyāṭ was 
to lead to hardship (ḥaraj), difficulty (ʿusr), or social disorder (ikhtilāl al-
niẓām), then in such cases it cannot be concluded that it is praiseworthy to 
prefer the marjūḥ over the rājiḥ, rather it would be blameworthy to do so292. In 
his final analysis, Khurāsānī, like Anṣārī, argues that this theory alone is 
insufficient in proving the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq, and following 
the legal epistemology set by Anṣārī, he maintains that there is no evidence to 
suggest that ẓann is rājiḥ in the jurisprudential discourse. Consequently, both 
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Anṣārī and Khurāsānī conclude that this theory is only effective – as it will be 
shown - as one of the fundamental premises of the theory of insidād293. 
 
 
5.3 The Third Theory: the necessity of following ẓann to ease hardship 
 
The third theory that is evaluated by Anṣārī, which aims to substantiate the 
epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq, is in some respects similar to the 
aforementioned theory. Anṣārī attributes this theory to Sayyid ʿAlī 
Ṭabāṭabāʿī294 who elucidates that there is no doubt that one has ambiguous 
knowledge (ʿilm al-ijmālī) due to there being a significant amount of of ẓann 
regarding obligatory and prohibited Sharīʿa precepts that a mukallaf is required 
to enact. Due to the existence of such ambiguous knowledge, a mukallaf is 
theoretically required to take recourse to the principle of iḥtiyāṭ and hence 
remain cautious by enacting everything that he either has ẓann or shakk of it 
being obligatory, and abstaining from anything that he either has ẓann or shakk 
of it being prohibited. However, this may result in the mukallaf experiencing 
ḥaraj (hardship), thus it is evident that the practical principle of iḥtiyāṭ 
conflicts with the principle of nafī al-ḥaraj (nullification of hardship). With 
this in mind, it follows that one has no choice but to give preference to the 
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most preferred i.e. ẓann (rājiḥ) over the least preferred i.e. shakk (marjūḥ), as 
giving preference to the marjūḥ over the rājiḥ is blameworthy.  
 
Based on these premises, Ṭabāṭabāʿī concludes that this theory sufficiently 
establishes the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq295. For example, if it is 
again hypothetically assumed that a mukallaf has ambiguous knowledge that he 
is required to pray, however he is unsure of what prayer to pray, as on one 
hand he has ẓann that the Friday congregational prayer is obligatory, and on 
the other hand he has shakk that the afternoon prayer may be obligatory in its 
place, then if he were to apply the principle of iḥtiyāṭ, he would have to enact 
both the dictates of his ẓann and his shakk. However, since the performance of 
both these acts may cause hardship for the mukallaf, the principle of nafī al-
ḥaraj becomes active and hence rather than following and acting in accordance 
with the principle of iḥtiyāṭ, the mukallaf is required to follow and act in 
accordance with the principle of nafī al-ḥaraj and enact the obligation he has 
ẓann of, as this obligation is rājiḥ. 
 
It must be noted that the reason why the principle of nafī al-ḥaraj supersedes 
the principle of iḥtiyāṭ is because the latter is a procedural principle (aṣālat al-
ʿamaliyya), whereas the former is recognised as a qāʿida fiqhiyya 
(jurisprudential maxim). As discussed in Chapter One, whilst a procedural 
principle only leads to a ḥukm al-ẓāhirī (an apparent Sharīʿa precept), since a 
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qāʿida fiqhiyya is a maxim that is established through textual and rational 
evidence, it leads to a ḥukm al-wāqiʿī (a real Sharīʿa precept). Thus, in the 
juristic process of the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts, a mujtahid is always 
required to first take recourse to evidence that leads him to ḥukm al-wāqiʿī and 
only when he cannot do so is he required to follow the principles that provide 
ḥukm al-ẓāhirī. Consequently, the qāʿida fiqhiyya of nafī al-ḥaraj overpowers 
the aṣālat al-ʿamaliyya of iḥtiyāṭ. 
 
Nonetheless, both Anṣārī and Khurāsānī uphold that this theory does not 
independently substantiate the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq296. They 
maintain that there are certain fundamental premises that are discussed in the 
theory of insidād, and only when all of these fundamental premises are proven 
to be accurate is it possible to substantiate the epistemic validity of ẓann al-
muṭlaq. Accordingly, they claim that this theory is incomplete, as it only 
contains some of the premises. In order to elaborate on this, Sayyid 
Muḥammad Jaʿfar al-Mūrawwij in his commentary of al-Kifāya, states that out 
of all the fundamental premises that are discussed in the theory of insidād, this 
theory contains three297, which are: 
 
1. There is ambiguous knowledge of obligatory and prohibited Sharīʿa 
precepts. 
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2. It is not possible to take recourse to the principle of iḥtiyāṭ to dissolve 
the ambiguous knowledge, as this would necessarily lead to hardship 
(ḥaraj). 
 
3. Since it is impossible to act in accordance with iḥtiyāṭ i.e. by enacting 
the Sharīʿa precepts that are known through ẓann and through shakk, 
one has to prefer acting in accordance with ẓann, as it is the most 
preferred (rājiḥ) in comparison to shakk, which is least preferred 
(marjūḥ). If the contrary were to take place, then this would be 
blameworthy. 
 
In light of this, it is evident that the difference between the second theory and 
this theory is that the former only contains one of the fundamental premises of 
the theory of insidād, which is that it is blameworthy to give preference to the 
marjūḥ over the rājiḥ. Meanwhile, this theory contains three of the 
fundamental premises. Anṣārī and Khurāsānī deem both the second and third 
theories as incomplete, and propose that the only complete theory that can 
potentially substantiate the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq is the theory of 
insidād. 
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5.4 The Fourth Theory: dalīl al-insidād 
 
The more popularly discussed theory in Uṣūlī legal theory is the fourth and 
final theory or “evidence” (dalīl) of insidād. This theory is founded upon four 
fundamental premises (muaqadimāt), and it is principally accepted in the post-
Anṣārī jurisprudential discourse that reason necessarily concludes upon the 
epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq only when all four of these premises are 
established or proven298 . This effectively implies that any evidence that 
produces ẓannī knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts can be used in the juristic 
process of derivation, and thus at first instance it appears that as soon as the 
fundamental premises of the theory of insidād are established, a wider range of 
evidence becomes epistemologically valid in the Shiite jurisprudential 
discourse. Accordingly, a mukallaf would be required to follow and act in 
accordance with ẓann al-muṭlaq in order for him to derive Sharīʿa precepts and 
be granted with excusability, otherwise he would be held accountable. 
 
Based on this, a specific evidence or source of law can only be considered as 
non-valid (ghayr ḥujja) when there is qaṭʿī evidence that establishes its non-
validity. An example of a specific ẓannī evidence that is normally cited to be 
excluded from the general epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq is qiyās. As 
Muẓaffar points out, there is ample textual and non-textual evidence that 
establishes - with qaṭʿ- that the ẓann produced from qiyās is excluded from the 
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general epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq 299 . Accordingly, if it was 
hypothetically supposed that a jurist can utilise ẓann al-muṭlaq in his derivation 
of Sharīʿa precepts, he is first required to distinctly search for any qaṭʿī 
evidence that determines what ẓann is excluded, and only then can he use ẓann 
al-muṭlaq. 
 
 
5.4.1 The First Premise 
 
The first premise of the theory of insidād is undoubtedly the central premise 
upon which all other premises of this theory are contingent. In accordance with 
proponents of this theory, there is a “closure of the door of knowledge and 
substantiated knowledge” (“insidād bāb al-ʿilm wa-l ʿilmī”) regarding Sharīʿa 
precepts in the current era.  
 
By arguing that the door of knowledge is closed (insidād bāb al-ʿilm), it is 
claimed that there is no access to detailed knowledge that enables one to have 
absolute understanding or awareness of Sharīʿa precepts. This is because there 
is no direct access to the Prophet or the Imams – i.e. the maʿṣūm – from whom 
it is possible to attain knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. Moreover, the number of 
clear injunctions that are emanated from the Qurʾān, mutawātir reports, or qaṭʿī 
ijmāʿ are few and do not sufficiently cover all of the issues for which a 
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mukallaf requires Sharīʿa precepts. Indeed, this component of the first premise 
is also accepted by post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs, who too – for the same reasons – agree 
upon and accept the claim that the door or access to knowledge is closed in the 
present day300. 
 
Secondly, by claiming that the door of substantiated knowledge is closed 
(insidād bāb al-ʿilmī), proponents of this theory imply that there is no access to 
evidence that gives rise to ẓann of Sharīʿa precepts that has been substantiated 
by the Divine Lawgiver. This component of the first premise is clearly 
incompatible with the post-Anṣārī discourse of legal epistemology, as post-
Anṣārī Uṣūlīs have somewhat unanimously maintained that there exists 
especial conjecture (ẓann al-khāṣ), whose epistemic validity is postulated by 
the Divine Lawgiver Himself, and thus evidence that emanates ẓann al-khāṣ is 
held at the same epistemic pedestal as evidence that emanates qaṭʿ. 
 
This signifies that the differing opinion amongst the Uṣūlīs regarding this 
premise is that some advocate that there is recourse to especial conjecture, and 
thus only ẓann al-khāṣ is epistemologically valid, whilst others claim that there 
is no recourse to ẓann al-khāṣ and thus argue for the epistemic validity of ẓann 
al-muṭlaq. It is for this reason that this premise has been deemed as the central 
premise upon which all other premises are contingent, to the effect that Anṣārī 
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This is the most important premise of the theory of insidād, rather what 
is quite explicit from the words of some [of the Uṣūlī predecessors] is 
that the establishment of this premise is sufficient in establishing the 
epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq because there is a consensus on the 
presumption that if there truly is no recourse to ẓann al-khāṣ then ẓann 
al-muṭlaq is epistemologically valid301. 
 
If Anṣārī and his contemporaries did not admit to the existence of ẓann al-khāṣ 
then they would necessarily have had to conclude on the epistemic validity of 
ẓann al-muṭlaq. However, since these scholars do admit to the existence of 
ẓann al-khāṣ, they conclude that this premise is inaccurate from the outset, and 
as a result deny the theory of insidād based on this premise. 
 
 
5.4.2 The Second Premise 
 
If the first premise is accepted, inasmuch as if one is to admit to insidād bāb al-
ʿilm wa-l ʿilmī, then according to Muẓaffar, the second premise of the theory of 
insidād is enacted. In accordance with this premise, since there is no access to 
detailed knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, a mukallaf – or a mujtahid – is left 
with ambiguous knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ijmālī) that is emanated from evidence 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
301 Ibid.  
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that merely gives ẓann of obligatory and prohibited Sharīʿa precepts. 
Accordingly, this premise argues that it is indeed not possible for a mukallaf to 
dissolve such ambiguous knowledge by discarding it and not following and 
acting in accordance with any Sharīʿa precept that is emanated by ẓannī 
evidence302. 
 
Prior to discussing this premise further, it must be noted that this proposition 
has two parts. The first part explicates that there is ambiguous knowledge of 
obligatory and prohibited Sharīʿa precepts, whereas the second part is 
concerned with what a mukallaf is required to do in cases when he has 
ambiguous knowledge. Indeed, it is found that there is discrepancy in the post-
Anṣārī Uṣūlī discourse regarding the exact number of the fundamental 
premises upon which the theory of insidād is based. For instance, Khurāsānī in 
al-Kifāya, states that there are actually five fundamental premises, as unlike 
Muẓaffar or Anṣārī, he does not deem it appropriate to amalgamate the two 
parts of this premise as one. Instead, Khurāsānī counts the first part as the first 
fundamental premise of the theory of insidād, and the second part as the third 
fundamental premise303. 
 
In any case, three explanations are given to substantiate the second part of this 
premise, and establish why it is not possible for a mukallaf to dissolve his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
302 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 27 
303 See Khurāsānī, Kifāyat al-uṣūl vol. 2, pp. 92-93. It is found that post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs have 
either followed Anṣārī’s categorisation of four premises or Khurāsānī’s categorisation of five 
premises. 
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ambiguous knowledge by discarding it and not following and acting in 
accordance with any Sharīʿa precept that is emanated by ẓannī evidence: 
 
1. The first explanation is that when a mukallaf has ambiguous knowledge 
of Sharīʿa precepts, he is required to take recourse to the procedural 
principle of iḥtiyāṭ and is unable to apply the procedural principle of 
barā’a. This is because the mukallaf has certain knowledge – as 
opposed to initial doubt (shakk al-badawī) – that the Divine Lawgiver 
has issued certain Sharīʿa precepts, however he is unsure of what 
exactly these Sharīʿa precepts are, as he only has ẓannī knowledge and 
thus “ambiguous” knowledge (ʿilm al-ijmālī) of them304. For instance, 
in the hypothetical example of when a mukallaf has ẓann that the Friday 
congregational prayer is obligatory as opposed to the afternoon prayer, 
he has ambiguous knowledge that ‘a prayer’ is obligatory, and thus in 
such a case he cannot apply the procedural principle of barā’a and 
conclude that he is exempted from prayers. 
 
However, Shaykh Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl al-Shaharkānī, in his commentary of 
Muẓaffar, argues that not all Uṣūlīs agree with the claim that a mukallaf 
has ambiguous knowledge in cases when he has no access to detailed 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. He points out that in accordance with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
304 For more clarification on the distinction between initial doubt (shakk al-badawī) and 
ambiguous knowledge (ʿilm al-ijmālī), and how the former necessitates recourse to the 
procedural principle of barā’a, whereas the latter necessitates recourse to the procedural 
principle of iḥtiyāṭ, see Chapter One. 
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Qummī, in the context of insidād bāb al-ʿilm wa-l ʿilmī, since a 
mukallaf only has access to ẓannī knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, he 
can technically take recourse to the procedural principle of barā’a, and 
thus be excused from every responsibility by discarding it. Qummī 
explains that this is because it is not possible to attain any knowledge – 
even ambiguous knowledge – from evidence that gives mere ẓann. 
Rather, he maintains that knowledge of any kind can only sufficiently 
be emanated by evidence that gives qaṭʿ. Consequently, evidence that 
gives rise to ẓann merely emanates initial doubt, and as a result the 
procedural principle of barā’a becomes active305. 
 
For instance, if there are two cups, and a person has ẓann that one of the 
two cups contains alcohol, then in such a case it cannot be concluded 
that he has ambiguous knowledge, for he does not know with certainty 
that even one of the cups definitely contains alcohol. Thus, the person 
has initial doubt and can take recourse to the principle of barā’a and 
drink from either of the two cups, as opposed to taking recourse to the 
principle of iḥtiyāṭ and abstaining from drinking from either cup. 
 
In summary, the mainstream Uṣūlīs maintain that in the situation of 
insidād, a mukallaf has ambiguous knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, and 
thus cannot discard following and acting in accordance with them. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
305 See Shaharkānī, al-Mufīd fi sharḥ uṣūl al-fiqh, p. 46; this is also pointed out by Anṣārī, see 
Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, p. 190!
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However, Qummī argues that this claim is inaccurate as a mukallaf 
does not have ambiguous knowledge, but rather he has initial doubt and 
thus takes recourse to the principle of barā’a over the principle of 
iḥtiyāṭ. Nonetheless, it is important to note that although Qummī is 
technically accurate, he still maintains that a mukallaf is not justified 
from discarding any responsibility; the reason for this assertion is 
possibly due to the following two explanations. 
 
2. The second explanation is given in Anṣārī’s Farāiʾd al-uṣūl. In 
accordance with Anṣārī, there is an ijmāʿ (consensus) amongst the 
Shiites that establishes that it is not possible for the mukallaf to discard, 
or be exempt from, following Sharīʿa precepts merely because they are 
known through ẓannī evidence. He explains: 
 
[There is a] certainty-bearing consensus (al-ijmāʿ al-qaṭʿī) that 
the point of reference is not [to take recourse] to exemption 
(barā’a) in the case when it is assumed that the door of 
knowledge is closed (insidād bāb al-ʿilm) and [in the case 
when] it is not possible to specifically substantiate evidence for 
the epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) of isolated reports (akhbār al-
āḥād)306. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
306 Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, p. 185 
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Anṣārī explains that this qaṭʿī ijmāʿ is derived from a detailed 
examination of the jurisprudential works of his Uṣūlī predecessors and 
contemporaries, who have indirectly argued that it is not permissible for 
a mukallaf to claim that he does not have any responsibility (taklīf) to 
follow and act in accordance with Sharīʿa precepts simply because they 
have not been explicated to him with proper disclosure. In fact, Anṣārī 
goes as far as clarifying that the majority of scholars (ʿulamāʾ) 
explicitly maintain that ẓann replaces ʿilm in cases where there is no 
access to knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts307. 
 
Based on this understanding, it can be argued that the existence of such 
ijmāʿ is sufficient in suggesting that there was a consensus amongst 
Anṣārī’s predecessors that access to knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts was 
“closed”. Otherwise it does not make any sense to claim that a mukallaf 
is not permitted to discard knowledge of any Sharīʿa precepts that have 
not been fully disclosed, because if a mukallaf had access to Sharīʿa 
precepts through either certainty-bearing evidence or substantiated 
ẓannī evidence, then there is no reason for him to take recourse to any 
ẓannī evidence that has not been substantiated. Accordingly, this ijmāʿ 
provides a counterattack to the legal epistemology that is maintained by 
post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs, whose discourse aims to maintain the non-validity 
of ẓann qua ẓann, and insists solely upon the epistemic validity of ẓann 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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al-khāṣ. Indeed, it is questionable that if ẓann al-khāṣ is the only 
epistemologically valid ẓann that can be used in the juristic derivation 
of Sharīʿa precepts, then why did Anṣārī’s predecessors take recourse to 
ẓann qua ẓann in their juristic derivation? It can possibly be suggested 
that this was due to the occurrence of a paradigm shift in legal 
epistemology during the pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlī and post-Anṣārī Uṣūlī period. 
The former claimed that there was no access to knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts as the “door of knowledge was closed,” and thus there was no 
choice but to take recourse to ẓann al-muṭlaq or ẓann qua ẓann. 
Meanwhile, the latter argue that there is access to knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts, because the Divine Lawgiver Himself has substantiated 
certain evidence that gives rise to ẓann al-khāṣ, and as such has 
postulated them to be on the same epistemic pedestal as qaṭʿ/ʿilm.  
 
Moreover, it can also be argued from Anṣārī’s aforementioned quote 
that when the Uṣūlīs discuss the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq, 
they are only concerned with the epistemic validity of isolated reports 
(akhbār al-āḥād) as opposed to the epistemic validity of evidence qua 
evidence that gives rise to ẓann. The reason for this is two-fold; firstly, 
the aforementioned quote specifically mentions “isolated reports”. 
Indeed, if the category of “ẓann al-muṭlaq” was to include a wider 
range of ẓannī evidence, then it makes no sense for Anṣārī to only 
mention a specific ẓannī evidence. Secondly, it is found that post-
Anṣārī legal epistemology makes a distinction between insidād al-kabīr 
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and insidād al-ṣaghīr308. The former refers to instances where the 
theory of insidād is applied to substantiate the epistemic validity of 
ẓann al-muṭlaq, whereas the latter refers to instances where the theory 
of insidād is applied to specifically substantiate the epistemic validity 
of the isolated report. For example, after detailing evidence from the 
Qurʾān, sunna and ijmāʿ in Qawānīn al-uṣūl, Qummī proposes the 
theory of insidād as an evidence that he believes is the most 
comprehensive in substantiating the epistemic validity of the isolated 
report309. Therefore, the post-Anṣārī distinction between insidād al-
kabīr and insidād al-ṣaghīr also suggests that pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs were 
predominantly concerned with only substantiating the epistemic 
validity of the isolated report through the theory of insidād, as opposed 
to substantiating the epistemic validity of other alternative evidence that 
also gives rise to ẓann. 
 
This once again supports the argument that since most of the juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts was obtained from the isolated report, the 
sole purpose of legal epistemology – if not legal theory as a whole – 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
308 See Ṣanqūr, Muʿjam al-uṣūl vol. 1, pp. 375-376; Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 25-26 
309 It must be noted that although Qummī uses the theory of insidād to specifically substantiate 
the epistemic validity of khabar al-wāḥid, he unlike other Uṣūlīs does categorically state that it 
also substantiates the epistemic validity of the apparent in indication of the Qurʾān and ijmāʿ. 
However, as shown in Chapter One, since Qummī restricts the subject matter of Uṣūlī 
epistemology to the four-fold characterisation of evidence, he from the outset establishes that 
knowledge of Sharīʿa norms cannot be attained through a wider range of evidence, but rather 
can only be attained through the Qurʾān, sunna, ijmāʿ and ʿaql. Therefore, he categorically 
promotes the theory of insidād to only substantiate the ẓann that is produced from the four-fold 
characterisation of evidence. See Qummī, Qawānīn vol. 1, pp. 47-48 and Qawānīn vol. 2 pp. 
420-458. 
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was to substantiate its epistemic validity310. However, at this juncture, 
it can conversely be suggested that the Uṣūlīs used the theory of insidād 
for substantiating the epistemic validity of the isolated report because 
this was the only ẓannī source available that indicated knowledge of 
Sharīʿa precepts at that time. In contrast, every other ẓannī source that 
potentially indicated Sharīʿa precepts, such as qiyās, was superseded by 
qaṭʿī evidence that established its non-validity. 
 
In essence, it is possible to assert that ambiguous knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts has emanated from the isolated reports that are not 
substantiated by qaṭʿī evidence. Consequently, when Anṣārī claims that 
there is an ijmāʿ in accordance with which it is impermissible for a 
mukallaf to not follow and act in accordance with Sharīʿa precepts that 
have not been explicated with proper disclosure, he is referring to those 
Sharīʿa precepts that are explicated in the form of the isolated report. 
 
3. The third explanation is also given in Anṣārī’s Farāiʾd al-uṣūl. In 
accordance with this explanation, when a mukallaf takes recourse to the 
principle of barā’a after having ambiguous knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts, he necessarily exits from the folds of religion (khurūj ʿan al-
dīn). Ansari elaborates that in cases where a mukallaf follows and acts 
in accordance with his ambiguous knowledge i.e. by performing iḥtiyāṭ, 
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310 See Chapter Four 
!!! 294!
he has certainty that he has fulfilled his responsibility as a Muslim. 
Conversely, when a mukallaf fails to follow or act in accordance with 
his ambiguous knowledge i.e. by applying barā’a, then he has certainty 
that he has not fulfilled his responsibility as a Muslim. Anṣārī notes that 
in accordance with the “great teachers”, a mukallaf who limits his 
obedience to those Sharīʿa precepts that are known with certainty, and 
abandons those Sharīʿa precepts that he does not know with certainty, is 
not considered as a Muslim311. They claim that this is because there is 
no doubt that there are only a few known Sharīʿa precepts, whereas 
there are many unknown Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
In order to substantiate his claim, Anṣārī refers to many of his 
predecessors and contemporaries by pointing out that this view is also 
found in the renowned works of the likes of Shaykh al-Ṣudūq (d. 
381/991), Muḥaqiq al-Ḥillī (d. 676/1277), ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī etc.312. For 
instance, he highlights: 
 
And ʿAllāma, in [his work entitled] Nahj al-mustarshidīn in the 
topic of establishing the infallibility (ʿiṣma) of the Imams has 
[also] said that he upon whom is peace (i.e. the Imam) is 
necessarily the safeguard (ḥāfiẓ) of the precepts (aḥkām), for 
indeed the Book (al-Kitāb) and [Prophetic] sunna do not give !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
311 Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, p. 185 
312 ibid pp. 186-188 
!!! 295!
the details [of Sharīʿa precepts], and exemption (barā’a) will 
lead to nullifying all the precepts313. 
 
Anṣārī suggests that the aforementioned statement demonstrates that 
ʿAllāma has highlighted that the majority of Sharīʿa precepts are 
unknown, and since it is wrong to apply the principle of barā’a and be 
exempt from all responsibility, it is incumbent upon a person to accept 
the infallibility of the Imams. Indeed, if a person does not do so, then he 
necessarily would not be considered to be a part of the religion, as 
within the Shiite tradition, the acceptance of the Imams is one of its 
fundamental tenants. 
 
Nonetheless, Anṣārī’s claim that in accordance with the great teachers 
there are only a few known and many unknown Sharīʿa precepts once 
again reinstates the argument that the notion of insidād bāb al-ʿilm wa-l 
ʿilmī appears to have been widely accepted by Anṣārī’s predecessors. 
 
Therefore, an amalgamation of all three of the aforementioned explanations 
provides sufficient evidence in establishing this premise, inasmuch as it proves 
that a mukallaf has ambiguous knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, and that it is not 
permissible for him to discard this knowledge by applying the procedural 
principle of barā’a. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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5.4.3 The Third Premise 
 
In accordance with this premise, if the first premise - i.e. the claim of insidād 
bāb al ʿilm wa-l ʿilmī - and the second premise - i.e. that there is ambiguous 
knowledge and that it cannot be discarded - are both accepted, then it follows 
that a mukallaf has no choice but to act in accordance with one of the following 
options: 
 
1. He can undertake taqlīd (imitation) of another mukallaf - or more 
precisely a mujtahid - who upholds the belief that the door of 
knowledge is “open” (infitāḥ), and as a result maintain that the other 
mukallaf has access to knowledge that he does not have. 
 
2. He can take recourse to the procedural principle of iḥtiyāṭ, and dissolve 
his ambiguous knowledge by being cautious and enacting every action 
he has ẓann or shakk of. 
 
3. He can follow and act in accordance with the ẓann he has of Sharīʿa 
precepts, and in cases where he has no ẓannī knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts, he can take recourse to the procedural principles (al-uṣūl al-
ʿamaliyya). 
 
In Muẓaffar’s analysis of this premise, he discusses the invalidity of the first 
two options, and then moves on to discuss the third option as part of the fourth 
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premise of the theory of insidād. With regards to the first option, Muẓaffar 
claims that: 
 
The imitation (taqlīd) of another [who maintains belief] in the door of 
knowledge being open (infitāḥ bāb al-ʿilm) is not permissible. For 
indeed, if it is assumed that a mukallaf believes in insidād then how is it 
right for him to refer to someone who in accordance with him is 
mistaken314. 
 
It is found that the likes of Anṣārī and Khurāsānī also conform to this 
understanding, and conclude that it is impermissible for a person who believes 
that the door of knowledge is closed to refer to or imitate a person who 
believes that the door of knowledge is open315. They both maintain that 
although an ignorant person (al-jāhil) should refer and imitate a knowledgeable 
person (al-ʿālim), in this case such reference and imitation makes no sense as it 
is not possible for person A, who for instance is ignorant but fundamentally 
believes that there is no access to knowledge, to imitate person B, who for 
instance is a knowledgeable person but believes that there is access to 
knowledge, for Person A knows that person B is wrong in maintaining such a 
belief. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
314 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 28 
315 See Khurāsānī, Kifāyat al-uṣūl vol. 1, p. 95; Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, pp. 194-196  
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Anṣārī further supports this stance by claiming that there is al-ijmāʿ al-qaṭʿī 
where all Shiite scholars have unanimously concurred that it is impermissible 
for a person who believes that there is no access to knowledge to refer to a 
person who believes that there is316. Therefore, the first option of this premise 
is collectively ruled out by both pre-Anṣārī and post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs. 
 
Nevertheless, with regards to the second option, Muẓaffar claims that: 
 
[Concerning] taking recourse to iḥtiyāṭ, it indeed necessitates intense 
hardship (al-ḥaraj) and difficulty (al-ʿusr), [and] rather it necessitates 
the disorder of society (ikhtilāl al-niẓām)317. 
 
This understanding is akin to the aforementioned third theory that was 
proposed by Sayyid Ṭabāṭabāʿī to prove the epistemic validity of ẓann al-
muṭlaq. Like Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Muẓaffar too concludes that it is impermissible to 
take recourse to the procedural principle of iḥtiyāṭ as it causes hardship, 
difficulty and social disorder, however unlike Ṭabāṭabāʿī, he evidently does 
this in the context of the theory of insidād. 
 
Khurāsānī explains the relationship between hardship, difficulty and social 
disorder by elaborating that taking recourse to iḥtiyāṭ becomes impermissible 
for a mukallaf when hardship (ḥaraj) and difficulty (ʿusr) reaches a stage !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
316 See ibid, p. 194 
317 Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al- fiqh vol. 2, p. 28 
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where it cause social disorder for him318. In other words, if the mukallaf is 
always preoccupied in being cautious and making sure that he has fulfilled 
every possible responsibility (taklīf) then this can lead to negatively affecting 
his day-to-day social life. Consequently, undertaking iḥtiyāṭ can prove to be 
too difficult for him, and as discussed previously, the legal maxims of la ḥaraj 
and la ʿusr fi-l dīn overrule the procedural principle of iḥtiyāṭ. 
 
 
5.4.4 The Fourth Premise 
 
Continuing on from the third premise, if it is accepted that following one of the 
first two aforementioned options is void, then the fourth premise of the theory 
of insidād concludes that a mukallaf – by default – has no choice but to accept 
the third option. Accordingly, he is required to follow and act in accordance 
with the ẓann he has of Sharīʿa precepts, and in light of this premise, it is found 
that although post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs accept that bāb al-ʿilmī is “open”, they too 
accept that if the aforementioned three premises are proven to be true, then 
reason necessarily substantiates the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq319. 
This effectively implies that a mujtahid is able to use any evidence that 
emanates ẓann of Sharīʿa precepts in the process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
318 See Khurāsānī, Kifāyat al-uṣūl vol. 2, p. 95 
319 See Anṣārī, Farāiʾd al-uṣūl vol. 1, pp. 209-211; Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, pp. 28 
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except for those that he knows with certainty have been prohibited, such as 
qiyās320. 
 
It is vital to note that similarly to the second theory, in accordance with this 
premise, whenever there is ẓann of something there is also room for doubt 
(shakk) of its opposite, as doubt is only alleviated when there is certainty. 
Therefore, the existence of ẓann always has two sides (aṭrāf); it either has a 
most preferred side (rājiḥ) or a least preferred side (marjūḥ), whereby the latter 
is doubt, and whenever a mukallaf has ẓann of a Sharīʿa precept, the principle 
of tarjīḥ al-marjūḥ ʿalā ’l-rājiḥ qabīḥ would rationally lead to the judgment 
that it is blameworthy (qabīḥ) for him to follow and act in accordance with the 
least preferred side of ẓann – which is shakk - of a Sharīʿa precept. Rather, he 
must follow and act in accordance with the most preferred side. 
 
Nevertheless, in accordance with the theory of insidād, taking recourse to the 
procedural principles (uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya) is only effective in those cases where 
there is not any ẓann of Sharīʿa precepts321. As discussed, the theory of insidād 
proposes that the ẓann that is emanated from the isolated report is 
epistemologically valid, and thus a mukallaf can follow and act in accordance 
with its indication. Owing to the fact that the isolated report is deemed as being 
epistemologically valid, its indication effectively dissolves most of the 
ambiguous knowledge that a mukallaf has of Sharīʿa precepts. Accordingly, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
320 Ibid.!
321 Ibid, p. 29 
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mukallaf is at a position where he only has to take recourse to the procedural 
principles to dissolve any remaining ambiguous knowledge that has not already 
been resolved by the indication of the isolated report. Thus, according to the 
Uṣūlī proponents of the theory of insidād, when no ẓann is found, recourse to 
the procedural principles could be taken, to the extent that a mukallaf is even 
permitted to apply the principle of barā’a to dissolve his remaining ambiguous 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, as this would not take him outside the folds of 
religion. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
It is apparent that amongst all the theories that establish the epistemic validity 
of ẓann al-muṭlaq, the theory of insidād provides the most comprehensive 
argument, and post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs have not been able to disagree with any of its 
fundamental premises with the exception of the first premise. It is apparent that 
the reason behind their disagreement with the first premise is because post-
Anṣārī Uṣūlīs have unanimously accepted that there is access to knowledge or 
qaṭʿ of Sharīʿa precepts. As such, they have exerted maximum effort in 
establishing a legal epistemology that accepts ẓann al-khāṣ (especial 
conjecture) that has been substantiated by the Divine Lawgiver Himself, which 
is held at the same epistemic pedestal as certain knowledge. 
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However, although post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs unanimously accept the epistemic 
validity of ẓann al-khāṣ, the same cannot be said about pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs. This 
chapter has established that not all pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs have maintained that 
there is access to qaṭʿ or knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts and thus they have not 
wholly agreed upon the epistemic validity of ẓann al-khāṣ. As a result, some 
pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs have not strictly abided by the primary axiom of the non-
validity of ẓann qua ẓann, but rather have displayed a tendency to accept the 
epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq or ẓann qua ẓann in their juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
Undoubtedly, this clearly demonstrates that the acceptance of ẓann qua ẓann – 
as opposed to just ẓann al-khāṣ – is not an unfamiliar concept within the Shiite 
tradition. Furthermore, it emphasises that it was not farfetched for the Akhbārīs 
to conclude that the Uṣūlī acceptance of ẓann was due to their legal theory 
being significantly influenced by the Sunni discourse. 
 
Nevertheless, accepting the theory of insidād and thus recognising the 
epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq is not entirely sufficient in establishing the 
epistemic validity of the utilisation of a wider range of evidence in the juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. As elucidated in this chapter, although the 
theory of insidād upholds every evidence that gives ẓann as being 
epistemologically valid unless its non-validity is proven by qaṭʿī evidence, in 
the context of the pre-Anṣārī jurisprudential discourse, the only ẓannī source 
that was actually available was the isolated report of the maʿṣūm. In light of 
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this, it would be fanciful, and indeed rather inaccurate, to decisively claim that 
if pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs had access to a wider range of evidence that gave ẓann of 
Sharīʿa precepts other than just the isolated report, then they would have 
necessarily extended the theory of insidād to also prove their epistemic 
validity.  
 
This claim is supported by the fact that the theory of insidād – or any other 
theory that endeavours to establish the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq – 
does not make any distinction between evidence that gives ẓann and evidence 
that gives more ẓann (ghalabat al-ẓann). Whilst it concludes that when a 
mukallaf finds no ẓann, he must refer to the procedural principles (uṣūl al-
ʿamaliyya), the theory does not provide guidance of what a mukallaf is required 
to do should he find conflict between something that produces less conjecture 
and something that produces more conjecture. This again highlights that the 
theory of insidād was applicable in a context where the only ẓann that needed 
substantiating was that which was emanated from the isolated report. This is 
because if there were other sources that also emanated ẓann of Sharīʿa 
precepts, then rather then only establishing that a mukallaf has to give 
preference (tarjīḥ) to ẓann (or the rājiḥ) over shakk (marjūḥ), the theory of 
insidād would also clarify whether he is required to give preference to an 
evidence that produces more ẓann over an evidence that produces less ẓann. 
 
It can be concluded that the practical application of the theory of insidād was 
never centred upon substantiating ẓann qua ẓann; rather its function was 
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restricted solely to the substantiation of ẓann that was emanated from the 
isolated report. Therefore, it is implausible to extend its scope in order to 
substantiate the epistemic validity of a wider range of evidence that is available 
in the present day context. Nonetheless, it has become apparent from this 
chapter that there has been a paradigm shift in the discourse of Uṣūlī legal 
epistemology, inasmuch as prior to Anṣārī, not all Uṣūlīs unanimously held the 
belief that bāb al-ʿilmī was open, and that they had access to ẓann al-khāṣ. 
However, during the post-Anṣārī period, Uṣūlīs have unanimously maintained 
that bāb al-ʿilmī is open, thus indicating that Sharīʿa precepts can only be 
derived from ẓann al-khāṣ or qaṭʿī evidence. ! !
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The Shiite jurisprudential discourse of legal epistemology has witnessed 
various paradigm shifts. Due to the access the Shiites had to the impeccable 
(maʿṣūm) Imams, the initial development of their legal epistemology occurred 
significantly after the legal epistemology that was maintained within the 
mainstream Sunni tradition. A polemical encounter with the mainstream 
tradition ensured that Shiites originating from the formative era upheld a 
distinct understanding of legal epistemology that distinguished and sanctified 
their juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts (or aḥkām al-Sharīʿa) from the 
conventional Sunni derivation. 
 
The fundamental epistemological underpinning, or the primary axiom, that was 
unwaveringly maintained during the formative period comprised of the non-
validity of ẓann (conjecture) in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. As 
elucidated from this research, by strictly abiding to the primary axiom, the 
Shiites denied the epistemic validity (ḥujjiyya) of any evidence that merely 
emanated ẓann – or ẓannī (conjectural) knowledge – of Sharīʿa precepts, and 
this particularly consisted of the evidence that was used in the mainstream 
juristic derivation. Instead, the Shiites argued that evidence could only be used 
if it emanated qaṭʿ (certainty) – or qaṭʿī (certain) knowledge – of Sharīʿa 
precepts. 
 
This epistemological paradigm upheld during the formative period of Shiite 
legal epistemology was however transitory. The emergence of evolving social 
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factors, combined with the influence of the highly effective combination of 
formal logic and traditional epistemology that was offered in Sunni legal 
theory, led to the initial Shiite epistemological standpoint undergoing a 
significant transformation. The legal theory proposed by ʿAllāma is recognised 
as being pivotal in creating the first epistemological paradigm shift in the 
Shiite jurisprudential discourse, which resulted in the emergence of the Uṣūlī 
School, and the distinct feature that set the Uṣūlī School apart from the 
formative Shiite tradition was its acceptance of ẓann in the juristic derivation 
of Sharīʿa precepts. Nonetheless, the findings of this research reveal that during 
this period, the legal epistemology proposed by adherents of the Uṣūlī School 
was divided. On one hand, certain Uṣūlīs supported the epistemic validity of 
ẓann al-muṭlaq (conjecture qua conjecture), and thus argued for the epistemic 
validity of any evidence, even if it provided ẓannī knowledge of Sharīʿa 
precepts. On the other hand, other Uṣūlīs took a more cautious approach and 
claimed that evidence was only epistemologically valid (ḥujja) in the juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts if its utility was permitted by the Divine 
Lawgiver (Shāriʿ). 
 
Although the Uṣūlī tradition maintained a substantial stronghold on Shiite 
seminary circles for a significant period of time, this ambiguity that existed 
within the Uṣūlī opinion is found to be the key cause behind creating the 
second epistemological paradigm shift in the Shiite jurisprudential discourse. 
This time it was the adherents of the Akhbārī School who brought about this 
transformation, as they condemned the Uṣūlīs for blindly basing their discourse 
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of legal theory on mainstream Sunni legal theory, and as a result were failing to 
adhere to the Shiite primary axiom of the non-validity of ẓann. Based on this 
criticism, the Akhbārīs maintained that knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts could 
only be derived from evidence that emanated or produced qaṭʿ. As such, the 
predominant tendency displayed by the Akhbārīs was an acceptance of the 
epistemic validity of the reports (akhbār) that revealed the sunna (tradition) of 
the maʿṣūm as a valid source of knowledge, and a rejection of the epistemic 
validity of every other evidence - in particular the non-textual evidence – that 
was deemed as being ẓannī. 
 
However, the legal epistemological paradigm initiated by the Akhbārīs was 
once again modified following the re-emergence of the Uṣūlī tradition, and the 
third and final paradigm shift is largely attributed to Anṣārī. It is noted that as 
Anṣārī’s legal theory entitled Farāiʾd al-uṣūl, alongside other prominent legal 
theories of his contemporaries, are currently studied at different levels within 
Shiite seminaries studies, the Shiite jurisprudential discourse has continued to 
operate within the epistemological standard set forth by post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs 
until the present day. 
 
Owing to the fact that post-Anṣārī legal theory has been formed around the 
criticism posed by the Akhbārīs, it sensitively accepts the primary axiom of the 
non-validity of ẓann. In fact, the likes of Muẓaffar have gone as far as arguing 
that the Akhbārīs wrongly criticised the Uṣūlīs, as the Uṣūlī tradition has never 
accepted the epistemic validity of ẓann. As a result, a distinct feature of post-
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Anṣārī legal epistemology has been its insistence on the epistemic validity of 
evidence that either emanates qaṭʿ or ẓann al-khāṣ (especial conjecture). As 
indicated, the Uṣūlīs have tactfully reasoned that the epistemic validity of the 
latter type of evidence is established or substantiated by the Divine Lawgiver 
Himself. In other words, although such evidence only produces ẓannī 
knowledge, the Divine Lawgiver permits its utility in the juristic derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts, and thus He allows a mujtahid to discard the primary axiom 
when “especial” evidence is available. 
 
From analysing the various epistemological paradigm shifts that have occurred 
in the Shiite jurisprudential discourse, it becomes apparent that the Shiites have 
resolutely endorsed the epistemic validity of the sunna of the maʿṣūm that is 
reported in the form of khabar al-wāḥid (the isolated report). Although the 
isolated report was rejected in the formative period, as it merely emanated 
ẓannī knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, this dismissal was almost immediately 
retracted as a result of the efforts made by Ṭūsī. Since then, by operating 
within the limits set by each of the paradigm shifts, both the Uṣūlīs and the 
Akhbārīs have endeavoured to give different argumentations and justifications 
to establish or substantiate the epistemic validity of the isolated report. 
 
Unlike the Akhbārīs, the Uṣūlīs have unanimously accepted that the isolated 
report produces ẓannī knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. Accordingly, within the 
parameters set forth in the epistemic paradigm created by pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs, 
the epistemic validity of the isolated report was at times justified or 
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substantiated by taking recourse to theories that established the epistemic 
validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq in the juristic derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. 
Meanwhile, within the limits of the epistemic paradigm created by post-Anṣārī, 
or contemporary, Uṣūlīs, the epistemic validity of the isolated report has been 
substantiated on the basis that it produces especial conjecture that is approved 
by the Divine Lawgiver.  
 
As elucidated, knowledge – irrespective of whether it is deemed as being qaṭʿī 
or ẓannī – that is emanated from the isolated report is considered as the most 
widely utilised evidence from which the majority of Sharīʿa precepts or fiqh 
are inferred. Accordingly, it is not improbable to conclude that the purpose of 
every epistemic paradigm shift that occurred within the Shiite jurisprudential 
discourse was primarily to provide a stronger justification for the epistemic 
validity of the isolated report. This understanding somewhat supports the 
argument that the function of uṣūl al-fiqh is nominal, in that it only 
systematically justifies pre-occurring Sharīʿa precepts that are found in the 
works of fiqh, as opposed to providing a theoretical framework that governs 
how Sharīʿa precepts or fiqh ought to be derived. 
 
Nonetheless, in line with the definition of uṣūl al-fiqh that is stipulated in the 
contemporary discourse, its function is clearly to present a systematic 
framework that specifies the key principles that can be used in the juristic 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. This definition – at least theoretically – 
maintains that the role of uṣūl al-fiqh is not solely restricted to justifying pre-
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existing fiqh, but instead also comprises of being able to provide continuous 
solutions towards establishing what fiqh ought to be in altering contexts. In 
light of the epistemological underpinnings offered by this framework, the post-
Anṣārī Uṣūlī discourse unwaveringly maintains that fiqh should only be 
derived from evidence that either emanates qaṭʿ or ẓann al-khāṣ of Sharīʿa 
precepts, and hence any evidence that emanates ẓann qua ẓann is rejected. In 
practical terms, if a mujtahid is to utilise one or both of the former two types of 
evidence, then he is granted with excusability and will not be held accountable 
or be subject to chastisement, even if by following the evidence he is led to act 
in contradiction to the objective reality (wāqiʿī). On the other hand, if he is to 
utilise the latter type of evidence, then the mujtahid cannot be granted with 
excusability, but rather is held accountable and subjected to chastisement. 
 
In order to support and preserve the primary epistemological underpinning, or 
the primary axiom, of the non-validity of ẓann qua ẓann, the post-Anṣārī 
discourse offers rational argumentation and certain textual evidence, in 
particular the verse of the Qurʾān that states: “Verily, ẓann does not take the 
place of truth322.” In line with the ʿAdliyya theological understanding, the 
majority of post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs collectively agree that the Divine Lawgiver acts 
in the same way as rational human beings, as He is the Chief of all rational 
beings (ra’is al-ʿuqalā). Accordingly, in theory, reason (maqām al-thubūt) 
judges that it is blameworthy (qabīḥ) for a master, whether human or divine, to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
322 Qurʾān 10:36 
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hold a servant – or a mukallaf – accountable without fully explicating the duty 
(taklīf) that is required from him. Apart from this mainstream rational 
understanding, a second rational observation is proposed by Ṣadr and the 
adherents of the School of ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa. As highlighted in Chapter Two, Ṣadr 
rejects the mainstream position, and alternatively establishes that reason only 
judges the non-validity of ẓann at a practical level (maqām al-ithbāt) and not at 
a theoretical level. 
 
In summary, it is evident that there is discrepancy amongst the contemporary 
Uṣūlīs regarding the rational argument that is used to establish the primary 
axiom. Nonetheless, it is unanimously agreed that the verses of the Qurʾān that 
prohibit following and acting in accordance with ẓann are irshādī (instructive), 
inasmuch as the Uṣūlīs admit that the Divine Lawgiver is simply instructing – 
in the sense of re-affirming - the Muslims of an obligation that their reason 
independently arrives at. Indeed, by rendering the verse as irshādī, 
contemporary Uṣūlīs ascertain the fact that the primary axiom is not viewed as 
a theological dictum of faith, but rather is a concept that is purely rational or 
epistemological. 
 
This research has clarified that the rational arguments used to establish the 
non-validity of ẓann are based upon the contemporary Uṣūlī understanding of 
the concept of bayān al-tām or qaṭʿ, which effectively indicates that following 
and acting in accordance with ẓann or conjectural knowledge is invalid when 
one has access, or the choice, to use qaṭʿ or evidence that is fully explicated by 
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the Divine Lawgiver. Therefore, as a result of the epistemic paradigm 
established by Anṣārī, post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs have maintained a further 
epistemological underpinning – or what can be categorised as the second 
fundamental epistemological underpinning of contemporary Uṣūlī legal theory 
- which is based upon the essential epistemic validity of qaṭʿ (ḥujjiyyat al-qaṭʿ). 
 
In the contemporary Uṣūlī discourse, qaṭʿ is defined as being synonymous to 
ʿilm and yaqīn, and as a result the Uṣūlīs concur that whenever a person has 
qaṭʿ of a Sharīʿa precept, his or her qaṭʿ always accurately corresponds to the 
objective reality (wāqiʿī), or that which is in the Mind of the Divine Lawgiver. 
They argue that this is because qaṭʿ (or certainty) by its very nature possesses 
the essential properties of kashfiyya (disclosure) and ṭarīqiyya (reflectiveness), 
and thus at the level of conception (taṣawwur) it always accurately reflects the 
objective reality. In light of the essential properties of qaṭʿ, post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs 
have offered various rational arguments to establish its epistemic validity in the 
realm of Sharīʿa. Following the ʿAdliyya understanding of rational 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness (al-ḥusn wa-l qubḥ ʿaqlī), the 
overriding opinion amongst post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs is that the property of epistemic 
validity is necessarily correlated to the essence of qaṭʿ, and thus it is 
praiseworthy – or obligatory – to follow and act in accordance with it. 
 
In contrast, the later generation of post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs have instead chosen to 
conclude that the property of epistemic validity is not essential to qaṭʿ, but 
rather is postulated. On one hand, scholars such as Ṣadr and his contemporaries 
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have advocated the theory of ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa, which proposes that ‘epistemic 
validity’ is postulated by the Divine Lawgiver due to Him being the Creator 
(khāliq) and the Proprietor (mālik) of all existence, and since the Divine 
Lawgiver deserves the right of obedience, it is obligatory to follow and act in 
accordance with qaṭʿ. On the other hand, scholars including Iṣfahānī and 
Muẓaffar explain that epistemic validity is a property of qaṭʿ that is postulated 
by the convention of rational people (banā’ al-ʿuqalā’), and consequently they 
maintain that since the Divine Lawgiver is the Chief of all rational people, He 
like other rational people also judges qaṭʿ to be epistemologically valid. 
 
In essence, it is concluded that all contemporary Uṣūlīs – or for that matter, all 
Uṣūlīs – are of the opinion that qaṭʿ is epistemologically valid, and thus the 
Uṣūlī School advocates that it is obligatory for a mujtahid to follow and act in 
accordance with qaṭʿ in his derivation of Sharīʿa precepts. This epistemological 
underpinning paves the way for a further epistemological underpinning that is 
maintained in the post-Anṣārī Uṣūlī discourse. The third epistemological 
underpinning of contemporary Uṣūlī legal theory is the epistemic validity of 
especial conjecture (ḥujjiyyat al-ẓann al-khāṣ). 
 
Although post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs uphold the primary axiom of the non-validity of 
ẓann, a distinct feature of their legal epistemology is that they maintain the 
epistemic validity of conjecture – or more precisely especial conjecture – that 
has been permitted by the Divine Lawgiver. As it has been substantiated by 
qaṭʿī evidence, especial conjecture can be used in the juristic derivation of 
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Sharīʿa precepts, as its substantiation indicates that there is no room for any 
doubt that the Divine Lawgiver has permitted a mujtahid to act in accordance 
with that particular ẓannī evidence. However, from the critical analysis 
undertaken on Muẓaffar’s substantiation of the especial conjecture that is 
produced from the isolated report, this research has revealed that there is a 
significant lack of sufficient proof for each of the “qaṭʿī” evidence he presents 
to substantiate its epistemic validity. 
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that in accordance with Muẓaffar’s presentation 
of evidence – which in fact is the evidence presented by all contemporary 
Uṣūlīs – there is no absolute qaṭʿ, ʿilm or yaqīn from the Divine Lawgiver that 
substantiates the epistemic validity of the isolated report, and enables a 
mujtahid to follow and act in accordance with it. This however poses a major 
setback for the Uṣūlīs, as the most largely used evidence from which Sharīʿa 
precepts are extrapolated are the isolated reports that reveal the sunna of the 
maʿṣūm. It becomes apparent that this concern was indeed raised by certain 
pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs, and thus rather than arguing for the epistemic validity of 
particular substantiated evidence that produces especial conjecture, they 
claimed the epistemic validity of conjecture qua conjecture (ẓann al-muṭlaq) 
itself.  
 
At first glance, a key implication of the pre-Anṣārī acceptance of ẓann al-
muṭlaq appears to be that a wider range of evidence that potentially reveal 
knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts - whether certain or conjectural in nature – 
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becomes epistemologically valid in the juristic process of the derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts. However, this proposition cannot be directly attributed to the 
pre-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs, for it seems that the only conjectural evidence they intended 
to authenticate through substantiating the epistemic validity of ẓann al-muṭlaq 
was the isolated report. As such, in order extend the pre-Anṣārī understanding 
to include a wider range of evidence, it would first need to be proved that pre-
Anṣārī jurists had access to, and validated, evidence other than the isolated 
report that produced ẓann of Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
It becomes evident that as an outcome of the second and the third 
epistemological underpinnings discussed thus far, the contemporary Uṣūlī 
discourse has theoretically restricted the utilisation of evidence in the 
derivation of Sharīʿa precepts to only those which emanate qaṭʿ or ẓann al-
khāṣ. Indeed, this research reveals that the fundamental epistemological 
foundations have evolved following each paradigm shift that has occurred 
within the Shiite jurisprudential discourse. Nonetheless, it is debatable whether 
these developments have occurred as a result of the endeavours undertaken by 
Shiite scholars to provide stronger justifications for why certain evidence is 
pre-assumed to be epistemologically valid, or whether they have attempted to 
adhere to their definition of legal theory and sincerely evaluate the validity of 
each evidence available in light of the epistemological developments made 
over time.  
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However, irrespective of this, this research has highlighted that the 
epistemological underpinnings that have been maintained in contemporary 
Shiite legal theory have made various assumptions. Undoubtedly, if it is 
accepted that the purpose of legal theory is to provide a systematic framework 
that effectively acts as a tool for deriving fiqh that is able to deal with the 
continuous challenges and questions that are posed by evolving societies, then 
it is imperative that these assumptions are also evaluated against measures such 
as relevance and accuracy in the current day context. 
 
The fundamental assumption that is incorporated within the contemporary 
Uṣūlī discourse relates to the accuracy of sense perception. As highlighted in 
Chapter Three, post-Anṣārī Uṣūlīs recognise that qaṭʿ – in the context of ʿilm 
or yaqīn – always essentially discloses and reflects the objective reality. This is 
based on the view that at the level of conception (taṣawwur), the mind - of a 
person who possesses certainty – apprehends a particular proposition, whereby 
the sensory organs send a message to the mind so that it can accurately cognise 
and apprehend the simple concept or immaterial form of the subject or the 
predicate of that particular proposition, and thus acquire knowledge of it. 
However, as this research has explicated, the assumed accuracy of the mind’s 
faculty of sense perception is in fact questionable, as it is found that an 
individual’s sensory organs can lead to potentially deceiving him or her at the 
level of conception. Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that sense 
perception can at times be inaccurate in disclosing or reflecting the objective 
reality. 
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The position held by the Uṣūlīs can be described as being akin to the 
epistemological theory of naïve realism. In accordance with the naïve realists, 
the mind’s faculty of sense perception has the capacity to provide direct or 
complete awareness of the objective reality or external world323. As one of the 
first proponents of naïve realism was Aristotle324, it can be insinuated that this 
view was first introduced within the realms of the Muslim tradition during the 
period it witnessed a significant influx of Greek works. Aspects of Greek 
philosophical and epistemological deliberations, in particular Aristotle’s formal 
logic, were adopted and developed in the Muslim jurisprudential discourse, and 
it is evident that the Uṣūlīs have remained dedicated in upholding what can 
essentially be described as Aristotelian naïve realism until the present day. 
 
In contrast to naïve realism, the discourse of philosophy, or more precisely 
epistemology, discusses the theory of representative realism. Representative 
realists argue that the mind is not able to directly experience the objective 
reality or external world through its faculty of sense perception; rather, the 
sensory organs only facilitate in providing ideas or representations of the 
objective reality. This theory is based on the notion that the mind’s faculty of 
sense perception is in fact fallible; however, instead of taking a skeptical 
approach and wholly denying the possibility of attaining any knowledge of the 
objective reality, representative realism suggests that the mind is able to gain !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
323 For more information on naïve realism see Olson, Robert G. A Short Introduction to 
Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967) pp. 21-22 
324 Irwin, Terence H. Aristotle’s First Principle (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 26 
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knowledge of the objective reality, in the sense that it constantly interprets the 
representations that it derives from its faculty of sense perception325. 
 
The theory of representative realism is popularly attributed to prominent early 
modern philosophers such as Rene Descartes (d. 1650) and John Locke (d. 
1704) 326 , who recognised the fallibility of sense perception in their 
epistemology. However, it is important to note that the overriding influence of 
any form of naïve realism was essentially brought to an end following the 
inception of quantum theory in the discourse of physics. Prior to the findings of 
quantum theory, the discourse of physics – or natural sciences – proposed that 
it was possible to determine the nature of the external world with certainty, 
inasmuch as the mind was able to inductively determine how the external 
world behaves through the use of sense perception. However, after examining 
the behavior of particles at an atomic and sub-atomic level, quantum physics 
concluded that it is not possible to determine the behavior of the external world 
at a microscopic level, thus effectively establishing that sense perception 
cannot lead to complete certainty327.  
 
The findings of quantum theory have been adopted in the present day 
contemporary discourse of philosophy, and as an alternative to the theories of 
naïve realism and representative realism, it also advocates numerous epistemic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
325 For more information on representative realism see Olson, A short introduction to 
Philosophy, pp. 22-30 
326 Ibid. pp. 25-30 
327 See Hawking, Stephen W. A Brief History of Time (New York: Batman Books, 1998), pp. 
38-44 
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theories that consider the concept of how the mind acquires knowledge of the 
objective reality or external world, whilst maintaining the underlying feature of 
the fallibility of sense perception328. Indeed, a detailed examination of these 
contemporary epistemic theories is beyond the remit and scope of this research, 
however what becomes apparent is that naïve realism, or the notion of having 
certainty – or qaṭʿ – in the form that it has been described in the contemporary 
Uṣūlī discourse is a concept that is no longer widely accepted in modern 
epistemology. 
 
It is clear from the findings of this research that the assumption of the accuracy 
of sense perception is not religious or theological, but rather it is purely 
epistemological. As pointed out by Khumaynī, in order to avoid convoluting 
the discourses, the discussions that pertain purely to the discourse of 
epistemology – or as he suggests, the discourses of logic or philosophy – 
should only be considered as a subject matter of that particular discourse, and 
as such omitted from the discourse of uṣūl al-fiqh. If Khumaynī’s 
understanding is to be maintained, then it necessarily follows that matters that 
are purely epistemological in nature must be taken as basic presumptions 
(mabādī al-taṣdīqiyya) in uṣūl al-fiqh. As a result, it is imperative that the 
assumption of the accuracy of sense perception is revisited in light of new 
discoveries made in contemporary epistemology. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
328 For a comprehensive study on contemporary epistemology and its theories of knowledge 
see Pollock, John L. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd edn. (Totowa NJ: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1999) !
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Interestingly, even if one was to disagree with Khumaynī’s understanding, the 
same implications arise. For instance, if it is alternatively claimed that as the 
primary function of uṣūl al-fiqh is to provide a systematic framework for 
arriving at knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, it is necessary that discussions that 
are purely epistemological must also be discussed within it, then this would 
imply that since the assumption of the accuracy of sense perception is not 
religious or theological, it must be constantly appraised and renovated in Uṣūlī 
legal epistemology. 
 
In essence, irrespective of the stance one takes, it is evident that meta-legal 
epistemological developments cannot be ignored in the Muslim jurisprudential 
discourse. As Aristotelian epistemology was at one stage significantly 
inaugurated within the Shiite jurisprudential discourse, it is visible that the 
Shiite tradition – in particular during the era of ʿAllāma and his contemporaries 
– was previously more open to adopting and incorporating innovations and 
developments from other sciences. Furthermore, it is highly feasible to 
conclude that the innovative progress being made in the Shiite jurisprudential 
discourse was put to an end following the Akhbārī onslaught targeted towards 
the Uṣūlīs. As a result, the contemporary Uṣūlī discourse has remained 
defensive in its approach to legal epistemology, by instead choosing to focus 
on proving that the Akhbārīs have misconstrued the Uṣūlī position.  Indeed, 
rather than endeavoring to produce a systematic framework that enables a 
mujtahid to derive Sharīʿa precepts based on a legal epistemology whose 
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epistemic underpinnings are founded on new developments made in 
epistemology, contemporary Uṣūlīs – despite establishing that the whole 
discourse of legal epistemology is in fact rational – have striven to justify how 
their legal epistemology is in sync with the Shiite legal epistemology that 
existed in the formative era. This highlights that apart from producing a 
systematic framework, a key concern of the Shiite jurisprudential discourse 
was to maintain its legitimacy and authority within Shiite seminary circles. 
 
In summary, a critical study of the theories, findings and developments 
proposed in contemporary epistemology regarding the fallibility of sense 
perception, and the potential implications this may have on the contemporary 
Shiite jurisprudential discourse, is imperative, however this is beyond the 
scope of this research. Nevertheless, if the fundamental Uṣūlī assumption of 
the accuracy of sense perception was to be re-evaluated against the concept of 
the fallibility of sense perception that is widely maintained within 
contemporary epistemology, then it is undisputable that the key 
epistemological underpinnings of Uṣūlī legal theory would be transformed 
substantially.  
 
Firstly, and most critically, by upholding the fallibility of the mind’s faculty of 
sense perception, the epistemological underpinning of the epistemic validity 
(ḥujjiyya) of qaṭʿ in the realm of legislation would be curtailed. As discussed, 
the popular understanding amongst contemporary Uṣūlīs is that the property of 
epistemic validity is essentially related to qaṭʿ, and thus it is praiseworthy, and 
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consequently obligatory, to follow and act in accordance with its indication. 
However, as soon as sense perception is deemed as being fallible, it is no 
longer possible to propose that the property of epistemic validity is essentially 
related to the essence of qaṭʿ, because in line with the Uṣūlī understanding, it is 
impossible for a person to ever have qaṭʿ about the objective reality if his or 
her sense perception does not, at the level of conception, accurately reflect or 
disclose it. Accordingly, it is clear that if qaṭʿ is nonexistent then by priority so 
is its essential property of epistemic validity, as it cannot be deemed as 
praiseworthy, and consequently obligatory, to follow and act in accordance 
with something that does not exist. 
 
The less popular understanding amongst the contemporary Uṣūlīs is that the 
property of epistemic validity is postulated to qaṭʿ, either due to the convention 
of rational people (banā al-ʿuqalā), or because it has been directly postulated 
by the Divine Lawgiver Himself. Similarly to the aforementioned case, if due 
to the fallibility of sense perception, qaṭʿ is nonexistent, then by priority it is 
not possible for the convention of rational people to agree that it is obligatory 
to follow and act in accordance with something that is nonexistent, nor can the 
right of obedience (ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa) that is possessed by the Divine Lawgiver 
create an obligation upon a mukallaf to do so. 
 
Secondly, by maintaining the fallibility of the mind’s faculty of sense 
perception, the epistemological underpinning of the epistemic validity of ẓann 
al-khāṣ would be affected. As shown, in line with the contemporary Uṣūlī 
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thought, ẓann al-khāṣ is only recognised as being epistemologically valid if it 
is substantiated by qaṭʿ. However, if qaṭʿ is found to be nonexistent, then the 
epistemic validity of ẓann al-khāṣ cannot be substantiated and held as a 
legitimate source of law. 
 
If it is ascertained that there is no access to qaṭʿ nor ẓann al-khāṣ of Sharīʿa 
precepts, a mukallaf can take a skeptical approach and discard following or 
acting in accordance with any Sharīʿa precept, on the basis that he cannot attain 
any knowledge of them, or conversely he can choose to accept the knowledge 
of Sharīʿa precepts that is emanated from evidence that gives sheer ẓann. As 
established in Chapter Five, the former option is negated due to the fact that 
there is ambiguous knowledge (ʿilm al-ijmālī) of Sharīʿa precepts that is 
emanated from ẓannī evidence. This is based on Anṣārī’s argument, which 
upholds that there is an ijmāʿ that claims that a mukallaf cannot discard 
following Sharīʿa precepts because he has ambiguous knowledge, and if he did, 
then the mukallaf necessarily exits from the folds of religion (khurūj ʿan al-
dīn). Accordingly, preference must be given to the latter option of following 
and acting in accordance with evidence that only give ẓann. In essence, if it 
were acknowledged that the mind’s faculty of sense perception is fallible, then 
the third epistemological underpinning of the primary axiom of the non-
validity of ẓann qua ẓann that is currently maintained in the contemporary 
Uṣūlī discourse would be completely modified, as ẓann qua ẓann would now 
be recognised as epistemologically valid. 
 
!!! 324!
It can be concluded that if the assumption of the accuracy of sense perception 
is retracted from the contemporary Uṣūlī discourse, the potential effects on the 
aforementioned epistemological underpinnings are substantial and would 
essentially require the Uṣūlīs to revaluate and modify their whole discourse of 
legal epistemology. It is clear then that the only feasible way in which the 
Uṣūlīs would be able to maintain their existing legal epistemology is by 
seeking an alterative explanation to the current assumption of the infallibility 
of sense perception, which justifies their epistemological underpinnings, 
particularly of the existence and epistemic validity of qaṭʿ. However, proving 
the existence of qaṭʿ on the basis of a new justification is an extremely 
challenging task, and it is highly unlikely that a new theory that conclusively 
provides sufficient and sustainable proof will be attained.  
 
Therefore, if it is established that the existence and epistemic validity of qaṭʿ 
cannot be satisfactorily verified, then in line with the findings of this research, 
evidence of a ẓannī nature must be substantiated, and it is essential that the 
Uṣūlīs reintroduce a modified version of dalīl al-insidād to their legal 
epistemology. As discussed, in accordance with the pre-Anṣārī theory of 
insidād, the “door of knowledge is closed” as there is no access to evidence 
that either emanates qaṭʿ or ẓann al-khāṣ of Sharīʿa precepts; thus, the only 
evidence from which knowledge can be derived is that which emanates mere 
ẓann. 
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It is proposed that a modified version of the theory of insidād is reintroduced 
as opposed to the original theory that was advocated by certain pre-Anṣārī 
Uṣūlīs for two key reasons. Firstly, although the theory of insidād theoretically 
validates a wide range of evidence, this did not take place in practice within the 
pre-Anṣārī jurisprudential discourse; rather, its function was restricted to 
substantiating the epistemic validity of the isolated report alone. However, in 
the current context, there is a broader range of evidence that potentially reveal 
or emanate ẓannī knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, as if there is no access to qaṭʿ 
due to the fallibility of sense perception, then it follows that there is no qaṭʿī 
evidence that can negate the epistemic validity of any particular ẓannī 
evidence. Consequently, in the present day, knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts may 
not only be attained from the classical four-fold categorisation of evidence, but 
also from the traditional evidence that is commonly accepted in the mainstream 
Sunni discourse, such as qiyās (analogy), maṣlaḥa (public interest), istiḥsān 
(juristic preference), ʿurf (social custom) etc. Furthermore, in addition to the 
traditional evidence, findings from developments that have been made in the 
contemporary discourses of natural science and social science, together with 
the numerous hermeneutical methods that have been proposed by Muslim 
thinkers, can also act as evidence that potentially provides knowledge of 
Sharīʿa precepts. 
 
Secondly, since the pre-Anṣārī theory of insidād was only concerned with 
substantiating the epistemic validity of the isolated report, it does not provide 
guidance on how two or more conflicting evidence that provide ẓann of Sharīʿa 
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precepts may be reconciled. At most, the theory indicates that when ẓann 
cannot be found, or if there is conflict between the ẓann that is emanated from 
the isolated reports, one must resort to the procedural principles (uṣūl al-
ʿamaliyya). However, in the present day, as there is access to a wider range of 
evidence, it is plainly evident that certain evidence emanates more ẓann, whilst 
other evidence emanates relatively less ẓann. In other words, whilst some 
evidence produces more probable knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, other 
evidence produces less probable knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts, and a modified 
theory of insidād would dictate that preference (tarjīḥ) must be given to the 
more probable evidence – which is rājiḥ - over the less probable evidence –
which is marjūḥ. 
 
By implementing a modified theory of insidād, not only would a new method 
of deriving fiqh be established, but it would also create a vital opportunity to 
resolve the longstanding reservations that exist between the traditional 
understanding of Muslim law and the modern discourse of Human Rights. For 
instance, controversial Sharīʿa precepts concerning the rights of women and 
non-Muslims can be reassessed and re-derived in the current context through 
not only examining the conjecture that is produced from the apparent 
indication of the textual evidence from which they have originally been 
derived, but also from evaluating the conjecture that is produced by evidence 
found in social sciences such as psychology, political science, economics, 
anthropology, etc., which also provide evidentiary knowledge of such issues. 
Indeed, if when applying the modified theory of insidād, it is found that the 
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evidence that is provided by the sources of social sciences produces more 
conjecture or probability in comparison to the evidence from the textual 
sources, then the former evidence must be given more preference. 
 
This clearly illustrates that in addition to developing and incorporating a 
modified theory of insidād, changing the assumption of the accuracy of sense 
perception would also necessarily require the jurisprudential discourse to 
produce a criterion that can be used by a mujtahid to systematically decipher 
the level of probability that is produced from individual sources. Although a 
critical study of such a criterion is beyond the scope of this research, it is clear 
that this is of paramount importance to Uṣūlī legal theory, as if a modified 
theory of insidād becomes actuated as the key method of acquiring knowledge 
of Sharīʿa precepts, it is essential that a meticulous criterion is developed in 
order to aid a mujtahid’s decision over when to prefer to follow or act in 
accordance with one particular evidence over another. 
 
For instance, it is found that every Sharīʿa precept regarding the subject of 
apostasy is in fact derived from the sunna of the maʿṣūm that is transmitted via 
the conjectural textual evidence of the isolated reports. However, the 
conjecture that is produced from the apparent indication of such isolated 
reports evidently contradicts the conjecture that is produced from other 
evidence. For example, the isolated report from the Prophet states: “Whoever 
!!! 328!
changes his Islamic religion, kill him329.” The apparent indication – which is 
akin to a non-contextual indication – of this report, signifies the Sharīʿa precept 
of killing the apostate. However, undoubtedly it is highly questionable whether 
a mujtahid is justified in deriving a Sharīʿa precept that decides upon the life or 
death of a person by merely trusting the conjectural apparent indication that is 
produced from an isolated report. 
 
In accordance with the modified theory of insidād, such a justification can only 
be achieved if the conjecture produced from the aforementioned isolated report 
is not contradicted by other conjecture that is produced from other forms of 
evidence, but rather is supported.  Accordingly, it is found that the Qur’an too 
deals with the subject matter of apostasy in several verses, and although it 
describes that an apostate would be dealt in harsh terms in the hereafter, none 
of the verses prescribe or apparently indicate upon a worldly death penalty for 
the apostate. Therefore, by considering the aforementioned isolated report in 
light of the apparent indication of the verses of the Qur’an, it can be affirmed 
that the Qur’an, as an independent source of evidence, neither supports nor 
contradicts the isolated report. 
 
However, in his book entitled The Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, Rahman 
points out that there in fact is a significant amount of textual evidence, either in 
the form of verses or reports, which contrastingly indicate that it is forbidden to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
329 See Shah, Niaz A “Freedom of Religion: Kornaic and Human Rights Perspectives”, Asia-
Pacific Journal Human Rights and the Law 1.2 (2005) pp. 69-88 
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compel a person to join or re-join any religion, including Islam, and hence 
imply that only God reserves the right to judge and chastise an apostate330. In 
other words, there exists a clear conflict between the apparent indications of 
different textual evidence. On one hand, a group of reports and verses produce 
“conjecture”, which indicates that an apostate is deserving of worldly 
chastisement, whereas on the other hand a significant group of reports and 
verses produce “counter conjecture”, which indicates that an apostate is not 
deserving of worldly chastisement. 
 
A possible explanation for such contradiction between textual evidence is that 
the former group of evidence – i.e. the isolated report that prescribes worldly 
punishment for the apostate – is either fabricated, or it has been expressed in a 
particular context. In support of the latter option, it can be suggested that based 
on the conjecture produced in the discourse of Muslim history, or by historians, 
it is very likely that the aforementioned isolated report was expressed in the 
context when people used to convert to Islam just so that they could spy on the 
Prophet and the Muslims, and then revert back to their former religions331. 
Therefore, in accordance with the conjecture produced by this historical 
context, it is possible to deduce that the worldly chastisement issued by the 
Prophet was not in fact for apostasy or because a person decided to change 
their religious affiliation, but rather was in response to treason. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
330 See Rahman, S A. Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, (Malaysia: The Other Press Sdn Bhd, 
2006), pp. 133-135 
331 See Jordan, David A “The Dark Ages of Islam: Ijtihad, Apostasy, and Human Rights in 
Contemporary Islamic Jurisprudence” Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. 9.55 (2003) pp. 55-71; 
Shah, N “Freedom of Religion” pp. 81-82; Rahman, Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, p. 108 
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Moreover, a further evidence that substantially produces conjecture against the 
worldly chastisement for apostasy are the norms that have been acknowledged 
within the contemporary discourse of Human Rights. Article 18 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights produces conjecture that signifies that 
any form of worldly chastisement for apostasy acts against a person’s natural 
right of autonomy and religious freedom. 
 
Although this research is not directly concerned with how one type of 
conjecture is given preference over another, from analysing the matter of 
apostacy in line with the modified theory of insidād, it becomes apparent that a 
mujtahid cannot solely follow and act in accordance with the conjecture that is 
produced from the isolated report, but he must also take into account the 
counter conjecture that is produced from a wide range of other evidence. Only 
after considering every possible conjecture produced from a wider range of 
evidence can a mujtahid derive a specific precept. Thus, if a mujtahid was to 
hypothetically derive a Sharīʿa precept that an apostate is deserving of worldly 
chastisement, then he must justify his derivation by using strong evidence 
whose conjecture undermines the conjecture that is produced from any counter 
evidence. 
 
In conclusion, it becomes clear that the discourse of Uṣūlī legal theory can be 
extended to consider the epistemic validity of a wider range of evidence, which 
in turn may lead to potentially accepting a greater variety of sources of law in 
the derivation of Sharīʿa precepts.  However, this opportunity has been 
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crucially limited by the rational – or Aristotelian – assumption of the accuracy 
of sense perception that is currently acknowledged in Uṣūlī epistemology. 
Using this assumption as their basis, contemporary Uṣūlīs have arrived at key 
epistemological underpinnings that have effectively restricted the derivation of 
Sharīʿa precepts from just textual evidence alone. However, this research has 
revealed that since these epistemological underpinnings, and the assumption 
upon which they are based, are all rationally derived as opposed to being 
religious or theological in nature, it is possible to revaluate them against new 
findings and developments.   
 
Whilst the contemporary discourse of epistemology itself is not free from 
limitations, by taking an insiders perspective it is visible that the current 
epistemological assumption of the accuracy of sense perception needs to be 
replaced by a feasible assumption that is more widely accepted in the present 
day discourse of epistemology. Therefore, similarly to how historical changes 
in epistemological assumptions and underpinnings have demanded epistemic 
paradigm shifts within the Shiite jurisprudential discourse over the course of 
time, it is likely that an evaluation of the existing epistemological foundations 
will require a further paradigm shift. In summary, in order for Sharīʿa precepts 
to continually provide egalitarian instructions that direct proper conduct in all 
aspects of a human being’s life, and thus guide human beings to prosperity and 
perfection in both an individual and social-communal capacity, a process of 
constant revaluation and appraisal of epistemic standards in light of human 
advancements in other sciences is necessary. 
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Glossary 
 
ʿadl      justice   
 
aḥkām      precepts of Sharīʿa 
 
Ahl al-Bayt descendants from the family of 
the Prophet 
 
al-ḥusn wa-l qubḥ ʿaqlī intelligibility of praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness 
 
ʿaql      reason 
 
baḥth al-khārij graduate studies at Shiite religious 
seminaries 
 
banā’ al-ʿuqalā’    the convention of rational people 
 
bayān al-tām     full explication 
 
dalīl evidence or substantiated 
evidence 
 
fiqh jurisprudence or the corpus of 
derived sharia precepts 
 
ghalabat al-ẓann    preponderant conjecture 
 
ghayba     occultation 
 
ḥujja      epistemologically valid 
 
ḥujjiyya     epistemic validity 
 
ḥukm al-wāqiʿī  real Sharīʿa precept or primary 
Sharīʿa precepts that are in the 
Mind of the Divine Lawgiver. 
These precepts are derived from 
evidence that either emanates 
certainty or especial conjecture 
 
ḥukm al-ẓāhirī  apparent Sharīʿa precepts or 
secondary Sharīʿa precepts that 
provide a practical standpoint 
when the primary Sharīʿa precepts 
are unknown. These precepts are 
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derived from the procedural 
principles 
 
ḥusn      praiseworthiness 
 
ijmāʿ      consensus 
 
ijtihād the juristic process of deriving 
Sharīʿa precepts 
 
ʿilm      knowledge 
 
inkishāf     disclose 
 
istiḥsān     juristic preference 
 
istinbāṭ     inference or extrapolation 
 
jazm the psychological state that is 
acquired by a person when a 
person acquires knowledge (ʿilm) 
or believes he has certainty (qaṭʿ) 
of a thing 
 
kalām      the Muslim discourse of theology 
 
kashfiyya disclosure, is one the essential 
properties of certainty  
 
khabar al-wāḥid    isolated report 
 
mabāḥith al-ḥujja the discourse of legal 
epistemology found in the 
discipline of uṣūl al-fiqh 
 
manṭiq      the Muslim discourse of logic 
 
maqām al-ithbāt in practice, or in the realm of 
physical occurrence 
 
maqām al-thubūt in theory, or in the realm of 
logical possibility 
 
marjūḥ   less or least preferred 
  
maṣlaḥa     public interest 
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maʿṣūm impeccable – collectively refers to 
the impeccable Prophet and 
Imams 
 
muḥarrikiyya impulsion, a property of certainty 
in the realm of existence 
 
mujtahid     jurist 
 
mukallaf a Muslim who is endowed with 
the responsibility of enacting 
Sharīʿa precepts 
 
mutawātir   widely narrated report 
 
nafs al-amr actual fact, refers to something 
that exists in actual fact 
 
qāʿida fiqhiyya   jurisprudential maxim 
 
qaṭʿ certainty (also used in the context 
of jazm and yaqīn) 
 
qaṭʿī    certainty-bearing 
 
qawāʿid    general rules/maxims 
 
qubḥ    blameworthiness 
 
qubḥ al-ʿiqāb bi-lā bayān the blameworthiness of 
chastisement without explication 
 
ra’is al-ʿuqalā    Chief of all rational agents 
 
rājiḥ    most or more preferred 
 
ṣaḥīḥ    authentic isolated report 
 
shāriʿ      the Divine Lawgiver 
 
sunna the tradition of the infallible 
Prophet and Imams 
 
taklīf    endowment of responsibility 
 
taqlīd    to imitate a mujtahid 
 
ṭarīq    way/path 
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ṭarīqiyya reflection, one of the essential 
properties of certainty 
 
tarjīḥ    giving preference 
 
tarjīḥ al-marjūḥ ʿalā ’l-rājiḥ qabīḥ the blameworthiness of giving 
preference to the least preferred 
over the most preferred 
  
ʿurf    social custom 
 
uṣūl al-fiqh    legal theory 
 
wājib    obligatory sharia precept 
 
wāqiʿī     objective reality 
 
wujūb obligation, or obligatory nature of 
a sharia precept 
 
yaqīn certainty (qaṭʿ) that corresponds 
to the objective reality 
 
ẓann    conjecture, conjecture per se 
 
ẓann al-khāṣ    especial conjecture 
 
ẓann al-muṭlaq    conjecture qua conjecture 
 
ẓannī    conjectural 
 
 
 !
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